Case Number: MC022261 Hearing Date: July 21, 2016 Dept: A11

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – NORTH DISTRICT

MARINA MORALES, )
) Case Number MC022261
Plaintiff, )
) ORDER AFTER HEARING
V )
) Date of Hearing:
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) July 21, 2016
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ) Dept. A-11
Et al., ) Judge Randolph A. Rogers
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)

Defendant County of Los Angeles’ motion to bifurcate/trifurcate came on for hearing on July 21, 2016. Plaintiff Marina Morales appeared through her counsel of record, ____________________. Defendant County of Los Angeles appeared through its counsel of record, ___________________. Defendants Antelope Valley-East Kern Water Agency and Nicholas Construction, Inc. appeared through their counsel of record, ________________. The Court, having received and reviewed the pleadings of record and evidence submitted and having considered argument of counsel, it is hereby ORDERED:

The motion to bifurcate is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this the _____ day of July, 2016.

______________________
RANDOLPH A. ROGERS,
JUDGE

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – NORTH DISTRICT

MARINA MORALES, )
) Case Number MC022261
Plaintiff, )
) STATEMENT OF DECISION
V )
) Date of Hearing:
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) July 21, 2016
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ) Dept. A-11
Et al., ) Judge Randolph A. Rogers
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)

The Court bases the Order After Hearing of this date upon the following Statement of Decision:

1. This case arises out of an automobile accident occurring on March 12, 2010, when a vehicle allegedly crossed over double yellow lines on Pearblossom Highway, resulting in a collision. One of the lanes was blocked by a k-rail at the time of the accident, and was subject to a Traffic Control Plan (“TCP”). On January 20, 2011, Plaintiff Marina Morales (“Plaintiff”) filed her complaint against Defendants State of California, County of Los Angeles, Elmer Mejia, Jr. and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, alleging two causes of action for (1) dangerous condition of public property and (2) negligence.

2. On January 6, 2012, Defendant County of Los Angeles (“COLA”) filed its first amended cross-complaint against Defendants Antelope Valley East Kern Water Agency (“AVEK”), Elmer Mejia, Jr., Nicholas Construction, Inc. (“Nicholas”), and Roes 1 through 10, inclusive, alleging five causes of action for: (1) implied/equitable indemnity; (2) express indemnity; (3) contribution; (4) comparative fault; and (5) declaratory relief.

3. On February 3, 2012, Plaintiff substituted Nicholas for Doe 1. Discovery ensued.

4. On June 8, 2016, COLA filed a motion to bifurcate or trifurcate the trial between liability on the Complaint, liability on the Cross-Complaints, and damages. COLA argues that it is not in the interest of judicial economy to force it, and potentially AVEK and Nicholas, to partake in the damages phase of the trial if they are found not to be liable, particularly in light of the abundance of experts designated by each of the parties. COLA further contends that bifurcation serves the interests of justice because Plaintiff sustained extensive injuries as a result of the accident, and the trier of fact may be improperly influenced by those injuries in finding liability.

5. AVEK and Nicholas filed a joinder to COLA’s motion on July 7, 2016. The joinder argues that due to defects in Plaintiff’s Complaint against them, bifurcation would serve the interests of justice.

6. Plaintiff filed her Opposition to COLA’s motion on June 21, 2016. Plaintiff argues that bifurcation will end up wasting time, rather than promoting judicial economy. Plaintiff further argues that bifurcation prejudices Plaintiff because it would inhibit her ability to demonstrate causation. Plaintiff also notes that there will be significant duplication of Plaintiff’s experts if bifurcation were permitted. Plaintiff finally notes that COLA has not shown how Plaintiff’s injuries present dangers of unfair prejudice beyond those ordinarily present in any trial.

7. The matter was originally set for hearing on July 6, 2016. By Order dated 6/27/16, the Court continued the hearing date to 7/21/16, to be heard together with Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend (to which AVEK and Nicholas have submitted a notice of non-Opposition), and for a trial setting conference on the same day.

8. Discussion – There are several statutory provisions which govern a court’s discretion to bifurcate a trial. Code of Civil Procedure §598 provides in relevant part, “The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby, on motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order, no later than the close of pretrial conference in cases in which such pretrial conference is to be held, or, in other cases, no later than 30 days before the trial date, that the trial of any issue or any part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in the case, except for special defenses which may be tried first pursuant to Sections 597 and 597.5. The court, on its own motion, may make such an order at any time.” Code of Civil Procedure §1048(b) provides that the court may order a separate trial of any cause of action in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials would be conducive to expedition and economy. Finally, in support of the court’s discretion, Evidence Code §320 provides that the court has the power to regulate the order of proof.

9. Section 598 was enacted by the legislature to avoid “the waste of time and money caused by the unnecessary trial of damage questions in cases where the liability issue is resolved against the plaintiff.” Horton v. Jones (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 952, 955. Indeed, even in cases where there is some evidentiary overlap between what is needed to prove liability and what is needed to prove damages, so long as such repetition is minimal, bifurcation remains proper. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 737, 746 (“while some evidence relating to damages would also be necessary on the issue of liability, only a small fraction of the evidence would be repeated so that the ends of justice were served by bifurcation”) (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Billings v. Edwards (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 238).

10. Under the facts of this case, bifurcation or trifurcation will yield no improvement in judicial efficiency. While it is true that an adjudication that no dangerous condition existed, or no liability exists as against COLA, will essentially end the lawsuit as to COLA, AVEK, and Nicholas, such a finding would not end the litigation because the trier of fact must still decide on the question of liability as against Mejia, and Plaintiff’s damages as a result of the accident. Thus, bifurcation merely provides a potential benefit to some of the parties, without any prospect of ending the litigation even if all of the proposed effects of bifurcation are realized.

11. COLA’s motion to trifurcate would be even less efficient. The request to trifurcate seeks a conditional trial of the issues in the cross-complaint in the event COLA is found liable, followed by a trial on damages. While this structure is most beneficial to COLA, it yields zero benefits to the Court, as no result from each of the separate trials will result in termination of the litigation. COLA’s proposition compels the Court to hold three separate trials, with the benefits accruing solely to COLA. This does not serve the interests of judicial efficiency.

12. Accordingly, COLA’s motion to bifurcate/trifurcate is DENIED.

SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the ______ day of July, 2016.

_____________________________
RANDOLPH A. ROGERS, JUDGE