Case Name: Manuel Echenique v. Omar Gonzalez-Ortega
Case No.: 2016-CV-294345

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a motor vehicle accident case. Plaintiff Manuel Echenique (“Plaintiff”) filed a judicial council form first amended complaint (“FAC”) against defendant Omar Gonzalez-Ortega (“Defendant”) setting forth causes of action for motor vehicle negligence, general negligence and negligence per se. The alleged motor vehicle accident occurred on or about April 26, 2014 at SR-87 southbound, 120 feet north of Branham Lane in San Jose, California. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. As a result of the collision, Plaintiff has incurred hospital and medical expenses and suffered general damages and wage loss.

Currently before the Court is Defendant’s motion to strike portions of the FAC. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 435, 436.) Plaintiff filed written opposition. Defendant filed reply papers.

Motion to Strike Portions of the FAC

Defendant moves to strike the punitive damage allegations in the FAC because they are not supported by facts establishing malice, oppression, or fraud.

Legal Standard

A court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter asserted in a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) A court may also strike out all or any part of a pleading not filed in conformity with the laws of the State of California. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

Analysis

“In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. ‘Malice’ is defined in the statute as conduct ‘intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’ ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. ‘Fraud’ is ‘an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.’” (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63 [internal citations omitted].)

In Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, the California Supreme Court held that punitive damages may be sought where the gravamen of the complaint is that the “[d]efendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby.” (Id. at p. 896.) This is exactly what Plaintiff alleges in the FAC. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant became severely intoxicated and drove his car at an alcohol level of 2.5 times the legal limit, despite knowing of the safety hazards he created to other drivers by doing so.” (See Exemplary Damages Attachment to the FAC.) This is a sufficient allegation of conscious disregard for purposes of seeking punitive damages. Furthermore, contrary to Defendant’s argument, a plaintiff is not required to plead facts showing a history of prior arrests or convictions to establish punitive damages. (See Taylor, supra, at p. 896 [“[W]hile a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident, we do not deem these aggravating factors essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases.”].) Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has properly alleged a claim for punitive damages.

Consequently, the motion to strike portions of the FAC is DENIED.