Case Number: BC641054 Hearing Date: February 27, 2018 Dept: 53

ZINA CAMP-LLOYD vs. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.; BC641054, February 27, 2018

[Tentative] Order RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff ZINA CAMP-LLOYD’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Zina Camp-Lloyd (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on November 16, 2016 against Defendant County of Los Angeles (the “County”). Plaintiff is a sworn peace officer and probation officer for the County. Plaintiff alleges that during the course and scope of her employment, her supervisor Senior Deputy Probation Officer Michael Russel (“Russell”) engaged in a course of verbal and physical conduct with the intent of sexually harassing her. Plaintiff alleges that, when she refused Russell’s advances, Russell transferred her against her wishes from Lancaster to the East Los Angeles office. Plaintiff further alleges that, after she complained about Russell’s actions, Russell changed her work schedule to eliminate her ability to work from a satellite office and force her to come to Russell’s worksite daily. The Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) sexual harassment in violation of the FEHA, and (2) retaliation in violation of the FEHA.

Plaintiff now moves for leave to file a First Amended Complaint to include new allegations and a new cause of action for retaliation relating to events that took place after the filing of the Complaint. The County opposes.

DISCUSSION

The Court notes that Plaintiff seeks leave to amend her complaint to allege facts that occurred after the filing of her original complaint. It is well-settled that a complaint, “whether original or amended, can properly speak only of things which occurred either before or concurrently with the commencement of the action.” (Kamei v. Kumamoto (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 381, 385.) The appropriate mechanism for Plaintiff’s request is instead the filing of a supplemental complaint, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 464, subdivision (a). Thus, the Court considers Plaintiff’s motion as one seeking leave to file a supplemental complaint. (See Hutnick v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 456, 464 [holding that the title of a pleading is not determinative and that which is labeled an amended complaint will be treated as a supplemental complaint if the new facts pleaded occurred after the original complaint was filed].)

It is the general policy that courts should exercise liberality in permitting the filing of supplemental pleadings when the alleged “occurring-after” facts are pertinent to the case. (Flood v. Simpson (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 644, 647.) A supplement seeking to introduce new causes of action is properly denied. (Ibid.) A supplemental complaint must be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original action. (Erickson v. Boothe (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 644, 647.)

The County argues that Plaintiff waited for more than five months to move for leave to amend her complaint to include the new instances of alleged retaliation. However, delay alone, absent prejudice, does not warrant denial of a motion for leave to amend. (Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564 (“Where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party, the liberal rule of allowance prevails.”); (Morgan v. Superior Court of Cal. In & For Los Angeles County (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530 (“If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.”).) The County argues that it will be prejudiced because it will need additional time to file a demurrer to the First Amended Complaint, to file another summary judgment motion, conduct additional discovery relating to the facts facts/new cause of action, and prepare for trial.

Plaintiff contends that her proposed cause of action for retaliation is against the same defendant (the County), at the same division, and involve the same personnel and supervisors involved in the prior allegations of harassment and retaliation and arise out of the filings of the DFEH claims and lawsuit to remedy those actions, and therefore will not prejudice the County. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that discovery has already been conducted on these allegations, therefore the County was already on notice of the existence of the facts supporting Plaintiff’s new cause of action. Therefore, the Court finds that any prejudice to the County is outweighed by the necessity to allow Plaintiff’s claim to have its day in court. Judicial economy would also weigh in favor of allowing Plaintiff’s amendment, as she could certainly simply bring a new lawsuit for the new claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to file the First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. The First Amended Complaint lodged by Plaintiff must be separately filed with the Clerk’s Office and served as of the date of this Order. As a condition for granting this motion, the Court will require Plaintiff to make promptly make herself available for a supplemental deposition to last no longer than 3 hours limited to the issue of retaliation. Plaintiff must pay for the costs associated with this deposition, not including fees of defense counsel.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice of this ruling.

DATED: February 27, 2018

_____________________________

Howard L. Halm

Judge of the Superior Court