Case Name: Gomez v. City of Mountain View, et al.
Case No.: 2016-1-CV-290705

This personal injury action arises from the arrest of plaintiff Alejandro Gomez (“Plaintiff”) on April 14, 2015, for a purported violation of the sex offender registration requirement in Penal Code section 290. Plaintiff has filed the first amended complaint (“FAC”) against defendants City of Mountain View (“Mountain View”), County of Santa Clara (“Santa Clara County”), State of California (“the State”), “John Doe Police Officer” (“Officer Doe”), and Does 1-25 (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that his arrest was wrongful because the court entered an order nunc pro tunc striking the registration requirement (“Recall Order”) in 2010. (FAC Attach. 1, p. 1 at ¶¶ 5-6, & Ex. C, p. 9.) Employees of the State and Santa Clara County allegedly failed to update databases to reflect the entry of the Recall Order and, as a result, he was arrested for failing to register as a sex offender and later found to be factually innocent of the charges. (Id., pp. 1-4 at ¶¶ 2-14 & p. 5 at ¶¶ 2-3.) Plaintiff also alleges that, during the arrest, the officers employed by Mountain View used excessive force and caused Plaintiff to sustain physical injuries. (Id., pp. 5-6 at ¶¶ 2-6, p. 6 at ¶ 2, p. 7 at ¶ 2, & p. 8 at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff allegedly presented timely government claims that have been denied and/or rejected. (E.g., id., p. 4 at ¶ 17.) Plaintiff asserts causes of action for: (1) false arrest (against Defendants); (2) false imprisonment (against Santa Clara County, the State, and Does 1 through 20); (3) excessive force (against Mountain View, Officer Doe, and Does 21 through 25); (4) battery (against Mountain View, Officer Doe, and Does 21 through 25); (5) negligence (against Mountain View, Officer Doe, and Does 21 through 25); and (6) violation of Civil Code section 52.1 (against Mountain View, Officer Doe, and Does 21 through 25).

The State demurs to the FAC as a whole and to each cause of action for failure to state a claim and makes a request for judicial notice in support thereof. (See Code Civ. Proc. [“CCP”], § 430.10, subd. (e).)

I. Judicial Notice

The State’s unopposed request for judicial notice of the records of Plaintiff’s claim filed with its Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (“the Board”) is GRANTED. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c) & (h); see also Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 369, fn.1 [stating that “[t]he court may take judicial notice of the filing and contents of a government claim, but not the truth of the claim”]; see also Ingram v. Flippo (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1285, fn.3 [providing that documents forming the basis of the allegations in a complaint are judicially noticeable, since “it is essential” for the court to “evaluate the complaint by reference to these documents”]; see also Gbur v. Cohen (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 296, 301 [stating that judicial notice is limited to relevant matters].)

II. Demurrer

Plaintiff asserts causes of action for false arrest and false imprisonment (first and second causes of action) against the State. (FAC Attach. 1, at pp. 1-5.) Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested and imprisoned as a result of the negligent failure by the State’s employees—including Does 1 through 20—to update databases that the State’s Department of Justice (“DOJ”) was obligated to maintain in order to reflect the entry of the Recall Order. (Id., at pp. 1-3 at ¶¶ 2-4 & 9-14.)

In support of the demurrer, the State argues that Plaintiff has not stated any claim against it based on violations of the U.S. Constitution or the California Constitution. (The State’s P&A, at pp. 6-10.) Although the FAC refers to alleged constitutional violations by Does 1 through 20—who allegedly acted as the State’s employees—Plaintiff clarifies in his opposition that he does not seek to impose liability against the State for the alleged constitutional violations. (See FAC Attach. 1, p. 3 at ¶ 15 & p. 4 at ¶ 3; see also Plaintiff’s Opp’n, at p. 8:7-13.) Thus, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against the State for constitutional violations.

Next, the State asserts that Plaintiff has not stated any cause of action against it pursuant to the Government Claims Act because (a) he did not comply with the claim presentation requirement or (b) otherwise plead facts to support a cause of action against a public entity. These issues are discussed below.

A. Claim Presentation Requirement

Before filing a civil action for damages against a public entity, the plaintiff must submit a government claim that includes a “general description” of the obligation, injury, or damage incurred. (Gov. Code, §§ 910, subd. (d) & 945.4.) The “facts underlying each cause of action in the complaint must have been fairly reflected in a timely claim,” and a “complaint is vulnerable to a demurrer if it alleges a factual basis for recovery which is not fairly reflected in the written claim.” (Stockett v. Assn. of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 447.) “Where the complaint merely elaborates or adds further detail to a claim, but is predicated on the same fundamental actions or failures to act by the defendants, courts have generally found the claim fairly reflects the facts pled in the complaint. ([Citation].)” (Ibid.) “Only where there has been a ‘complete shift in allegations, usually involving an effort to premise civil liability on acts or omissions committed at different times or by different persons than those described in the claim,’ have courts generally found the complaint barred. ([Citation].)” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff alleges that the State’s employees failed to fulfill their duties to input the Recall Order into databases that Mountain View’s officer reviewed to form the basis for Plaintiff’s arrest. (FAC Attach. 1, pp. 1-4 at ¶¶ 2-4 & 9-14.) The State contends that Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action based on its employees’ allegedly wrongful conduct because such allegations were not included in his government claim.

Plaintiff directed the same claim to Mountain View, Santa Clara County, the State, and the Board. (The State’s RJN, Ex. A; FAC, Ex. D.) In both the claim and the FAC, Plaintiff has asserted that he suffered injuries as the result of the false arrest and imprisonment caused by unidentified public employees upon the execution of an arrest warrant on April 14, 2016. (The State’s RJN, Ex. A; e.g., FAC Attach. 1, pp. 1-5.) Plaintiff has consistently alleged that the arrest was improper because the court entered the Recall Order striking his requirement to register as a sex offender on September 20, 2010, and he has attached copies of the Recall Order as exhibits. (The State’s RJN, Ex. A; FAC Attach. 1, p. 1 at ¶¶ 5-6, & Ex. C.) He has also consistently alleged that the false arrest was based on a warrant issued by the district attorney for Santa Clara County upon the request of a police officer employed by Mountain View. (The State’s RJN, Ex. A; FAC Attach. 1, p. 1 at ¶ 5 & p. 5 at ¶¶ 2-3.) In both the claim and the FAC, Plaintiff has submitted facts showing that the officer requested the warrant because he conducted a “records check” between January 16, 2015 and April 14, 2015, and that records check caused him to believe that Plaintiff was required to register as a sex offender and had failed to do so. (The State’s RJN, Ex. A; FAC Attach. 1, p. 2 at ¶ 8.) The FAC elaborates on the claim by alleging that the record check involved the State’s databases, and the State’s failure to update its records to reflect the Recall Order was a substantial factor that caused Plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment. (Id., pp. 1-3 at ¶¶ 2 & 9-14.) These explanatory allegations are fairly reflected in the claim. Therefore, for purposes of demurrer, Plaintiff has satisfied the claim presentation requirement.

B. Liability of a Public Entity

The Government Claims Act provides that, except as otherwise provided by statute, “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) By statute, a public entity may be vicariously liable for its employees’ acts or omissions (Gov. Code, § 815.2) or directly liable for breach of mandatory duty (Gov. Code, § 815.6). To state a cause of action, “every fact material to the existence of its statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity.” (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795.)

1. Direct Liability

A public entity may be directly liable for violating a mandatory duty under Government Code section 815.6. That statute provides: “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” (Gov. Code, § 815.6.)

Plaintiff alleges that the State’s employees acted negligently and Defendants are liable under Civil Code section 1714. (FAC Attach. 1, at pp. 1-3 at ¶¶ 2-4 & 11-16.) That statute sets forth the ordinary standard of care in a negligence action. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) Civil Code section 1714 does not impose any mandatory duty that may support a cause of action under Government Code section 815.6. (Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183.) Thus, Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action for direct liability against the State based on allegedly negligent acts or omissions in violation of Civil Code section 1714.

Plaintiff also states that Defendants are liable under Government Code sections 802, 815.2, 895, and 895.2. (FAC Attach. 1, at pp. 1-3 at ¶¶ 2 & 16.) Government Code sections 815.2 and 820 authorize claims based on the acts or omissions of public employees. Government Code sections 895 and 895.2 authorize public entities to enter into agreements to transfer functions and provide for joint and several liability. These statutes do not impose any mandatory duty against a public entity that could support a cause of action under Government Code section 815.6. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action for direct liability against the State based on Government Code sections 802, 815.2, 895, and 895.2.

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that the State’s agents had “ministerial duties” to maintain and update records in the databases maintained by the State’s Department of Justice (“DOJ”). (FAC Attach. 1, at pp. 1-3 at ¶¶ 2 & 9-11.) In opposition, Plaintiff cites Bradford v. State of California (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 16 (“Bradford”) for the proposition that the State has a mandatory duty to maintain criminal records and the failure to do so can result in false arrest. That court found that the State could be liable in a false arrest action under Government Code section 815.6 for violation of its mandatory duty under Penal Code sections 11116.6 and 11117 to record the dismissal of charges against the plaintiff. (Bradford, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d, at p. 21.) Penal Code section 11116.6 states that certain dispositions “must be entered on all appropriate records of the party arrested, detained, or against whom criminal proceedings are brought.” Penal Code section 11117 provides that the DOJ “shall add the reports received to all appropriate criminal records.” (Italics added.) No legal authority suggests that the DOJ has a mandatory duty to report information in criminal records that it did not receive. The plaintiff in Bradford alleged that the department of the State that was under a mandatory duty to report the dismissal had received notice of the order dismissing the charges. (Bradford, supra, 36 Cal.App.3d, at p. 18.) Here, in contrast, Plaintiff does not allege facts that could support the reasonable inference that the DOJ received notice of the Recall Order before his arrest. Plaintiff therefore has not pleaded that the State breached its mandatory duty. Furthermore, as discussed above, allegations related to the State’s breach of the duty to update the databases are not fairly reflected in Plaintiff’s claim. Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cause of action for direct liability against the State based on Penal Code sections 11116.6 and 11117.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cause of action for direct liability against the State pursuant to Government Code section 815.6.

2. Vicarious Liability

A public entity may be vicariously liable for its employees’ acts or omissions under Government Code section 815.2 “if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a).) Plaintiff alleges that his false arrest and imprisonment was caused by (1) the acts and omissions of Officer Doe and Does 21 through 25, who were employed only by Mountain View (FAC Attach. 1, p. 5 at ¶¶ 1-3); (2) the acts and omissions of Santa Clara County’s employees (id., pp. 1-4 at ¶¶ 2-4 & 10-16); and (3) the acts and omissions of its own employees (id., pp. 1-4 at ¶¶ 2-4 & 9-16). Since the Government Claims Act only permits a public entity to be held vicariously liable for its employees’ acts or omissions (see Gov. Code, § 815.2), Plaintiff cannot state a claim for vicarious liability against the State based on the acts and omissions of individuals employed only by Mountain View and/or Santa Clara County, including Officer Doe and Does 21 through 25.

As for the State’s employees, Plaintiff alleges that the employees acted negligently by failing to update databases maintained by the DOJ to reflect the entry of the Recall Order before his arrest. (See FAC Attach. 1, pp. 1-4 at ¶¶ 2-4 & 9-16.) “Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (b).) A public employee is generally liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person. (Gov. Code, § 820.) The existence and scope of a legal duty are questions of law for the court based on the foreseeability of the harm and a balancing of policy considerations. (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112-113; Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 552.) “A complaint which lacks allegations of fact to show that a legal duty of care was owed is fatally defective” and subject to demurrer. (Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1111.) The allegations show that Plaintiff seeks to impose a legal duty on the State’s employees at the DOJ who maintained the databases. (FAC Attach. 1, pp. 1-3 at ¶¶ 2 & 9-14.) As discussed above, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded facts to support a duty to update the databases under Penal Code sections 11116.6 and 11117 because he does not allege that the DOJ received notice of the Recall Order. Plaintiff further alleges that the State’s employees acted negligently under Civil Code section 1714, which sets forth the ordinary standard of care. (FAC Attach. 1, at pp. 1-3 at ¶¶ 2-4 & 11-16; see also Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) The risk of harm due to the omission of the Recall Order was not foreseeable to the DOJ employees, given that Plaintiff does not allege that the DOJ knew of the Recall Order. Policy considerations weigh strongly against imposing a duty on the DOJ employees to monitor court records to ensure that any registration order is still valid. Therefore, Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to support the existence of a legal duty owed by the State’s employees.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cause of action for vicarious liability against the State pursuant to Government Code section 815.2.

C. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, the demurrer will be sustained. The remaining issue is whether to grant leave to amend. The State contends that leave to amend should be denied because Plaintiff has not identified a proposed amendment. Although a plaintiff bears the burden to show how he or she could amend the complaint, it may be an abuse of discretion by a trial court if it were to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend “if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) If the plaintiff has not previously had an opportunity to amend in response to a demurrer, leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the pleading shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment. (City of Stockton v. Super. Ct. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.) Here, Plaintiff has not had a prior opportunity to amend in response to demurrer. The FAC does not show on its face that it is incapable of amendment. Thus, the State’s demurrer to the FAC as a whole and to each cause of action for failure to state a claim is SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND.