Case Number: 18PSCV00016 Hearing Date: November 28, 2018 Dept: J

Re: Virginia Murguia v. Jacqueline Hernandez, et al. (18PSCV00016)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Moving Party: Plaintiff Virginia Murguia

Respondents: No timely opposition filed

POS: See below

Plaintiff Virginia Murguia (“plaintiff”) is the 89-year-old mother of Defendant Jacqueline Hernandez (“Hernandez”). Plaintiff alleges that Hernandez has attempted to alienate Plaintiff from Plaintiff’s other children and grandchildren for the sole purpose of taking control of Plaintiff’s assets. Plaintiff alleges Hernandez hired attorney Craig Darling (“Darling”) purportedly for Plaintiff’s behalf to have multiple TROs taken out against Plaintiff’s children and grandchildren. Plaintiff further alleges that Hernandez tricked Plaintiff into signing over to Hernandez quitclaim deed to Plaintiff’s home located at 1715 Clover Street in La Verne and Plaintiff’s commercial property located at 4020 N. Figueroa Street in Los Angeles. The complaint, filed 10/15/18, asserts causes of action against Defendants Hernandez, Darling, Law Office of Craig A. Darling, All Persons Unknown, Claiming Any Legal or Equitable Right, Title, Estate, Lien, or Interest in the Properties Described in the Complaint Adverse to Plaintiff’s Title, or Any Cloud Upon Plaintiff’s Title Thereto and Does 1-20 for:

Quiet Title

Financial Elder Abuse

Fraud

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Conversion

Legal Malpractice

On 11/14/18, plaintiff’s “Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause Regarding Preliminary Injunction” was heard. The TRO was granted and an OSC re Preliminary Injunction was set for 11/28/18. Plaintiff was ordered to personally serve Hernandez with the summons and complaint, application for preliminary injunction, notice of the OSC and the order on or before 11/16/18 and to file the proof of service for all of these items on or before 11/19/18.[1] The court further ordered that Hernandez file any opposition on or before 11/20/18.

Plaintiff Virginia Murguia (“plaintiff”) seeks a preliminary injunction (1) prohibiting Defendant Jacquelyn Hernandez (“Hernandez”) and anyone acting on her behalf, from dissipating, diverting, converting, or wasting any funds, assets from plaintiff’s Union Bank Account ending in 3066, Wells Fargo Bank Accounts ending in 9215 and 3860, Chase Bank Account ending in 1397, Bank of America Account ending in 1717, and any additional accounts that belong to plaintiff and (2) precluding Hernandez, and anyone acting on her behalf, from removing, dissipating, diverting, or converting any property belonging to plaintiff or Greg Murguia that is currently located at or was, in the past six months, located at 1715 Clover Street, La Verne, CA 91750 (the “La Verne Property”).

On 11/7/18, plaintiff filed a proof of service, which reflected that Hernandez had been personally served with the summons and complaint, only, on 10/30/18.

However, no proofs of service were filed on or before 11/19/18; instead, on 11/21/18, plaintiff filed the Declaration of Scott Vuchsas (“Vuchsas”), who is employed by SECO Group, LLC (“SECO”), a security and investigations firm. (Vuchsas Decl., ¶ 1.) SECO was previously hired by plaintiff’s son, Michael Murguia (“Mike”), to try to locate plaintiff so that he could speak with plaintiff and know she was safe. (Id., ¶ 2.) During Vuchsas’ work on determining plaintiff’s whereabouts, he became familiar with Hernandez’s counter-surveillance behavior. (Id., ¶ 3.) Hernandez has a tendency to use multiple vehicles and to park those vehicles at separate locations in order to hide her whereabouts. (Id.). During the investigation, SECO found several addresses associated with Hernandez, including the La Verne Property, 1423 N. 2nd Ave., Upland, CA 91786 (“the Upland Address”) and 10808 Foothill Blvd., Ste. 160, Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730. (Id., ¶ 4.) Hernandez has kept her cars parked at the Upland Address and La Verne Property, often at the same time, on several occasions in order to hide her whereabouts. (Id.). SECO was contacted by plaintiff’s counsel in this case to serve Hernandez with the summons and complaint package (which included the summons and complaint, civil case cover sheet addendum and statement of location, notice of case assignment unlimited civil case and supplement to verified complaint). (Id., ¶ 6.) SECO had great difficulty locating Hernandez at any of the properties associated with her name and was convinced she was hiring to avoid any type of service. (Id., ¶ 8.)

SECO had uncovered Hernandez’s work address of 8253 White Oak Avenue, Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730 (“Work Address”) during the initial investigation, so on 10/30/18, Vuchsas went there to see if he could effectuate service on her. (Id., ¶¶ 8-9). Vuchsas was informed by an office worker of Hernandez’s employer that Hernandez would arrive at work later that day, so he parked his car nearby to wait for her. (Id., ¶ 9.) Hernandez arrived at the Work Address sometime after 5:00 p.m. (Id., ¶ 10.) When Hernandez arrived, Vuchsas observed her circling the parking lot in her car and could see her looking at each car parked in that lot. (Id.) After driving around the lot for a few minutes, Hernandez eventually parked and sat in her car. (Id.) Seeing that Hernandez was not leaving her car, Vuchsas pulled his car up behind her, got out of his vehicle and approached her window. (Id.) Vuchsas confirmed that it was Hernandez in the driver’s seat and he served her with the summons and complaint package. (Id.) In the process of doing so, Hernandez attempted to flee the scene and almost hit Vuchsas’ car in the process. (Id.) Since Hernandez could not leave without hitting Vuchsas’ car, she was unable to avoid service, which Vuchsas completed at 5:25 p.m. (Id.) as Vuchsas walked away from Hernandez’s vehicle, he saw Hernandez throw all the paperwork on the ground of the parking lot. (Id.).

On the afternoon of 11/14/18, SECO was again contacted by plaintiff’s counsel in order to serve Hernandez with the summons and complaint, application for preliminary injunction, notice of order to show cause and court’s 11/14/18 order re: TRO. (Id., ¶ 11.) On 11/15/18, Vuchsas spent a total of 10 hours surveilling the various addresses associated with Hernandez’s name and her Work Address. (Id., ¶ 13.) Vuchsas was advised that Hernandez had been picking up her and plaintiff’s mail at the U.S. Post Office’s branch in La Verne so he also conducted surveillance on that location. (Id.). He could not locate Hernandez. (Id.).

On 11/16/18, Vuchsas spent another 8 hours surveilling the various addresses associated with Hernandez’s name, her Work Address and the La Verne Post Office. (Id., ¶ 14.) He could not find Hernandez at any of these locations. (Id.) To date, SECO has not been able to locate and serve Hernandez with the documents pursuant to the court’s 11/14/18 order. (Id., ¶ 15). SECO is continuing its efforts to effectuate service until it is completed. (Id.)

“In case a temporary restraining order is granted without notice in the contingency specified in subdivision (c): (1) The matter shall be made returnable on an order requiring cause to be shown why a preliminary injunction should not be granted, on the earliest day that the business of the court will admit of, but not later than 15 days or, if good cause appears to the court, 22 days from the date the temporary restraining order is issued. (2) The party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall, within five days from the date the temporary restraining order is issued or two days prior to the hearing, whichever is earlier, serve on the opposing party a copy of the complaint if not previously served, the order to show cause stating the date, time, and place of the hearing, any affidavits to be used in the application, and a copy of the points and authorities in support of the application. The court may for good cause, on motion of the applicant or on its own motion, shorten the time required by this paragraph for service on the opposing party. (3) When the matter first comes up for hearing, if the party who obtained the temporary retaining order is not ready to proceed, or if the party has failed to effect service as required by paragraph (2), the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order…(5) Upon the filing of an affidavit by the applicant that the opposing party could not be served within the time required by paragraph (2), the court may reissue any temporary restraining order previously issued. The reissued order shall be made returnable as provided by paragraph (1), with the time for hearing measured from the date of reissuance…” CCP § 527(d).

The court will dissolve the TRO issued on 11/14/18 at the time of the 11/28/18 hearing. The court is inclined, based on the Vuchsas Declaration, to reissue the TRO previously issued, with an OSC to be set within the statutory time period set forth above. Plaintiff is to submit a new proposed order to the court prior to the 11/28/18 hearing date.

[1] On 11/7/18, plaintiff filed a proof of service, which reflected that Hernandez had been personally served with the summons and complaint on 10/30/18.