Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike is denied. Defendants failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff’s claims “arise from protected activity.” C.C.P. §425.16.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is also denied as there is nothing before the Court which indicates the motion was brought for the “sole purpose of harassing an opposing party” and the motion was not “completely without merit.” C.C.P. §425.16(c); C.C.P. §128.5(b)(2).

Additionally, the Court rules as follows on Defendants’ evidentiary objections:

Overruled: Nos.1-12, 14-20 and 22-42.
Sustained: Nos. 13 and 21.

Statements qualify for protection under C.C.P. §425.16, regardless of whether they are made in a “public forum,” when they are made “in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” C.C.P. §425.16(e)(4).

Pursuant to Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468, “public interest” has been “broadly construed to include not only governmental matters, but also private conduct that impacts a broad segment of society and/or that affects a community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity.” Id. at 479.

Thus, the Court in Damon concluded, statements made in connection with the management of a private homeowners association, concerning issues of critical importance to a large segment of the local population, qualify as “public issues.” Id. at 479-480.

Importantly, however, pursuant to Du Charme v. International Broth. Of Elec. Workers, Local 45 (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 107:

“in order to satisfy the public issue/issue of public interest requirement of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) and (4) of the anti-SLAPP statute, in cases where the issue is not of interest to the public at large, but rather to a limited, but definable portion of the public (a private group, organization, or community), the constitutionally protected activity must, at a minimum, occur in the context of an ongoing controversy, dispute or discussion, such that it warrants protection by a statute that embodies the public policy of encouraging participation in matters of public significance.”

Id. at 119. The Court in Du Charme distinguished from Damon (wherein statements were made to persuade members of the homeowners association to change its method of governance), by finding the following:

By contrast, in this case, the Local’s trustee posted on its Web site the information that Du Charme had been removed from office for financial mismanagement, a statement that was presumably of interest to the membership (else why post it at all?), but unconnected to any discussion, debate or controversy. Du Charme’s termination was a fait accompli; its propriety was no longer at issue. Members of the local were not being urged to take any position on the matter. In fact, no action on their part was called for or contemplated. To grant protection to mere informational statements, in this context, would in no way further the statute’s purpose of encouraging participation in matters of public significance (§ 425.16, subd. (a).

Id. at 118. Thus, the Court in Du Charme found, where a statement is not made in the context of an ongoing discussion, the protections of C.C.P. §425.16 do not apply.

In this instance, Defendants argue that each of the allegedly defamatory statements concerned Plaintiff’s ability to manage GRF and, thus, relate to the ongoing controversy concerning Plaintiff’s competency as Executive Director.

While Defendants have presented evidence, demonstrating community members were concerned about Plaintiff’s conduct (e.g. Letters to the Editor), importantly, the comments referenced by Plaintiff were not encouraging participation.

Similar to Du Charme, the relevant statements were informational and sought no action by the listeners. Pursuant to Ms. Dugocevic, the statements were made to individuals who were not Board Members. Thus, it does not appear the statements were made to individuals with power to affect Plaintiff’s employment.

Additionally, pursuant to Ms. Dugocevic, at least one statement included the comment: “Don’t worry, the Board is investigating this and we’ll get rid of him.” (¶7 of Dugocevic Dec.).

Based on all of the above, it appears that the relevant statements were informational, only, and do not qualify for protection under C.C.P. §425.16, pursuant to Du Charme v. International Broth. Of Elec. Workers, Local 45 (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 107.

Thus, Defendants failed to meet their burden, on the first step of analysis and the motion must be denied.