Case Number: BC614219 Hearing Date: March 13, 2018 Dept: 53

clevis management corp. vs. scott ishikawa, et al. ; BC614219, MARCH 13, 2018

[Tentative] Order RE: CROSS-COMPLAINANT’S REQUEST FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Cross-Complainant Scott Ishikawa (“Ishikawa”) requests that the Court enter default judgment against Cross-Defendant Clevis Management Corp. (“Cross-Defendant”). Ishikawa’s Cross-Complaint asserts causes of action for wrongful retaliation in violation of public policy, retaliation in violation of California Labor Code §1102.5, wrongful termination in violation of Cal. Gov’t Code §12940 et seq., wrongful retaliation in violation of Cal. Gov’t Code §12940(h), and hostile work environment harassment in violation of FEHA and Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12940(j) (the “Cross-Complaint”). Ishikawa seeks an award of $2,094,073.60 reflecting $2,093,500.00 as demanded in the Cross-Complaint and $573.60 in costs.

The Court notes several defects with the default judgment request as follows:

First, there is no amount of damages set forth in the Cross-Complaint; therefore, no notice has been given to Cross-Defendant as to the amount of damages that could be awarded against him. Except for personal injury or wrongful death matters, a plaintiff must identify the damages sought against a defendant in the allegations in the complaint or in the prayer. (Becker v S.P.V. Constr. Co. (1980) 27 Cal. 3d 489, 494; Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10(a): “A complaint or cross-complaint shall contain both of the following: (1) A statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language. (2) A demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims to be entitled. If the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the amount demanded shall be stated.” [emphasis added]; see also Dhawan v. Biring (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 963, 971 [holding that a statement of damages does not substitute for an amended complaint where the underlying claims did not involve personal injury or wrongful death].)

Second, the Court finds that no request for dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought was submitted with the default judgment packet, which is required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1800.

Third, Ishikawa has not set forth the authority or evidence supporting a recovery of $2,000,000.00 in emotional damages. The brief submitted by Ishikawa asserts in general terms that Ishikawa’s testimony is sufficient to seek damages for emotional distress; however, there is no authority or evidence supporting the $2,000,000.00 figure. A damages award may not work a “gross injustice” – that is, the award may neither be (1) “so disproportionate to the evidence as to suggest that the [judgment] was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption” or (2) “so out of proportion to the evidence that it shocks [the] conscience.” (Uva v. Evans (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 356, 363-364.) Based on the evidence before the Court, an award of $2,000,000.00 for emotional distress damages in this case would work a gross injustice.

Lastly, Ishikawa seeks “travel and parking fees; copies; motion fees” in the “other” category in his Memorandum of Costs (section 7 of Form CIV-100). Travel, parking, and copy fees are not allowable as costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5.

The Court orders Ishikawa to submit a new default judgment packet upon the correction of the above deficiencies.

DATED: March 13, 2018

_____________________________

Howard L. Halm

Judge of the Superior Court