Filed 1/21/20 Min v. Min CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

YUNHEE MIN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRIS SUNG HOON MIN,

Defendant and Appellant.

B282863

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC584100)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ruth Ann Kwan, Judge. Affirmed.

Chris Sung Hoon Min, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

Michael R. Bennett for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________________

Yunhee Min sued her brother, Chris Sung Hoon Min, to quiet title to an apartment building on South Wilton Place that Yunhee, Chris and their now-deceased father, Byung Ok Min, had once owned as tenants in common. Following a two-day bench trial, judgment was entered in favor of Yunhee. Chris, representing himself, appeals the trial court’s overruling of his demurrer to Yunhee’s first amended complaint. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The History of the South Wilton Place Property
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At some point prior to 2003 Byung Ok Min acquired the South Wilton Place property, and in 2003 he gave Yunhee and Chris each a 15 percent interest in the property. Yunhee, Chris and their father held the property as tenants in common. Byung Ok Min died on February 18, 2015.

After her father’s death, Yunhee discovered two quitclaim deeds that had been recorded with the Los Angeles County Recorder on February 10, 2015: a quitclaim deed purportedly executed by Yunhee on November 22, 2013 conveying her 15 percent interest in the South Wilton Place property to Chris; and a quitclaim deed purportedly executed by Byung Ok Min on November 22, 2013 conveying his 70 percent interest in the property to Chris.

5. Yunhee’s Complaint and Chris’s Demurrer
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On June 22, 2015 Yunhee filed a lawsuit against Chris seeking to quiet title to the Wilton Place property. Yunhee also asserted causes of action for fraud/forgery, conversion and negligence. Her complaint alleged both quitclaim deeds were forgeries, and Yunhee and her father had not transferred their interest in the property to Chris in 2013. The fraud cause of action alleged Chris knowingly made false statements in connection with the forgeries, including presenting the false documents for notarization and recording.

Chris, who was represented by counsel in the trial court proceedings, demurred to the complaint, arguing as to the fraud cause of action that Yunhee had failed to allege fraud with the requisite specificity. Rather than oppose the demurrer Yunhee requested permission to amend the complaint to address issues raised by the demurrer.

On November 12, 2015 the trial court issued a tentative ruling, which it later adopted as its final order, sustaining Chris’s unopposed demurrer and granting Yunhee leave to amend all but her conversion causes of action. In ruling on the fraud/forgery cause of action the court found Yunhee had failed to allege fraud with the requisite specificity, stating she “did not identify each alleged misrepresentation made by Defendant, as well as, how, when, where, to whom, and by what means each misrepresentation was tendered.”

9. Yunhee’s First Amended Complaint and Chris’s Demurrer
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On December 11, 2015 Yunhee filed her operative first amended complaint alleging causes of action against Chris for forgery and negligence and to quiet title. The first cause of action, now titled “forgery” instead of “fraud/forgery,” alleged Chris knowingly forged the signatures on the quitclaim deeds with the intent to improperly deprive Yunhee and Byung Ok Kim of their interests in the South Wilton Place property.

Chris demurred to the first amended complaint, arguing as to the forgery claim that Yunhee had failed to address the court’s ruling requiring her to allege the misrepresentations made by Chris with specificity. To the extent Yunhee was attempting to abandon her fraud cause of action and reframe it as a cause of action for forgery, Chris argued the first amended complaint was insufficient because Yunhee had not obtained permission to add a new cause of action and forgery is not an independent cause of action.

The trial court issued a tentative ruling on February 16, 2016, which it adopted as a final order after a hearing on the same date, overruling the demurrer to the forgery and quiet title causes of action and sustaining the demurrer to the negligence cause of action. However, the court stated Yunhee’s forgery cause of action in fact stated a claim not for forgery, but for cancellation of written instruments. After reviewing the elements of a cancellation claim, the trial court found Yunhee had adequately alleged a claim for cancellation of the quitclaim deeds. Because the court construed the cause of action as one for cancellation, it rejected Chris’s argument Yunhee had failed to adequately allege fraud. The court also rejected Chris’s argument Yunhee had failed to obtain permission to add a new cause of action because the cancellation claim was based on the same general facts as the original fraud/forgery claim.

13. The Bench Trial
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The two-day bench trial commenced on November 7, 2016. The court heard testimony from Yunhee, Chris, the notary listed on the quitclaim deeds, one of the lender-defendants and a handwriting expert. The trial court issued a tentative decision, which ultimately became its statement of decision, ruling the signatures of Yunhee and Byung Ok Min on the quitclaim deeds recorded in 2015 were forgeries. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of Yunhee on April 7, 2017. The judgment stated the 2015 quitclaim deeds were cancelled and set aside; title to a 15 percent interest in the South Wilton Place property was quieted in the name of Yunhee; and a 70 percent interest in the property was quieted in the name of Byung Ok Min, to be administered by his estate. Chris filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review
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A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint. We independently review the trial court’s ruling on a demurrer and determine de novo whether the pleading alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action or discloses a complete defense. (Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1100; McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415.) We assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded and matters of which judicial notice has been taken. (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 20; Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) However, we are not required to accept the truth of the legal conclusions pleaded in the complaint. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126; Yhudai v. IMPAC Funding Corp. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1257.) We liberally construe the pleading with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1340; see Schifando, at p. 1081 [complaint must be read in context and given a reasonable interpretation].)

5. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Overruling the Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint
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Chris does not challenge the trial court’s findings after the bench trial or the resulting judgment. Instead he argues the trial court erred in overruling his demurrer to the forgery cause of action in the first amended complaint. In doing so, Chris repeats the same arguments made in his demurrer, in large part verbatim, contending forgery is not an independent cause of action, Yunhee had not obtained leave to add a new cause of action, and Yunhee had failed to allege any fraudulent activity with particularity.

Chris’s arguments on appeal entirely ignore the court’s ruling the first cause of action stated a claim for cancellation rather than fraud or forgery. It was on this basis that the court overruled the demurrer, and it was the cancellation claim that proceeded to trial and on which a judgment was rendered. Presuming the first amended complaint contained allegations supporting a cancellation claim, there was no error in the court’s recharacterization of the cause of action. (See Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38 [“[i]f the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer”]; accord, Lee Newman M.D., Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 73, 78-79 [trial court erred in sustaining demurrer when complaint adequately pled cause of action under California Uniform Commercial Code despite plaintiff’s labelling cause of action as common law negligence]; Saunders v. Cariss (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 905, 908-910 [trial court erred in sustaining demurrer because cause of action mislabeled as “fraud” stated a cause of action for professional malpractice].) Chris was on notice both before and after the trial that the court would be treating Yunhee’s first cause of action as one for cancellation. Chris has not argued he was unable to properly defend himself against Yunhee’s claims, nor has he identified any prejudice resulting from the court’s determination to treat the forgery cause of action as one for cancellation of written instruments.

Finally, the overruling of the demurrer was proper given the first amended complaint adequately stated a claim for cancellation of written instruments. Civil Code section 3412 provides a “written instrument, in respect to which there is a reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding it may cause serious injury to a person against whom it is void or voidable, may, upon his application, be so adjudged, and ordered to be delivered up or canceled.” Thus, to plead a right to cancellation under this section, a plaintiff must allege the instrument is “void or voidable” and would cause “serious injury” if not canceled. (Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 808, 818-819.) A deed will be declared void if the grantor’s signature is forged. (See La Jolla Group II v. Bruce (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 461, 477.)

Yunhee sought cancellation against Chris of the quitclaim deeds purporting to transfer her and her father’s interests in the South Wilton Place property to Chris. Yunhee alleged the deeds were void because the grantors’ signatures had been forged. Specifically, she alleged neither she nor her father had signed a quitclaim deed nor had they been present with the notary at the time of the alleged notarizations. She further alleged the notary’s record book did not include a reference to the notarizations of the deeds. These allegations were sufficient to state a claim for cancellation of written instruments, and the trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Yunhee is to recover her costs on appeal.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

ZELON, J.

FEUER, J.