2017-00218831-CU-BC

Tim R. Hunter vs. FCA US, LLC

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Special Interrogatories

Filed By: Hanson, John W.

Plaintiff Tim Hunter’s motion to compel FCA US, LLC’s further responses to special interrogatories is ruled upon as follows.

In this Lemon Law action involving a 2015 Chrysler 200 which Plaintiff alleges had engine defects (transmission shifting problems/stalling) Plaintiff seeks to compel FCA’s further responses to certain of his special interrogatories.

Specifically he seeks to compel further responses to special interrogatories nos. 1-33, 35-37, 38-43, 48, 49, 51, and 53-57. With respect to almost all of the interrogatories, FCA interposed numerous objections, including, that the interrogatories were vague and ambiguous, were compound, and otherwise called for information that was not relevant, and attempted to refer to documents.

At the outset, FCA’s contention that it agreed to supplement certain special interrogatories, or has supplemented the interrogatories, has no bearing on the outcome of the instant motion. Service of responses after the motion was filed does not moot the motion. Plaintiff is still entitled to an order. To be clear, a motion is “made” when it is filed and served. (CCP § 1005.5.) The Court expresses no opinion regarding the sufficiency of any further responses served after the motion was filed.

The Court would note that FCA’s opposition focuses, at least in part, on Plaintiff’s requests for production though this motion is to compel relates to the special interrogatories.

The motion is granted. In opposition, FCA fails to discuss any specific special interrogatory and instead simply refers generally to all interrogatories. Indeed, the sum of its opposition is that “[n]early all of Plaintiff’s special interrogatories contain either a defined term or is compound, conjunctive and disjunctive, and therefore, FCA US placed the proper objections in response.” (Opp. 6: 1-3.)

As the party seeking to resist discovery based upon objections, it was FCA’s burden to justify the objections. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 [citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 220-221].) Chase made no attempt to meet that burden. Other than the statement quoted above, FCA made no legitimate effort to do so.

To the extent that FCA objected on the basis of relevance, that objection is overruled. Here, the interrogatories related to the warranty for Plaintiff’s vehicle, the reasons it was not repurchased, inspections regarding the vehicle, contacts with repair facilities, various contention interrogatories, information regarding other vehicles with the same problems, etc. Indeed, in the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [citations omitted] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 [court’s emphasis].) The interrogatories all relate to issues in this Lemon Law matter. Moreover, even to the extent that they relate to other vehicles, evidence regarding other vehicles with similar defects as Plaintiff’s could potentially be admissible at trial in a lemon law action. ( Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154; see also Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 971.) Such information would certainly be relevant to Plaintiff’s claim for civil penalties under Civil Code § 1794(c) given that Plaintiff must show a willful failure by FCA in complying with its obligations under the Song-Beverly Act. Further, information related to the warranty and repurchase policies could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding Defendant’s compliance with the Song-Beverly Act.

To the extent that the interrogatories touch on vehicles other than Plaintiff’s, the Court limits the scope to cover only similar defects in identical (same year, make, model, in California) vehicles. This deals with FCA’s overbreadth objection.

Further, FCA’s reliance on CCP § 2030.230 is insufficient as the responses currently stand. First, while FCA has opposed the motion, it made no attempt to demonstrate that answering the interrogatories would in fact require it to provide a compilation, abstract, audit or summary of its records to answer, that no such compilation exists, and that the burden of preparing the compilation would be substantially the same for Defendant. (CCP § 2030.230.) Nor do the responses refer to the documents “in sufficient detail to permit the propounding party to locate and to identify, as readily as the responding party can, the documents from which the answer may be ascertained.” (CCP § 2030.230.) Indeed, in most cases, FCA simply referred to “dealer repair orders produced” in response to Plaintiff’s request for production. This is insufficient. “A broad statement that the information is available from a mass of documents is insufficient.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 784.) At a bare minimum, to the extent FCA intends to rely upon CCP § 2030.230, FCA must provide specific identification of the documents that contain the information requested in the interrogatories.

Further, while FCA interposed vague and ambiguous objections to essentially all of the interrogatories, it made no effort to justify those objections and they are overruled.

FCA’s compound objections are also overruled. Case law interpreting CCP § 2030.060(f) governing interrogatories suggests that a practical approach be taken to such an objection and that the prohibition against compound, conjunctive, or disjunctive interrogatories should likely only apply where the interrogatory covers more than a single subject. (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1291.) The interrogatories at issue only cover a single subject.

To the extent that FCA objected on the basis of undue burden, that objection is overruled. Indeed, undue burden objections must be accompanied by a specific

factual showing setting forth the amount of work necessary to respond to the subject discovery. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417-418.) FCA makes no such showing.

The Court rejects the claim that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer. Plaintiff’s counsel sent correspondence specifically discussing these special interrogatories. Indeed, FCA’s counsel’s meet and confer response addressed these interrogatories as well. (Hanson Decl. Exh. 2.) Admittedly, the meet and confer could have been more extensive, but the Court will not deny the motion based on a failure to meet and confer.

To the extent that there were any additional objections not specifically addressed by FCA in its opposition papers and not discussed above they too are also overruled.

No later than March 20, 2018, FCA shall provide further verified responses to Plaintiff’s special interrogatories 1-33, 35-37, 38-43, 48, 49, 51, and 53-57 consistent with the above.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is denied. The Court finds that sanctions would be unjust under the circumstances, especially in light of the minimal meet and confer efforts.