2017-00216865-CU-BC

Andrew Smith vs. General Motors, LLC

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Production of Documents, Set 1

Filed By: Zhang, Nancy

Plaintiffs Andrew and Rachelle Smith’s motion to compel Defendant General Motors. LLC’s further responses to request for production (set one) is granted as set forth below.

In this Lemon Law action involving a 2011 Buick Enclave which Plaintiffs allege suffered from widespread defects including defects affecting the steering, cooling system and brakes, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant to provide full and complete responses to certain requests for production (set one). Requests nos. 19, 22, 24-26, 37, 40, 42-44, 55, 58, and 60-62 relate to Defendant’s investigations and analysis regarding the defects. Requests 7, 94-97 and 110 relate to Defendant’s warranty and repurchase policies. Defendant interposed numerous objections to the requests for production, including objections based on relevance, burden and oppression, and trade secrets.

Plaintiffs are entitled to information about the Steering, Cooling System and Brake defects regarding other identical (same year, make, model, in California) Buick vehicles. Indeed, in the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [citations omitted] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 [court’s emphasis].) In fact, evidence regarding other vehicles with similar defects as Plaintiff’s could potentially be admissible at trial in a lemon law action. (Donlen v. Ford Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 154; see also Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 971.) Here, for example, the subject documents could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding Defendant’s knowledge of the Steering, Cooling System and Brake defects, that Defendant lacks the means to fix the defects and nevertheless refuses to repurchase Plaintiff’s vehicle. Such information would certainly be relevant to Plaintiff’s’ claim for civil penalties under Civil Code § 1794(c) given that Plaintiffs must show a willful failure by GM in complying with its obligations under the Song-Beverly Act. Further, documents related to the warranty and repurchase policies could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence regarding Defendant’s compliance with the Song-Beverly Act.

The Court’s imposed limitation of the requests above to cover only similar defects in identical (same year, make, model, in California) Buick vehicles effectively addresses Defendant’s vigorous claim that the requests here are hopelessly overbroad and precludes it from even determining what Plaintiff is asking for. The fact that the requests do not specifically indicate whether a non-conformity relates to a complaint about the vehicle or a repair does not, as Defendant argues in opposition, mean that the requests are seeking attorney-work product. While Defendant argues that it would

be required to assert its own theory as to what constitutes a non-conformity, all it must do is simply make a good faith effort to respond to the discovery based upon a reasonable interpretation of the request. The defects were adequately defined in the requests and were tied to Plaintiffs’ vehicle’s repair history. The overbroad objections are overruled. The fact that the documents may involve defects that Plaintiffs’ vehicle did not specifically experience does not render the requests impermissibly overbroad.

Defendant’s burdensome and oppression objections are overruled. Defendant failed to substantiate any objection based on undue burden. Indeed, undue burden objections must be accompanied by a specific factual showing setting forth the amount of work necessary to respond to the subject discovery. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417-418.) There is no declaration from Defendant setting forth any facts to support any claim of burden in this case. Defendant’s opposition is devoid of any factual showing whatsoever and any objection based on undue burden is therefore overruled. Defendant’s claim in the moving papers that it is a large company with offices all over the globe and that it would be required “scour every corner of the global company for anything at all relating to the engine installed in Plaintiffs’ vehicle” is not persuasive. The Code, however, only requires that a responding party make a reasonable inquiry when responding to discovery. Further any burden is lessened due to the fact that as set forth above the discovery is limited to identical vehicles in California.

Plaintiffs also argue that to the extent that the undue burden objection relates to emails and related electronic data, that objection has been waived. An objection to production of ESI on the grounds that it is from a source that is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or expense must “identify in its response the types of categories of sources of electronically stored information.” (CCP § 2031.210
(d).) By objecting on this basis the responding party preserves “any objections it may have relating to that electronically stored information.” (Id.) Defendant argues that no such waiver occurred because the information requested was not otherwise discoverable and that the section only provides for a waiver where the party objects on the basis that the source of the information is not readily accessible and does not impose a waiver where the request is simply overbroad in the first instance. Here, even if it could be said that Defendant had not waived any undue burden objection with respect to any ESI, the fact remains that it failed to substantiate any undue burden objection in its opposition.

In addition, while Defendant interposed objections based on privilege, e.g., trade secret, it failed to indicate whether any documents were withheld on this basis. To the extent that Defendant withheld any documents on the basis of trade secret privileges, it must provide further responses that provides sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including if necessary, a privilege log. (CCP §2031.240.)

The Court would note that Defendant argues that the warranty related documents are protected trade secrets but it presented no evidence in this regard to substantiate that claim. Indeed, it concedes is has not done so as it indicates that it will move for a protective order substantiating the claim in the event it is required to produce such information and the parties cannot agree on a protective order. In reply, Plaintiffs indicate that they proposed a protective order but Defendant has not responded. The parties are encouraged to meet and confer on a protective order to present to the Court for its signature.

In addition, the other boilerplate objections, including the vagueness objection are also overruled. The objections are meritless and no legitimate effort is made to justify them. In sum, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel is granted. Defendant’s boilerplate objections are overruled.

While Defendant complains that Plaintiffs failed to adequately meet and confer, the Court finds that the meet and confer efforts were adequate.

Defendant’s contention that the discovery is moot because it served a CCP § 998 offer is rejected. Plaintiffs have not accepted that offer and the case is still active.

Defendant’s reference to decisions of two other trial courts regarding motions to compel is improper. Those decisions are not binding on this Court and have no relevance to the instant motion.

Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections are overruled.

No later than March 26, 2018, Defendant shall serve further responses in accordance with the above.