Case Number: BC527499 Hearing Date: May 05, 2016 Dept: 20

TENTATIVE RULING
This Tentative Ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such document will be considered by the Court.
Counsel may submit on the tentative ruling without appearing at the hearing. After conferring with each other about submitting on this tentative, moving party is to call the Judicial Assistant in Department 20 at (213) 633-0520 to report whether the parties are submitting. If the all parties submit, this tentative ruling will become the final ruling and it will be posted online with the minute order.
JUDGE DALILA C. LYONS
DEPARTMENT 20
________________________________________
Hearing Date: Thursday, May 05, 2016
Case Name: Drumea, et al. v. 1300 N. Curson Investors, LLC
Case No.: BC527499
Motion: Anti-SLAPP CCP § 425.16 Attorneys’ Fees & Costs
Moving Party: Defendant 1300 N. Curson Investors, LLC
Responding Party: UNOPPOSED
Notice: OK
________________________________________
Ruling: Defendant 1300 N. Curson Investors, LLC’s motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED in the amount of $19,863.50.
________________________________________

BACKGROUND

On November, 13, 2013, Plaintiffs Cecilia Drumea and Elena Drumea (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against Defendants 1300 N. Curson Investors, LLC (“Curson”) and Does 1 thorugh 10 alleging malicious prosecution (via unlawful detainer action), elder abuse, and unfair business practices.

Curson now moves for an award of attorneys’ fees after becoming the prevailing party regarding its anti-SLAPP motion filed on June 12, 2014. Curson moved to have the Plaintiffs’ Complaint dismissed on the grounds that that the Plaintiffs could not meet their statutory burden of showing they would probably success on their claims. On July 29, 2014, this Court granted Curson’s anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed the case on August 5, 2014. On March 26, 2015 the Court granted Curson’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $13,799.00. Plaintiffs appealed the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion and the order awarding attorneys’ fees, and ultimately the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal from the judgment as untimely and affirmed the post-judgment award of attorneys’ fees. Curson now moves for an award of its attorneys’ fees incurred in successfully defeating Plaintiffs’ appeal.

Curson request attorneys’ fees of $19,863.50 incurred on appeal of their successful anti-SLAPP motion. Curson argues as it is the prevailing party on the anti-SLAPP motion and the appeal taken therefrom, it is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees from the appeal. No opposition was filed.

ANALYSIS

A prevailing defendant as to a special motion to strike is entitled to mandatory, reasonable attorney fees and costs. Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141 -1142; CCP §425.16(c); Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Pro Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2011) ¶7:1120. The statute also permits recovery of costs and fees on an appeal from the court’s ruling on a section 425.16 motion: ¿A statute authorizing an attorney fee award at the trial court level includes appellate attorney fees unless the statute specifically provides otherwise.¿ Evans v. Unkow (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1499; Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 785.

A defendant who prevails on a special motion to strike and thereafter prevails on an appeal from that ruling is entitled to recover attorney¿s fees and costs on appeal in an amount determined by the trial court on remand. Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port District, (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1249; Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at 785.

“[T]he starting point of every fee award … must be a calculation of the attorney’s services in terms of the time he has expended on the case. Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.” In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal. App. 4th 1041, 1058 (quoting Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 322). Furthermore, in Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2001) 92 Cal. App. 4th 819, 833, the Court of Appeal stated: “[T]he primary method for establishing the amount of ‘reasonable’ attorney fees is the lodestar method. The lodestar (or touchstone) is produced by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate.” Under this approach, a base amount is calculated from a compilation of time reasonably spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48; Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.

Parties opposing motions for attorneys’ fees fail to show any abuse of discretion where they merely contend that amounts of attorneys’ fees are excessive without providing an analysis or factual support. Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1250; Avikian v. Wtc Fin. Corp. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1119; Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 560 (emphasizing that opposing parties “submitted no evidence that the hours claimed by counsel were excessive,” and declining to “declare as a matter of law that the hours were unreasonable”); Villanueva v. City of Colton (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1204 (opposing party “offered no evidence of any kind which might have warranted a reduced fee award.”). Trial courts properly may use equitable considerations to reduce the lodestar amount of attorney fees, including on the basis that certain fees were unnecessary. EnPalm, LLC v. The Teitler Family Trust, etc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 778.

The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts. PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134. “’[P]adding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.” Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 556.

Curson seems attorneys’ fees incurred in defeating Plaintiffs’ appeal of Curson’s successful anti-SLAPP motion in the amount of $19,863.50. See Goldman Decl., Exh. E. On July 29, 2014 the Court granted Curson’s anti-SLAPP motion and a formal order dismissing the case was entered on August 05, 2014. On March 26, 2015 the Court granted Curson’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $13,799.00. Plaintiffs appealed the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion and the order awarding attorneys’ fees, and ultimately the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal from the judgment as untimely and affirmed the post-judgment award of attorneys’ fees.

Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion. “A party who has not timely filed written opposition to a motion…may not be afforded an opportunity to offer oral argument at the hearing.” Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410. “The failure to file opposition creates an inference that the motion or demurrer is meritorious.” Id. “In such cases, the court may hear argument limited to a request for a continuance of the hearing in order to afford an opportunity for written opposition.” Id. “[T]he rule is patently intended to prevent the introduction of legal theories without prior notice to opposing counsel and the court.” Id.

Here, Curson’s submitted attorneys’ fees and costs are reasonable and Plaintiffs have not opposed the request in any manner.

Accordingly, Curson’s motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED in the amount of $19,863.50.