Paramount Petroleum Corporation vs. International Surfacing
Nature of Proceeding:
Filed By:
Motion to Compel Deposition of Brian Orr
Wood, Ryan C.

Defendant’s Motion to Compel Depositions of plaintiff’s witnesses Brian Orr, Jim Ryan, Mark C. Mitchell, and William Thorpe is ruled on as follows:

Paramount and ISS are competing manufacturers of pavement surfacing compounds. This action arises, in part, out of Paramount’s claims that ISS disseminated false statements about its product, “Terminal Blend,” in an advertising brochure. ISS manufactures a product called “Asphalt Rubber.”

ISS seeks to depose four Paramount witnesses. ISS noticed the depositions of the four witnesses to take place between November 12 and November 21, 2013. Paramount contends that the notice was issued without meeting and conferring as to the dates beforehand, and also contends that ISS had not complied with its own discovery obligations with respect to document discovery and providing dates for the depositions of its witnesses. However, ISS notified Paramount in November that Wendell Reed and Jeff Smith would be available for deposition the week of December 9th. ISS contends Paramount never responded to this email. ISS filed the motion to compel on December 12, 2013.

Paramount does not contend that its witnesses should not be deposed, but rather contends that the parties should have met and conferred to reach a stipulation for a deposition schedule for all the witnesses. The Court is not persuaded based on the history of the discovery disputes between the parties that they will be able to reach a mutually acceptable schedule without court intervention. information sought. The broad “relevancy to the subject matter” standard is not enough. Rather, the court must be convinced that the information is directly relevant to a cause of action or defense, i.e., that it is essential to determining the truth of the matters in dispute. Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859-862. Even highly relevant, non-privileged information may be shielded from discovery if its disclosure would impair a person’s “inalienable right of privacy”. Id.

Moreover, the Court must carefully balance the right of privacy against the need for discovery. Disclosure may be ordered only if a “compelling public interest” would be served thereby. Id. at 848-849. Specifically, the Court must “carefully balance” the interests involved, i.e.. the claimed right of privacy versus the public’s interest in obtaining just results in litigation. Valley Bank of Nev. v. Superior Conn (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656-658. The Court must also consider the purpose of the information sought, the effect that disclosure will have on the affected persons and parties, the nature of the objections urged by the party resisting disclosure, and availability of alternative, less intrusive means for obtaining the requested information. Id. at 658. The more sensitive the information requested (e.g. personal medical information), the greater the need for disclosure that must be shown. Hoffman Corp. v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 357; 362 (discussing balancing test). Any disclosure must be narrowly tailored to assure maximum protection of the privacy rights. Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at 859.

Mere allegations of alter ego do not make the financial records directly relevant to the litigation. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Rawnsley v Superior Court (1986) 183 Cal..App.3d 86 is misplaced. In Rawnsley, the court allowed evidence of financial information only because plaintiff’s case arose from an alleged mismanaged financial investment. The financial information sought went to the heart of the case, and plaintiff could not support his case without it.

Plaintiffs’ attempt to advance the alter ego doctrine as an independent basis for liability by itself cannot circumvent the discovery limitations provided under Civil Code § 3295. To be sure, a claim based on the theory of alter ego is not itself a claim for substantive relief Hennessey’s Tavern. Inc. v. American Air Filter Co. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1351, 1358-1359 [noting “An alter ego defendant has no separate liability) to plaintiff. Rather, plaintiffs claim against the alter ego is identical with that claimed by the plaintiff against the already named defendant.”] Alter ego is a procedural device that enables an equitable result. Id. Theories that companies participated in a single enterprise or a joint venture are likewise equitable doctrines, giving rise only to vicarious liability. Las Palmas Association v. Las Palmas Center Association (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1249-1250. Thus, a finding that Vitas is the alter ego of any co-defendant (which is disputed herein) does not create liability on the part of Vitas for any alleged wrongdoing committed by said co-defendants.

The Court makes its ruling based on the privacy at issue. The court is not persuaded based on the opposition that the discovery implicates third party privacy or the peer review privilege.

Sanctions are denied.

Defendant’s Request for a discovery referee is denied. See ruling on the companion motion re: Special Interrogatory # 40.