2017-00214011-CU-PA

Jacque Francis Denhart vs. Steven Spencer Beane

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Strike

Filed By: Robyn, Christopher R.

Defendant Steven Spencer Beane’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages is ruled upon as follows.

This action arises out of a vehicle-motorcycle accident in which Defendant struck Plaintiff’s care while traveling at a speed in excess of the posted speed limit. Defendant, who was operating the motorcycle, “popped a wheelie” but due to the wheelie and his speed, he collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle. Plaintiff, who filed this action using Judicial Council form PLD-PI-001, has merely marked the box indicating that he seeks punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages as a result of the collision.

Defendant moves to strike the claim for punitive damages on the grounds that the limited allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint do not reflect any malicious, fraudulent or oppressive conduct, as required by Civil Code § 3294, that result in injury to Plaintiff. To survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts show entitlement to such relief must be pled by the plaintiff in the complaint. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166; Blegen v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 959, 962, 963.)

Generally, to state a claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted with malice, fraud, or oppression. (Civil Code § 3294.) Nonintentional torts support punitive damages when the defendant’s conduct “involves conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Gawara v. United States Brass Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1361.) Under the statute, “malice” means conduct that is intended to injure the plaintiff or despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard of others. (Civil Code § 3294(c)(1).) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civil Code § 3294(c)(3).) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (Civil Code § 3294(c)(2).) The term ‘”despicable,”‘ though not defined in the statute, is applicable to ‘circumstances that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.”‘ (College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8Cal.4th 704, 725.) “Under the statute, ‘malice does not require actual intent to harm. Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be sufficient where the defendant is

aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228 [citations omitted].)

As a general principle, routine negligent or even reckless disobedience of traffic laws does not justify an award of punitive damages. (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 900.) Here, the Complaint alleges only that Defendant was traveling in excess of the speed limit and that he lifted the front tire of his motorcycle off the ground while traveling down Greenback Lane. Plaintiff cites the language of section 3294 and merely concludes that a motorcycle rider such as Defendant “must have known” or “must have been aware” that driving in excess of the speed limit and driving with a wheelie would limit his ability to steer the motorcycle. (Opp. at p. 4.) Even assuming these allegations are true for purposes of a motion to strike, this is insufficient to establish the requisite level conduct that section 3294 mandates. The allegations as currently pled reflect, at most, a reckless manner of operation of a motorcycle; there is no allegation in the operative complaint that evinces the utter disregard for the safety of others that would support a claim for punitive damages.

To further explicate, the allegations sound only in negligence and are insufficient to allow the pleading of punitive damages.“Malice” under Civil Code §3294(c)(1) means conduct intended to injure the plaintiff or despicable conduct by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of others. Malice “based on a conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights, requires proof that the defendant’s conduct is ‘despicable’ and ‘willful.’” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1211.) “‘[D]espicable’ connotes conduct that is ‘…so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.’” (Id. [citations omitted].) Despicable conduct includes “that which is in blatant violation of law or policy.” (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter, & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1050.) Indeed, “[e]ven ‘nonintentional torts’ may form the basis for punitive damages when the conduct constitutes conscious disregard of the rights or safety of other. [citation omitted] ‘Nonintentional conduct comes within the definition of malicious acts punishable by the assessment of punitive damages when a party intentionally performs an act from which he knows, or should know, it is highly probable harm will result.’ [citation omitted].” (Skf Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 907.)

As the Supreme Court noted in College Hospital (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704), the reference to “despicable” conduct is a substantive limitation on punitive damage awards because the term refers to circumstances which are base, vile or contemptible. (8 Cal.4th at p. 725.) On the continuum of conduct, it is toward the extreme, eliciting adjectives such as vile or base and rousing the contempt or outrage of reasonable people. (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter

& Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1050-1051.) Likewise, oppression requires “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard” of another’s rights. (Civil Code, section 3294(c)(2).) In other words, the bar for recovery of punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294 is quite high.

As noted above, simple negligence cannot support an award of punitive damages ( Grieves v. Superior Court, supra, 157 Cal. App.3d at 166-168) nor can “gross negligence” (Woolslrum v. Mailloux (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 10). Non-intentional conduct can only support a punitive damage award if the defendant intentionally performs an act, and that act is of such severity and shocking character

that it warrants the same treatment as that accorded willful misconduct. (Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279.)

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike is granted with leave to amend.

Plaintiff may file and serve an amended complaint no later than March 23, 2018. Although not required by statute or court rule, Plaintiff is direct to present the clerk a copy of this ruling at the time of filing the amended complaint. Defendant shall respond to the amended complaint within 10 days, or 15 days of the complaint is served by mail.