Case Name: KYLEEAN BELTRAN v. MORGAN HILL USD, ET AL.
Case No.: 2015-1-CV-276960

This is a personal injury case brought by Plaintiff Kyleean Beltran (“Plaintiff”) arising from an accident on a school campus on June 7, 2014 after the school year had ended. Currently before the Court is the motion for summary judgment/adjudication by Defendant Heidi Golden (“Golden”) directed at Plaintiff’s first cause of action for motor vehicle negligence (negligent entrustment) and second cause of action for general negligence, the only causes of action alleged against Golden in the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). On June 7, 2014 Golden had, like Plaintiff, volunteered to participate in a clean-up taking place on a portion of the campus of Live Oak High School that was run by Defendant Live Oak Safe and Sober Grad Night, Inc. (“LOSSGN”).

Previously on October 17, 2017 the Court adopted as final its tentative rulings granting the separate motions for summary judgment by Defendant Erin Larrus (as to the SAC’s first cause of action for motor vehicle negligence and second cause of action for general negligence) and by Defendant LOSSGN (as to the SAC’s first and second causes of action and also the third cause of action for premises liability). Plaintiff did not contest these tentative rulings. On November 9, 2017 the Court adopted as final its tentative ruling granting the motion for summary judgment brought by Defendant Morgan Hill Unified School District (“MHUSD”) against Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for general negligence, the only claim alleged against it in the SAC. Plaintiff had not opposed that motion.

Motion for Summary Judgment
The operative SAC limits the issues presented for summary judgment/adjudication, and the motion may not be granted or denied based on issues not raised by the pleading. (See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 98; Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258; Nieto v. Blue Shield of Calif. Life & Health Ins. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 73 [“the pleadings determine the scope of relevant issues on a summary judgment motion.”].) The SAC’s first and second causes of action are solely based on the events of June 7, 2014.

The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) The moving party’s declarations and evidence will be strictly construed in determining whether they negate or disprove an essential element of a plaintiff’s claim “in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s (or opposing party’s) favor.” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64, parentheses added.) While the same standards of admissibility govern both, the opposition declarations are liberally construed while the moving party’s evidence is strictly scrutinized. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768.) The evidence must be liberally construed in support of the opposing party, resolving any doubts in favor of that party. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.)

An opposing party will sometimes rely on circumstantial evidence and/or inferences arising from declarations or other evidence. To defeat summary judgment such inferences must be reasonable and cannot be based on speculation or surmise. (See McGrory v. Applied Signal Technology, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1530 [“a material triable controversy is not established unless the inference is reasonable.”]) Moreover, the inference a plaintiff attempts to rely on must satisfy the “more likely than not” evidentiary standard plaintiff will bear at trial. (Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 487.)

“A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. … The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show there is a triable issue of material fact on that issue.” (Alex R. Thomas & Co. v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 66, 72; internal citations omitted.) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable finder of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, supra, at 850.) To be material for summary judgment purposes, a fact must relate to some claim or defense in issue under the pleadings. Also it must be in some way essential to the judgment; i.e., if proved, it could change the outcome of the case. (See Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 926; Kelly v. First Astri Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 462, 470.)

As an initial matter the Court notes that Golden’s notice of motion also seeks summary adjudication of the SAC’s request for punitive damages. While summary adjudication of a request for punitive damages can generally be sought regardless of whether it wholly disposes of the associated cause of action, any motion for summary adjudication must comply with Rule of Court 3.1350(b), stating in pertinent part, “If summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” Golden’s separate statement does not “repeat verbatim” the request for adjudication stated in her notion of motion and the motion is therefore one for summary judgment only.

Defendant Golden’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as follows.

Golden has clearly met her initial burden as to the first cause of action for motor vehicle negligence as alleged against her. It is undisputed that this cause of action is more properly understood as alleging negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle, specifically a utility vehicle referred to by the parties as the “mule.”

CACI 724 [Negligent Entrustment of Motor Vehicle] states the elements to establish such a claim are as follows: 1. That [driver] was negligent in operating the vehicle; 2. That [defendant] owned the vehicle operated by the driver or had possession of the vehicle operated by driver with the owner’s permission; 3. That [defendant] knew or should have known that [driver] was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle; 4. That [defendant] permitted [driver] to drive the vehicle; and 5. That [driver’s] incompetence or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to [plaintiff]. “It is generally recognized that one who places or entrusts his motor vehicle in the hands of one whom he knows, or from the circumstances is charged with knowing, is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for an injury inflicted by the use made thereof by that driver, provided the plaintiff can establish the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver’s disqualification, incompetency, inexperience or recklessness.” (Allen v. Toledo (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 415, 420, emphasis added; see also Dodge Center v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 332, 341 [stating that “[f]or liability to exist, knowledge must be shown of the user’s incompetence or inability safely to use the chattel”].)

Both Jessica Pfaendler and Defendant Golden testified (see exhibits A and C to the declaration of Robert Burchfiel) that Pfaendler, an 18 year-old licensed driver, asked Golden for permission to use the Mule. Golden, in her deposition testimony and her declaration in support of the motion, states that she told Pfaendler that only she could use it (whether she was told that Plaintiff and Casey Cowern would be accompanying her is disputed but irrelevant). Tonya Bollenbacher’s deposition testimony (exhibit D to the Burchfiel Decl.) supports Golden’s claim that she only gave Pfaendler permission to use the Mule. Golden’s testimony, her declaration, and Pfaendler’s testimony constitute admissible evidence supporting the argument that Pfaendler knew how to drive to drive the Mule and that Golden had seen her do so previously without incident. No reasonable trier of fact could find that the entrustment of the mule to Pfaendler was negligent, nor could any reasonable trier of fact find Golden liable for negligent entrustment based on the decision by Pfaendler to let Cowern drive, as it was made after the three girls had left the area where Golden or any other adults participating in the clean-up could reasonably be expected to observe or supervise them. The owner/possessor of a vehicle can only be liable for negligent entrustment if they knew or should have known that the entrusted driver “was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle.” Pfaendler’s later decision to allow Cowern to drive the mule had nothing to do with Pfaendler’s competence or fitness to drive the vehicle—which Plaintiff does not even question. Cowern’s purportedly negligent driving does not support a claim for negligent entrustment against Golden.

When the burden shifts Plaintiff is unable to raise any triable issues of material fact. The dispute over who owned the Mule is not a dispute over a material fact because it makes no difference to the outcome of the motion; there was no negligent entrustment by Golden on June 7, 2014 regardless of whether she was the “owner” or the “possessor” of the mule. Whether or not Pfaendler told Golden that she was going to use the mule to take Cowern and Plaintiff to the farm is also not a dispute over an issue of material fact as it has nothing to do with whether Golden’s decision to entrust Pfaendler with the Mule was negligent. The same is true as to the dispute over whether or not Defendant Larrus had an “unwritten” rule that students could not use the Mule. The school year was over on June 7, 2014, Pfaendler had graduated, and the existence of an unwritten rule is irrelevant to the question of whether Pfaendler was competent to drive the mule.

Plaintiff’s argument that negligence could be reasonably inferred based on what purportedly happened on “farm work days” as part of the FFA program during the school year also does not raise any triable issues of material fact. First, the argument is irrelevant to the SAC’s first and second causes of action as they are based solely on the events of June 7, 2014, after the school year had ended when a volunteer activity was taking place. Second, even if it were assumed that such an inference could be drawn, it could not satisfy the “more likely than not” standard. Again, negligent entrustment liability is limited to the issue of whether the owner/possessor of a vehicle knew or reasonably should have known that the entrusted driver was incompetent to drive the vehicle. (See CACI 724.) Here there is no argument or evidence that Pfaendler—the only person Golden entrusted the Mule to on June 7, 2014—was incompetent to drive it. The opposition does not cite any authority for its “one step removed” or “indirect” theory of negligent entrustment liability. Golden is not liable for decisions the entrusted person might make beyond driving the vehicle, and she owed no general duty of care to Plaintiff on June 7, 2014.

As for the second cause of action for (general) Negligence, while neither side’s papers specifically address it, Golden has also met her initial burden to show that the claim fails as alleged against her. “In order to establish negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate a duty on the part of defendant, breach of that duty, causation and damages.” (Strong v. State of Cal. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1449.) Whether a duty of care exists and its scope is a question of law for the Court. (Id.) “An action in negligence requires a showing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, that the defendant breached the duty, and that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of injuries suffered by the plaintiff.” (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673.)

The narrative portion of the SAC does not identify any other basis for the second cause of action as alleged against Golden other than her allowing Pfaendler to use the Mule. This was not a negligent action as described above. No other duty of care and breach are alleged. As the Court has already stated in the October 17, 2017 Order granting the motions for summary judgment brought by Defendants Larrus and LOSSGN, even if it were assumed for purposes of argument that the adult defendants volunteering at the clean-up (including Golden) had some general duty to supervise the student co-volunteers, such a duty would not extend to the activities of Plaintiff, Pfaendler and Cowern after they had stopped participating in the clean-up and had left the area to pursue unrelated personal goals such as getting animal feed from a vehicle in the school parking lot and then continuing towards the farm to feed animals. Golden’s decision to allow Pfaendler to use the mule on June 7, 2014 did not breach any general duty of care owed to Plaintiff and also cannot reasonably be described as the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injury, regardless of whether or not Golden knew Pfaendler intended to give Plaintiff and Cowern a ride. (See Weissich v. County of Marin (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1069, 1084 [“Ordinarily proximate cause is a question of fact which cannot be decided as a matter of law from the allegations of a complaint. … Nevertheless, where the facts are such that the only reasonable conclusion is an absence of causation, the question is one of law, not of fact.”]