2016-00199813-CU-WT

Jamileff Haywood vs. Twin Rivers Unified School District

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel 1. Form 2. Employment Law Form 3. Special

Filed By: Williams, Amy E.

Defendant Twin Rivers Unified School District’s motion to compel Plaintiff Jamileff Haywood to provide further responses to form and special interrogatories is ruled upon as follows.

In this employment action, Plaintiff, a former teacher’s assistant with Defendant, alleges claims for whistleblower retaliation based on complaints of alleged violations of Head Start regulations. Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated for reporting the violations.

At issue on the instant motion are Plaintiff’s responses to form interrogatories 2.12, and 12.1-12.7, employment law form interrogatories 200.5, 207.2, 210.2, 210.3, 210.6, 213.1, and 217.1 and special interrogatories Nos. 1-4.

The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s argument that the motion to compel was not timely filed. The motion was filed on November 28, 2017. According to Plaintiff, the last deadline to file a motion to compel to which she agreed was November 20, 2017. Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant requested an extension to November 28, 2017, and that she stated that such an extension was agreeable so long as Defendant agreed to extend her deadline to file a motion to compel regarding Defendant’s responses, but asserts that Defendant never responded prior to November 20, 2017, the previously agreed upon deadline. However, the email from Plaintiff’s counsel specifically shows that Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to the November 28, 2017 deadline and that counsel separately asked for an extension for Plaintiff’s motion to compel. (Cohen Decl. Exh. 6.) Plaintiff’s counsel did not specifically condition extending Defendant’s deadline on Defendant extending Plaintiff’s deadline. In any event, on November 30, 2017, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed Defendant’s counsel indicating that he “assumed [counsel] agreed to mutually move the [motion to compel] deadlines…” (Id. Exh. 6.) Defendant’s counsel confirmed the agreement the next day. (Williams Reply Decl. Exh. AA.) The motion was timely filed pursuant to the parties’ agreement.

Plaintiff’s opposition with respect to the numerous interrogatories is based on three central precepts and neither party specifically discusses any individual interrogatory in the moving or opposition memoranda though they are of course set forth in the separate statement. As a result, the Court will simply address the interrogatories generally based on the arguments set forth in the opening and opposing memoranda.

Plaintiff argues that the further responses to the form interrogatories are not required because of the use of the term “incident.” According to Plaintiff the term “incident” in this employment case is vague because the matter spans months, or years, and involves numerous state employees. Plaintiff argues that such matters are more appropriately addressed in the employment law form interrogatories which she fully responded to. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff must make a good faith effort to, at a minimum, interpret the term “incident” as it relates to her complaint and provide a substantive response accordingly. Indeed, she has alleged that she was retaliated because she was allegedly terminated after reporting violations of the law that she saw in her Head Start class and that she was not paid accrued and unused vacation. “Incident” relates to those matters. Plaintiff can respond to the form interrogatories accordingly.

Indeed, form interrogatories regarding witnesses, interviews, statements, photos and reports certainly meet the broad relevance standard for discovery. In the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its

case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [citations omitted] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612.) The Court must point out that Plaintiff herself took issue with Defendant objecting to the term “incident” in her discovery and requested Defendant amend the responses for the same reasons Defendant now requests that she amend hers. The objection based on “incident” is overruled and must be removed in any further response.

To the extent that Plaintiff argued that the general form interrogatories were duplicative of certain employment law form interrogatories, she has failed to demonstrate that any interrogatories were identical.

Plaintiff also asserted the attorney-client and work product privileges with respect to form interrogatories 12.1-12.7. In opposition she simply indicates that she interposed these objections “to the extent” that they could apply to the vague and ambiguous nature of “incident” and because “it remained unclear what information Defendant was seeking in those interrogatories.” However, as seen above, the objection based on “incident” was overruled. No factual information was set forth in the responses to allow Defendant or the Court to determine the applicability of any privilege. To the extent that Plaintiff interposed objections to the discovery based on privilege, e.g., attorney-client, work-product, she must provide further responses that provides sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including if necessary, a privilege log. (CCP §2030.240.) Plaintiff may provide such a privilege log.

Finally, Defendant argues that many of the interrogatory responses were insufficient because Plaintiff refuses to conduct a diligent search to obtain information required to provide a straightforward response. Defendant argues that Plaintiff avoids all attempts to obtain information relevant to the pertinent Collective Bargaining Agreement applicable to her employment claiming that she was never provided a copy of the CBA during her employment. Plaintiff argues in opposition that her verified responses state that she has never received or seen the CBA before and thus cannot verify the CBA or provide information regarding the CBA. She reasons that she does not have a duty to search the Internet, try to contact former union representatives, or rely upon another party’s discovery responses (a copy was provided to Plaintiff in discovery) in an attempt to obtain information regarding the CBA. However, Plaintiff is required to conduct a reasonable investigation regarding the CBA as a “party cannot plead ignorance to information which can be obtained from sources under his control.” ( Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 782.) Here, the fact that Plaintiff never received a copy of the CBA while she was employed does not allow her to simply avoid answering any questions regarding the CBA. Plaintiff is not, as she contends in opposition, being asked by Defendant to scour public records. Nor is it correct that information that may be in the possession of third parties is not under her control. Plaintiff has been provided an internet link to the CBA and provided a copy of the CBA in discovery. Further, her counsel has produced portions of the CBA in discovery. Plaintiff has a duty to respond in good faith after conducting a reasonable investigation. Plaintiff cannot avoid responding to discovery related to the CBA simply because she contends she was never provided a copy during her employment.

The Court also rejects the contention that Defendant failed to meet and confer. Despite the accusations that Defendant failed to meet and confer on the issues raised by the instant motion, Defendant adequately met and conferred. (E.g., Williams Decl.

Exhs. M, P, R.)

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is denied as Defendant’s motion was successful and thus substantially justified. Defendant’s request for sanctions made for the first time in reply on the basis that Plaintiff improperly accused Defendant of misusing discovery and opposing the motion without substantial justification is denied. Defendant did not request sanctions in the notice of motion nor discuss sanctions in the opening memorandum. “A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanctions sought.” (CCP § 2023.040.) Defendant appears to have recognized this as it filed and served a notice of request for sanctions on January 5, 2018. However, as seen in the Court’s ruling in item 9, this request was dropped for insufficient notice.

As a result, the motion is granted. No later than January 26, 2018, Plaintiff shall provide further verified responses to Defendant’s form interrogatories 2.12, and 12.1-12.7, employment law form interrogatories 200.5, 207.2, 210.2, 210.3, 210.6, 213.1, and 217.1 and special interrogatories Nos. 1-4 as requested in the moving papers.