(1) Motion to Compel Arbitration (2) Joinder (3) CMC

Tentative Ruling: Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. Plaintiff, Evelyn Garibay is ordered to arbitrate her claims against Defendant Kimco Staffing Services, Inc. pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2. Section 1281.2 provides that, on petition of a party to an arbitration agreement, “the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.”

“The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.) “In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Id.)

In this instance, the Court finds the preponderance of the evidence weighs in favor of Defendant Kimco and supports the existence of a valid Arbitration Agreement. As Ms. Burton indicates that a unique password and four digit pin is required for an applicant to electronically sign documents and that passwords cannot be retrieved by management, sufficient evidence exists to demonstrate the electronic signature at issue in this action was completed by Plaintiff. (See ¶4-¶5 and ¶10 of Burton Dec.)

Importantly, Plaintiff does not deny that she agreed to electronically sign employment documents with Defendant. Additionally, Plaintiff does not deny having completed the process articulated by Ms. Burton, within ¶3-¶10 of Ms. Burton’s Declaration; rather, Plaintiff indicates, only, that she did not agree to the specific document at issue.

As Plaintiff does not dispute having engaged in the process described by Ms. Burton, Plaintiff fails to contradict Ms. Burton’s testimony. Further, to the extent Plaintiff is merely indicating she didn’t read the Agreement containing the arbitration provision, prior to completing the process to electronically sign it, this argument is unavailing.

“General principles of contract law determine whether the parties have entered into a binding agreement to arbitrate.” (Mitri v. Arnel Management Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1170.) “A basic rule of contract law is, in the absence of fraud, overreaching or excusable neglect, that one who signs an instrument may not avoid the impact of its terms on the ground that he failed to read the instrument before signing it.” (Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 87, 93.) Based on all of the above, a valid Arbitration Agreement exists and arbitration is required pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2.

Additionally, the Court finds section 1281.2(c) does not apply, as Defendant Jacabo (as an employee of Kimco) would be entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement. (Exhibit “B” of Torres Dec.); Laswell v. AG Seal Beach, LLC (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1399; RN Solution v. Catholic Healthcare West (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1511; and Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605.)

The action against Defendant Kimco is stayed, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4.

(2) Joinder: Defendant Ricoh’s Joinder to the Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. Plaintiff Evelyn Garibay is ordered to arbitrate her claims against Defendant Ricoh Electronics, Inc.

Pursuant to Rowe v. Exline (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1276, “a signatory plaintiff who sues on a written contract containing an arbitration clause may be estopped from denying arbitration if he sues nonsignatories as related or affiliated persons with the signatory entity.” (Id. at 1287.) “The equitable estoppel doctrine applies when a party has signed an agreement to arbitrate but attempts to avoid arbitration by suing nonsignatory defendants for claims that are based on the same facts and are inherently inseparable from arbitrable claims against signatory defendants.” (Id.) As explained by JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222:

Thus, a nonsignatory defendant may compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. For the doctrine to apply, “the claims plaintiff asserts against the nonsignatory must be dependent upon, or founded in and inextricably intertwined with, the underlying contractual obligations of the agreement containing the arbitration clause.”

(Id. at 1238; see also Turtle Ridge Media Group, Inc. v. Pacific Bell Directory (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 828, 833.) Further, as explained by the Fourth District, Division 3, in Metaclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, “the equitable estoppel doctrine applies when a party has signed an agreement to arbitrate but attempts to avoid arbitration by suing nonsignatory defendants for claims that are ‘based on the same facts and inherently inseparable from arbitrable claims against signatory defendants.” (Id. at 1713.)

In this instance, Plaintiff asserts equitable estoppel cannot apply, as her claims against Ricoh are not “inextricably intertwined with the underlying contractual obligations.” While it is true this action is not one for breach of contract, such that it would clearly invoke contractual obligations, the claims against Ricoh are based on the “same facts” such that they are “inherently inseparable from arbitrable claims.”

Indeed, the Complaint makes no distinction between Kimco and Ricoh, in its allegations against “Defendants.”

As Metalclad and Rowe each allow for the application of equitable estoppel where the facts are the same, Ricoh can seek to enforce the arbitration agreement under this theory.

Additionally, as the Arbitration Agreement broadly seeks to compel arbitration of “all disputes that may arise out of the employment context,” and the claims against Ricoh are based on Plaintiff’s employment, arguably the claims are “intertwined” with the contractual agreement.

The action against Defendant Ricoh is stayed, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4.