Demurrer to the Complaint

With respect to the first cause of action for sexual abuse of a minor, Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to state a cause of action because Plaintiff fails to allege any statute to support this claim against the District. “Under the California (Government) Claims Act, a public entity is not liable for injury arising from an act or omission except as provided by statute. Thus, in California, all government tort liability must be based on statute. In the absence of a constitutional requirement, public entities may be held liable only if a statute…is found declaring them to be liable.” (Tom Jones Enterprises, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1291 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].) Here, the first cause of action incorporates prior allegations in the Complaint. (See Complaint at ¶ 20.) The prior allegations provide various statutes in support of the first cause of action. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 11, 13, 17, 20, and 23.) Defendants’ argument that a statute must provide for a private right of action to form the basis for a claim against a public entity is not supported by authority and is contrary to Leger v. Stockton Unified School District (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff cannot hold the District vicariously liable for Chandler’s alleged sexual battery of a minor. (See John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 452 [connection between the extensive authority conferred on teachers to carry out their instructional duties and the abuse of that authority to indulge in personal, sexual misconduct is simply too attenuated to deem a sexual assault as falling within the range of risks allocable to a teacher’s employer]; see also Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1854-1855 [conduct of teachers who sexually molest students under their supervision will not be imputed to school district, though districts may be liable for their own negligence in hiring and supervising teachers].) However, this argument fails to recognize that Plaintiff need not necessarily rely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. Instead, a principal may be liable when it ratifies an unauthorized tort. (See Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 852; see also Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 151, 169 [as an alternate theory to respondeat superior, an employer may be liable for an employee’s act where the employer either authorized the tortious act or subsequently ratified an originally unauthorized tort].) “Whether an employer has ratified an employee’s conduct is generally a factual question.” (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1110.) Here, the court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts showing that the District ratified Chandler’s alleged sexual misconduct. (See Complaint at ¶¶ 12, 20, and 25.)

Finally, Defendants claim that “sexual abuse of a minor” is not recognized as a valid cause of action, and that the pleading is uncertain because it does not disclose whether the alleged conduct was intentional or negligent. Plaintiff does not, in response, identify authority holding that “sexual abuse of a minor” constitutes a cause of action. Plaintiff has not identified, and cannot identify, the elements of such a cause of action if it is not sexual battery. Plaintiff relies on the statute of limitations pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, subdivision (a). (See Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 536; see also Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 963 [in 1990, the legislature amended section 340.1 to extend beyond the members of the minor’s household to reach any perpetrator of sexual abuse against a child].) However, those authorities address “recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse”—and thus describe a type of misconduct which may result in damages but do not identify a cause of action. Defendants are entitled to know the elements of a claim before the pleadings are settled and discovery begins.

Therefore, Defendants’ demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

With respect to the second cause of action for negligence/breach of mandatory duty, Defendants argue that this claim is merely duplicative of the first cause of action. Defendants’ Notice of Motion does not provide a legal basis for challenging the second cause of action. On the merits, the argument that the second cause of action is duplicative of the preceding causes of action is rejected because redundancy simply is not a proper ground for demurrer. (See McDonell v. American Trust Co. (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 296, 302-303.)

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the second cause on the ground that it fails to state a claim is OVERRULED.

With respect to the third cause of action for negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention, Defendants are only challenging the negligent hiring portion of the claim. (See Memo of P’s & A’s at p.14.) Defendants concede that they are not disputing the negligent training, supervision, and retention portions of the third cause of action. (Ibid.) However, a demurrer is not the appropriate vehicle to challenge a portion of a cause of action. (Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 385; see Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047 [a demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to part of a cause of action]; see also Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 992, 998 [general demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint fails to state a cause of action under any possible legal theory].)

Therefore, Defendants’ demurrer to the third cause of action on the ground that it fails to state a claim is OVERRULED.

With respect to the fifth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, Defendants argue that it is simply duplicative of the second cause of action. As stated above, redundancy is not a ground for demurrer. (See McDonell v. American Trust Co., supra, 130 Cal.App.2d at pp. 302-303.)

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the fifth cause on the ground that it fails to state a claim is OVERRULED.

With respect to the demurrer by defendant Peery to the entire Complaint, Peery argues that there are no facts suggesting that Peery knew or should have known that Chandler had sexually abused students to state any cause of action. However, this argument ignores Plaintiff’s third cause of action which seeks to hold Peery liable in part for failing to institute and implement school safety plans to prevent child abuse. (See Complaint at ¶ 42.) Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff has alleged at least some facts to state a cause of action against defendant Peery. (See Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 998 [general demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint fails to state a cause of action under any possible legal theory].)

Therefore, Peery’s demurrer to the entire Complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim is OVERRULED.

Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint

Defendants’ motion to strike various provisions of the California Constitution, Education Code, Penal Code and Code of Regulations in the Complaint (see p. 3, lines 11-22; p. 3, line 23 – p. 4, line 11; p. 4, lines 12-16; p. 4, line 28 – p. 5, line 1; p. 5, lines 19-22; p. 6, lines 4-7; p. 7, lines 3-7; p. 11, lines 21-23; p. 13, lines 14-26) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion to strike is granted with respect to portions of the Complaint citing to provisions of the California Constitution. (See Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448 [appellate court held that plaintiff could not maintain action for damages under the “safe schools” clause in the California Constitution]; Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School Dist. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1237-1238 [same].)

However, the court denies the motion with respect to the remaining statutes alleged in the Complaint. The legal authority cited by Defendants pertains only to provisions of the California Constitution. Defendants do not offer any authority or explain why the remaining statutes would be irrelevant in this action. Furthermore, Plaintiff has alleged claims against the District, a public entity, which must be supported by statute. (See Tom Jones Enterprises, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291.) Thus, while a court may, in its discretion, strike portions of a complaint that are irrelevant and improper, matter that is essential to a cause of action should not be stricken. (See Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1281.)

Defendants’ motion to strike the allegations that Chandler was acting within the course and scope of his employment when the alleged sexual abuse occurred (see p. 9, lines 1-9) is DENIED. Defendants argue that such allegations are irrelevant since there is no basis for the District to be held vicariously liable for Chandler’s actions. (See John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 447-452.) Nevertheless, these allegations would support Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants ratified Chandler’s sexually abusive conduct towards minors. (See Baptist v. Robinson, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 169.)

Defendants’ motion to strike the three prior “Jane Doe” allegations (see p. 1, lines 26-27) is DENIED. Defendants argue that such allegations are irrelevant to claims raised in this case. However, issues of notice may be relevant.

Defendants’ motion strike the content of defendant Vijayendran’s notes (see p. 9, line 19 – p. 10, line 4) is DENIED. Defendants argue that such allegations are irrelevant to claims raised in this case. However, these allegations may be relevant with respect to Vijayendran’s knowledge or ratification of Chandler’s alleged sexual abuse of minors.

Defendants’ motion to strike the allegation with respect to defendant Vijayendran’s testimony at her criminal trial (see p. 14, lines 1-3) is DENIED. Defendants argue that such allegations are irrelevant to claims raised in this case. However, these allegations appear to support Plaintiff’s third cause of action which is based in part on the negligent training of school administrators.

Defendants’ motion to strike the prayer for attorney’s fees (see p. 11, lines 7-13; p. 15, lines 23-24) is DENIED. Pursuant to these allegations, Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. “Section 1021.5 codifies California’s version of the private attorney general doctrine, which is an exception to the usual rule that each party bear its own attorney fees. The purpose of the doctrine is to encourage suits enforcing important public policies by providing substantial attorney fees to successful litigants in such cases.” (Robinson v. City of Chowchilla (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 382, 390.)

Here, Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees at the pleading stage is premature since such fees are only awarded to a party who ultimately prevails on a suit to benefit a broad class of citizens. (See Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1217-1218.) Thus, it is sufficient that the Complaint expressly states that the fees are sought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 and alleges that the public will be served by this litigation. (See Complaint at ¶ 34.)