2017-00210406-CU-DF

Lambert Davis vs. Sacramento River Cats Baseball Club, LLC

Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Attorney Fees

Filed By: Barnes, Heather A.

Defendants’ Sacramento River Cats Baseball Club, Jeffrey Savage, John Krivacic and

Daniel Emmons’ (“Defendants”) Motion for Attorneys Fees is ruled on as follows:

Defendants’ Requests for Judicial Notice are granted.

Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys Fees and costs is granted in the reasonable amount of $19,163.

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections are sustained for the reasons stated in the Evidentiary Objections filed on February 15, 2018.

Defendants prevailed on their anti-SLAPP motion as to all defendants. CCP Section 425.16(c) provides for the award of attorneys fees to a successful defendant who prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants request fees in the amount of $22,765 and additional costs in the amount of $1,860.

Plaintiff’s opposition does not address the merits of this motion other than to say it is “premature” because defendants are not the prevailing party. The motion is not premature. On January 3, 2018 the Court signed an Order granting Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion, and Defendants filed and served the Notice of Entry of Order on January 16, 2018. This motion was filed on January 24, 2018. Plaintiff filed his motion for reconsideration on January 31, 2018. Without citation to authority, Plaintiff contends that defendants are not yet the prevailing parties because, after they filed their motion for attorneys fees, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s ruling granting the Anti-Slapp motion.

The Court has denied the motion for reconsideration, finding that it contains no new facts, circumstances or law that could not with reasonable diligence been presented at the time plaintiff filed the opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion. Therefore, the Court is ruling on the motion for attorneys fees.

On April 3, 2017, Plaintiff Davis filed this action against Defendants Sacramento River Cats Baseball Club, LLC, President Jeff Savage, Baseball Operations Manager, Daniel Emmons, and former Box Office Manager, John Krivacic, alleging defamation, various invasion of privacy claims, violations of the Freedom of Information Act, Interference with Prospective Business; and Violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. (Exh. 1, 4/3/17 Complaint.) The individual defendants, at relevant times, were all employed by Defendant Sacramento River Cats Baseball Club, which operates a minor league baseball team in the Pacific Coast League. Plaintiffs allegations against the Defendants relate to their alleged copying of Plaintiff s driver license when he picked up complimentary tickets from the River Cats’ box office, and the subsequent use of that copy by Defendants to warn one another of suspicions that Plaintiff or someone he was associated with might be scalping complimentary tickets reserved per rules of the Pacific Coast League for visiting players to assign to friends and family. (Declaration of Heather A.

Barnes in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs (“Barnes Decl.”), ¶ 2, 5.)

A “prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” (Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(c).) “This section authorizes the court to make an award of reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing defendant, which will adequately compensate the defendant for the expense of responding to a baseless lawsuit.” (Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld,
Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 785.) This Court granted Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion in its entirety as to all causes of action, thus

Defendants are unquestionably the prevailing party. (Mann v. Quality Old Time

Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 338 (Anti-SLAPP statute reflects Legislature’s “strong preference for awarding attorney fees to successful defendants,” and “prevailing party” must be interpreted broadly to favor an

award of attorney fees to a successful defendant).) As the prevailing party on their Anti -SLAPP Motion, Defendants are entitled, as a matter of law, to recover against Plaintiff the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs that they incurred in bringing the Anti-SLAPP Motion and Motion for Attorney’s Fees. (Code Civ.

Proc. § 425.16(c); Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131 (award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike is intended to adequately compensate the defendant for the expenses incurred in responding to a SLAPP action). Attorneys’ inefficient or duplicative efforts are not subject to compensation. (Id. [citation omitted].) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id. at p. 1139 [citation omitted].)

When setting a fee award under section 425.16(c), courts generally apply a “lodestar” approach. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1131-1132; Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 658-659 disapproved on other grounds (upholding $130,000 award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 425.16(c) lodestar method.) The lodestar figures are computed by multiplying (a) the number of hours reasonably spent by (b) the reasonable hourly rate for each attorney. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132; Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25,48-49.) Out-of-pocket expenses of the type normally billed to fee-paying clients are added to the lodestar figures, as is the time spent preparing the fee application. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1133, citing Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 633 (“absent circumstances rendering the award unjust, an attorney fee award should ordinarily include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent, including those relating solely to the fee”) (emphasis

in original); Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1419, disapproved on other grounds.)

The Court finds that the hourly rates of Mr. Munoz ($425) and Ms.Barnes ($275) are reasonable. However, upon its review of the evidence of the fees/hours charged, the Court is reducing some of the fees incurred in drafting the anti-slapp motion as the Court finds that the number of hours spent on the motion was excessive. Counsel first prepared separate motions for each defendant and then combined them into one motion. Defendant seeks 22 hours for this task. The Court believes that 11 hours is a reasonable amount of time to have spent on this task and thus reduces the total fees requested ($6,050) by $3,025. An additional 5 hours was billed by Mr. Munoz and 8 hours billed by Ms Barnes for Preparation of motion for attorneys fees, including anticipated reply and attendance at hearing. The Court is reducing those fees (last item on billing summary) by 50%. Thus, it will award $1,062.50 for Mr. Munoz and $1,375 for Ms. Barnes for that entry. The reduction of fees sought for preparation of the anti-SLAPP motion results in the award of fees for a total of 17 1/2 hours for actual preparation of the anti-SLAPP motion (not counting research) rather than the requested 34 hours for preparation of the motion.

Thus the requested attorneys fees of $22,765 are reduced by $5,462 for a total attorneys fee award of $17,303. Costs are awarded in the requested amount of $1860 as all were required to extricate defendant from this anti-SLAPP action.

Total fees and costs are awarded in the amount of $19,163.00.