Case Name: Nicole Albaum v. Ravinderbal Singh, et al.
Case No.: 2014-1-CV-268097 (Consolidated with 2015-1-CV-281056)

(1) Motion by Defendants Saini Trucking, Inc. and Parminder Tambar to Strike Portions of the Second Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs Gail-Jean McGuire and Doug McGuire; and (2) Motion by Defendants Saini Bros Trucking, Inc., Ravinderpal Singh, and Surinder Banwait to Strike Portions of the Second Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs Gail-Jean McGuire and Doug McGuire

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs Gail-Jean McGuire and Doug McGuire (collectively “Plaintiffs”) are the parents of decedent Daniel McGuire, who was killed during his morning commute on State Route 17 “when a tractor hauling two fully loaded trailers caused the vehicle he was operating to roll-over.” (Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), ¶ 1.) The tractor and/or one or both of the trailers being hauled allegedly “had indicia of malfunction or poor maintenance particularly with the braking mechanisms of both trailers” and “the tractor and/or especially one or both trailers suffered brake failure, resulting in the loss of control of the combination and culminating in the death of Daniel McGuire.” (Id., at ¶ 2.)

At the time of the accident, the tractor was being operated by defendant Ravinderpal Singh (“Singh”) in the course and scope of his employment with defendant Saini Bros Trucking, Inc. (“Saini Bros”). (SAC, ¶ 4.) Saini Bros and defendants Saini Trucking (“Saini Trucking”), Surinder Banwait (“Banwait”), and Parminder Tambar (“Tambar”) owned and/or controlled the tractor and/or trailers. (Id., at ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs allege that Singh, Saini Bros, Saini Trucking, Banwait, and Tambar (collectively, “Defendants”) “negligently and carelessly owned, maintained, inspected, serviced, repaired, entrusted, operated, managed, and/or controlled said vehicles so as to allow one or more of said vehicles to be in an unsafe condition and/or so as to cause the tractor and/or one or more of the trailers to collide with the vehicle operated by Daniel McGuire.” (Id., at ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs further allege that Saini Bros, Saini Trucking, Banwait, and Tambar failed to: “properly screen, select, train, monitor, regulate[,] schedule and/or supervise [Singh] and/or to ensure that he was in compliance with all applicable Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations”; “ensure that they and/or that all companies hired and/or contracted by them properly [complied] with [Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations], hired or red drivers with the proper training and experience given the risks inherent in the business”; and “mandate updates on drivers employed by companies hired and/or leased by them to ensure that they are properly trained, experienced and in compliance with [Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations].” (Id., at ¶ 25.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs filed the operative SAC against Defendants, alleging causes of action for: (1) negligence; (2) negligent hiring, supervision, training and/or retention; and (3) unfair competition.

On June 3, 2016, Saini Trucking and Tambar filed a motion to strike portions of the SAC. Several days later on June 14, 2016, Saini Bros, Singh, and Banwait also filed a motion to strike portions of the SAC. Plaintiffs filed papers in opposition to both matters on July 6, 2016. On July 12, 2016, Defendants filed reply papers in support of their respective motions.

Discussion

Since substantial portions of the two motions before the Court are virtually identical, the substantive merits of the motions are addressed collectively below.

I. Requests for Judicial Notice

Saini Trucking and Tambar’s request for judicial notice of court documents filed in this case is GRANTED. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [permitting judicial notice of court records].)

Saini Bros, Singh, and Banwait’s request for judicial notice of court documents filed in this case is GRANTED. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [permitting judicial notice of court records].)

II. Procedural Issue

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs argue that the motion to strike by Saini Bros, Singh, and Banwait is untimely filed as it was filed more than 35 days after service of the SAC. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1) [a motion to strike any pleading must be filed “within the time allowed to respond to a pleading,” e.g., 30 days after service of the complaint], 1013 [“any period of notice and any right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be extended five calendar days, upon service by mail”].) While Saini Bros, Singh, and Banwait concede that the motion to strike was not timely filed, the Court has discretion to hear the motion on its merits. (See McAllister v. County of Monterey (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 253, 281-282 [there is no absolute right to have a pleading stricken for lack of timeliness in filing where no question of jurisdiction is involved and the late filing was a mere irregularity; the granting or denial of the motion is a matter which lies within the discretion of the court].) Given that Plaintiffs do not show that they were in any way prejudiced by the delay, the Court finds that hearing the motion to strike will not affect Plaintiffs’ substantial rights. Consequently, the Court will address the motion to strike on its merits.

III. Legal Standard

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 436, a court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted into any pleading or strike out all or part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from matters of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) In ruling on a motion to strike, the court reads the pleading as a whole, all parts in their context, and assuming the truth of all well-pleaded allegations. (See Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63 citing Clauson v. Super. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)

IV. Substantive Merits of the Motions

Defendants move to strike the request for punitive damages, the request for attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, and the third cause of action from the SAC.

A. Punitive Damages

Defendants argue that the Court should strike Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages because Plaintiffs do not plead sufficient facts demonstrating that they were aware of the probable dangerous consequences of their alleged conduct or that they deliberately failed to avoid the same.

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs seek punitive damages only from Saini Trucking and Saini Bros. (SAC, ¶¶ 21-22, Prayer, p. 16:15-16.) Thus, to the extent the motions to strike punitive damages are brought by Singh, Banwait, and Tambar, the motions are improper because punitive damages are not sought against them.

Accordingly, the motions to strike punitive damages are DENIED to the extent they are brought by Singh, Banwait, and Tambar.

The Court now turns to the merits of the motions as they pertain to Saini Trucking and Saini Bros. To survive a motion to strike a request for punitive damages, “the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled.” (Clauson v. Super. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) Punitive damages are permitted “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice ….” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) The statute defines “malice” as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Despicable conduct is conduct “ ‘so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.’ ” (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1050 quoting Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 331.) Additionally, to demonstrate conscious disregard, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct, and that the defendant willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. (Taylor v. Super. Ct. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896; Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1055.) Finally, a request for punitive damages against a corporation must allege that an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation was either personally responsible for the allegedly despicable conduct or that an officer, director; or managing agent of the corporation: (1) had advance knowledge of the despicable conduct and consciously disregarded it; or (2) authorized or ratified the despicable conduct. (See Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)

Here, Plaintiffs allege sufficient ultimate facts to demonstrate malice on behalf of Saini Trucking and Saini Bros. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Iqbal Tambar is the president and sole officer of Saini Trucking and the incorporator and secretary of Saini Bros; the subject vehicles suffered from long-standing deficiencies with respect to their braking systems; the subject vehicles posed an imminent danger to the public; a former truck driver for Saini Trucking and Saini Bros “detected and confirmed a problem relating to the [subject vehicles’] braking system necessitating repair prior to the collision”; Iqbal Tambar “refused to have the repairs performed due to the cost and insisted that the [subject vehicles] continue to be utilized”; “Iqbal Tambar admitted that he made certain decisions based exclusively on profits at the expense of safety”; “[p]rior to the subject collision, Iqbal Tambar willfully violated law requiring inspections and repair of commercial vehicles, aware of the probable injurious consequences of his conduct”; “Iqbal Tambar falsified reports that such inspections had been performed with qualifying results, including their mechanic’s report the day before this crash asserting that the brake system was fine”; “[p]rior to the subject collision, Iqbal Tambar instructed [Singh] and other truck drivers employed by [Saini Trucking and Saini Bros] to avoid CHP weigh/inspection stations in violation of [the Vehicle Code] due to the poor condition of his vehicles”; and “in relation to the hauling job [Singh] performed on [the date of the incident], Iqbal Tambar either explicitly or implicitly instructed [Singh] to drive through the dangerous mountainous terrain of State Route 17 instead of the quicker and flatter route of U.S. Route 101 because he knew that [the subject vehicles] would not pass inspection and would be ordered immediately out of service ….” (SAC, ¶ 21(a)-(c), (k).)

These allegations establish that the braking system of the subject vehicles suffered from long-standing problems that portended danger; an officer of Saini Trucking and Saini Bros, Iqbal Tambar, intentionally refused to have repairs performed on the braking system of the subject vehicles knowing that the braking system suffered from problems; Iqbal Tambar also insisted that the vehicles be used notwithstanding the defects; he admitted to making the decision at the expense of safety; and he thereafter falsified inspection reports and instructed Singh to avoid inspection stations. These are acts from which Iqbal Tambar—at the very least—should have known it was highly probable that harm would result. (See Peterson v. Super. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 158 citing Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979)] 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 286 [“[n]onintentional conduct comes within the definition of malicious acts punishable by the assessment of punitive damages when a party intentionally performs an act from which he knows, or should know, it is highly probable that harm will result”], emphasis added; see also Penner v. Falk (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 858, 867 [“The pleadings sufficiently allege facts setting forth long existing physical conditions of the premises which portend danger for the tenants. The pleadings also set out that respondents knew of those conditions for up to two years, had power to make changes, but failed to take corrective and curative measures. If proven, these allegations would support an award of punitive damages.”].) Thus, Plaintiffs have adequately pled facts supporting their request for punitive damages.

For these reasons, the motions to strike punitive damages are DENIED to the extent they are brought by Saini Trucking and Saini Bros.

B. Attorney Fees

Defendants argue that the Court should strike Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 because Plaintiffs have a substantial financial stake in the outcome of this case. Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 provides for the award of attorney fees in an action “which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest.” (Snatchko v. Westfield, LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 469, 496, fn. 15.) Such fees are not part of any claim, but are incidents thereto, which are properly awarded after the entry of judgment. (Id., at p. 497.) As there is no requirement that facts showing an entitlement to such fees be pled at all, it would be inappropriate to strike Plaintiffs’ request at this juncture. (Ibid. [finding that the trial court erred by striking a request for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 because there was no requirement that entitlement to such fees be pled at all].) All of the cases cited by Defendants involve an award or denial of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 after trial and are, therefore, distinguishable. (See Nelson v. County of Los Angeles (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 783, 787, 795-796; see also Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1137, 1169-1171; Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 632-633.)
Accordingly, the motions to strike the request for attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 are DENIED.

C. Third Cause of Action

Defendants argue that the Court should strike the third cause of action for unfair competition in its entirety because Plaintiffs are not entitled to any remedy under Business & Professions Code section 17200, et seq. and the claim is contrary to public policy.

A pleading challenge to an entire cause of action should be brought by demurrer rather than a motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 436. (See Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1281 [“[I]t is improper for a court to strike a whole cause of action of a pleading under Code of Civil Procedure section 436. … While under section 436, a court at any time may, in its discretion, strike portions of a complaint that are irrelevant, improper, or not drawn in conformity with the law, matter that is essential to a cause of action should not be struck and it is error to do so. [Citation.] Where a whole cause of action is the proper subject of a pleading challenge, the court should sustain a demurrer to the cause of action rather than grant a motion to strike.”].) Thus, the Court may not properly strike the third cause of action.
Moreover, Defendants’ arguments substantively lack merit. First, the facts alleged by Plaintiffs permit a reasonable inference that the wrongful acts alleged in the SAC are likely to be repeated in the future such that the request for injunctive relief is proper. (See Feitelberg v. Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 997, 1012 [“For more than 70 years, the UCL statute has expressly provided for injunctive relief. [Citations] … But ‘an injunction must seek to prevent harm, not to punish the wrongdoer.’ [Citation.] Thus, the ‘injunctive remedy should not be exercised ‘in the absence of any evidence that the acts are likely to be repeated in the future.’ ’ ”].) Second, Defendants do not cite any legal authority supporting the proposition that the Court should strike the third cause of action because it is purportedly contrary to public policy.

For these reasons, the motions to strike the third cause of action are DENIED.