Case Name: Mona Lisa Mendieta v. County of Santa Clara, et al.
Case No.: 16-CV-290744

I. Introduction

This is a negligence action brought by Mona Lisa Mendieta (“Plaintiff”) against the County of Santa Clara and its employee Rachel McDaniel (“McDaniel”) (collectively, “Defendants”).

McDaniel is a deputy sheriff who served as Plaintiff’s probation officer. (Compl., ¶¶ 3, 8.) In June 2012, when Plaintiff was 15 years old, Defendants released her into the custody of her biological mother instead of her adoptive parents. (Compl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges her biological mother and her partner are affiliated with the Norteño street gang, and are involved in the sale of illegal drugs and prostitution. (Compl., ¶ 8.) When Defendants released Plaintiff into the custody of her biological mother, she was forced to live with six children ages 7 months to 7 years in a one-bedroom motel room. (Compl., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges she was held at the motel against her will, subjected to statutory rape, offered alcohol and drugs, verbally and psychologically abused, and given illegal drugs to sell at her school. (Compl., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff witnessed violence on a daily basis, including a shooting. (Compl., ¶¶ 12-13.) Plaintiff was also held at gunpoint. (Compl., ¶ 12.)

Plaintiff could not endure these living conditions and frequently went without food, so she left her biological mother’s residence in September 2013. (Compl., ¶¶ 11, 14.) Upon her departure, while staying at a temporary residence her biological mother helped arrange, she was pushed out of a second-story window. (Compl., ¶ 14.) She was admitted to intensive care, found by the San Jose Police Department, and placed back in the custody of her adoptive mother. (Compl., ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome, shoulder pain, and severe headaches, neck, and back pain. (Compl., ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges these ailments are attributable to Defendants’ negligent failure to investigate her biological mother prior to placing her in her custody. (Compl., ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff asserts causes of action against Defendants for negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and negligent failure to investigate. Currently before the Court is Defendants’ demurrer to each cause of action on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The parties met and conferred in advance of the filing of the demurrer in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41. (Loisel Decl., ¶¶ 3-4.)

II. Request for Judicial Notice

In determining the legal sufficiency of a pleading on demurrer, courts may consider facts subject to judicial notice. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); see also South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732.)

Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of records from her adoptive mother’s previous case against Defendants. A matter must be relevant to a material issue in order for a court to take judicial notice of it. (Silverado Modjeska Recreation and Park Dist. v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 282, 307, fn. 18.) These records are not relevant to a material issue before the Court and are not therefore a proper subject of judicial notice.

Defendants also ask the Court to take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s administrative claim and application to present a late claim. A court may take judicial notice of “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) Official acts include a government entity’s records pertaining to compliance with the Government Claims Act. (Gong v. City of Rosemead (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 363, 376, citing Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) Plaintiff’s administrative claim and late-claim application are part of the County of Santa Clara’s records of compliance with the Government Claims Act and clearly relevant. Consequently, Plaintiff’s administrative claim and application to present a late claim are the proper subject of judicial notice.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice is therefore GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s claim and late-claim application and DENIED with respect to the records from her adoptive mother’s previous case.

III. Demurrer

Defendants argue all of Plaintiff’s claims are subject to demurrer on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts because she failed to comply with the pre-litigation claim requirement pursuant to the Government Claims Act, she cannot assert common law claims against a public entity, and Defendants are immune from liability.

A. Government Claims Act

Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to timely file an administrative claim, an application for leave to present a late administrative claim, and a petition for relief from the claim presentation requirements.

Before filing a civil action for damages against a public entity, a plaintiff must lodge an administrative claim with the entity that sets forth “[a] general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim.” (Gov. Code §§ 910, 945.4.) A plaintiff must submit the administrative claim within six months of the accrual of his or her claim. (Gov. Code § 911.2, subd. (a); see also J.J. v. County of San Diego (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1219.) If a plaintiff fails to timely submit an administrative claim within six months of accrual, he or she may apply to the public entity for leave to present a late claim within one year of the accrual of his or her claim. (J.J. v. County of San Diego, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1220, citing Gov. Code, § 911.4.)

“‘If the public entity denies the application, Government Code section 946.6 authorizes the injured party to petition the court for relief from the claim requirements.’” (J.J. v. County of San Diego, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1220, quoting Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1777.) “Filing a late-claim application within one year after the accrual of a cause of action is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a claim-relief petition.” (Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 713.) “When the underlying application to file a late claim is filed more than one year after the accrual of the cause of action, the court is without jurisdiction to grant relief under Government Code section 946.6.” (J.J. v. County of San Diego, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1221.) The petition itself must be filed within six months of the denial of the application to present a late claim. (See Lineaweaver v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 738, 740-41; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 946.6.) The six-month deadline for filing the petition is mandatory. (Lineaweaver v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 741.)

Complying with the pre-litigation claim requirement is a mandatory prerequisite to maintaining a cause of action against a public entity or its employee. (State v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1249 [“[F]ailure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.”]) It is well established “that failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement subjects a complaint to general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.” (Id. at pp. 1244-45.)

Here, Defendants argue and Plaintiff does not dispute her causes of action accrued in September 2013. The last event Plaintiff alleges her claims are based upon is her fall from the second-story window and return to the custody of her adoptive mother in September 2013. She does not allege any subsequent events as the basis for her claims. Plaintiff waited until June 2, 2015, well over six months after her causes of action accrued, to submit her administrative claim. (Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. A; see also Opp. at p. 2:5-9.) Plaintiff’s claim was therefore untimely.

Because Plaintiff’s claim was untimely, she filed a late-claim application on July 31, 2015. (Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. B; see also Opp. at p. 2:5-9.) Plaintiff filed her application more than one year from the accrual of her causes of action. Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument in opposition to the demurrer, she did not have one year from obtaining the age of majority to file her late-claim application. (See J.J. v. County of San Diego, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1220 [must submit late-claim application within one year even if claimant is a minor during that time], citing John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 444, fn. 3.) Her late-claim application was therefore untimely as well.

Next, on September 8, 2015, the County of Santa Clara denied her untimely late-claim application by not responding within 45 days. (Gov. Code, § 911.6, subd. (c) [late-claim application denied by operation of law if entity does not respond within 45 days].) Consequently, in order to avoid a bar to litigation, Plaintiff needed to petition the Court for relief from the pre-litigation claim requirement by March 2016. Plaintiff does not allege she filed a petition for relief. In fact, it is clear she failed to file such a petition because she affirmatively requests relief from the claim requirement in opposition to the demurrer. Plaintiff therefore failed to obtain judicial relief from the pre-litigation claim requirement prior to filing her complaint.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s causes of action are barred by the Government Claims Act because she did not comply with the pre-litigation claim requirement or obtain judicial relief from non-compliance prior to filing her complaint.

B. Common Law Claims

Defendants also argue Plaintiff may not maintain claims against them for common law negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and negligent failure to investigate because only statutory claims may be brought against a public entity.

The Government Claims Act limits public entities’ liability for common law claims. (Miklosy v. Regents of the University of California (“Miklosy”) (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899.) “‘Except as otherwise provided by statute: [¶] (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.’” (Ibid., quoting Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a), original italics.) “The Legislative Committee Comment to section 815 states: ‘This section abolishes all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the state or federal constitution, e.g., inverse condemnation. . . .’” (Miklosy, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 899.) It is well established “section 815 abolishes common law tort liability for public entities.” (Ibid.) Consequently, “a public entity cannot be held liable for common law negligence.” (McCarty v. Cal. Dept. of Transportation (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 955, 977; see also Dina v. Cal. Dept. of Transportation (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1053 [“[A]ny claim of negligence against [a public entity] must be based on a statute.”]; see also McAllister v. L.A. Unified School Dist. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1218-19 [may not assert claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress].)

All of Plaintiff’s claims are common law negligence claims. Plaintiff does not identify a statutory basis for her claims anywhere in her complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff may not maintain any of her claims against Defendants.

C. Immunity

Finally, Defendants argue Plaintiff may not maintain claims against them because they are immune from liability.

“[A] public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his [or her] act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him [or her], whether or not such discretion be abused.” (Gov. Code, § 820.2.) Furthermore, “a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (b).)

Discretionary acts and omissions for which a public employee is not liable include the decision of whether or not to remove a child from his or her home and where to place a child in protective custody. (See Jacqueline T. v. Alameda County Child Protective Services (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 456, 466; see also County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 627, 633.) Similarly, a public employee cannot be held liable for the decision to release an incarcerated juvenile from custody or the selection of a custodian and placement of a juvenile in the care and residence of that custodian upon release. (Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 748-49 [no liability for releasing juvenile on parole to his mother].)

All three of Plaintiff’s claims are based on McDaniel’s decision to release her into her biological mother’s custody without adequately investigating her fitness as a custodian. McDaniel’s decision was discretionary, and she cannot therefore be held liable for her decision. Additionally, because McDaniel is immune, the County of Santa Clara cannot be held liable for her acts. Plaintiff cannot therefore maintain any of her claims against Defendants.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff cannot maintain any of her negligence claims against Defendants because she failed to timely present an administrative claim pursuant to the Government Claims Act, she cannot assert common law causes of action for negligence, and Defendants are immune from liability. Defendants’ demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action is therefore sustainable.

A court may deny leave to amend if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate any reasonable possibility of curing the defect in the pleading through amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) “If there is no liability as a matter of law, leave to amend should not be granted.” (Schonfeldt v. State of California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1465, citing Baughman v. State of California (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 182, 187.)

Here, given the nature of the defects in the pleading, the Court cannot see and Plaintiff does not suggest there is any reasonable possibility she could cure them through amendment. Consequently, the demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

The Court will prepare the order.