Defendants JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) and California Reconveyance Company (“CRC”) (collectively, “Defendants”) demur to the complaint (“Complaint”) filed by plaintiff Emura Naoko (“Plaintiff”).

This is an action arising out of the foreclosure of real property located at 5654 Allen Avenue, #3, in San Jose (the “Property”). On October 13, 2000, a deed of trust (“DOT”) was recorded reflecting Plaintiff’s acquisition of the Property with a purchase money loan from GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. in the amount of $147,000. (Complaint, ¶ 1; see also Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exhibit 1.) On March 15, 2006, a DOT securing a loan to Plaintiff in the amount of $200,000 was recorded encumbering the Property. (Id., Exhibit 6.) The lender is identified as Washington Mutual Bank, FA (“WaMu”) and the trustee is identified as CRC. (Id.) On September 25, 2008, Chase acquired certain assets and liabilities of WaMu from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) acting as receiver, including the loan that is the subject of this action. (Id., Exhibit 9.) On November 30, 2010, a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust relating to the March 2006 DOT reflecting an arrearage in the amount of $10,982.16. (Id., Exhibit 11.) On March 2, 2011, a Notice of Trustee’s Sale was recorded relating to the foregoing DOT. (Id., Exhibit 13.) On October 13, 2011, a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded reflecting the sale of the Property at public auction to Chase. (Id., Exhibit 13.)

On June 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed the Complaint asserting the following causes of action: (1) Contractual Fraud; (2) Quiet Title; (3) Declaratory Relief; (4) Equitable Relief; and (5) Injunctive Relief.

On January 9, 2014, Defendants filed the demurrer to each of the five causes of action asserted in the Complaint on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)
Defendants’ request for judicial notice of various recorded documents is GRANTED. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (h); see Alfaro v. Committee Housing Imp. System & Planning Ass’n, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1382; Evans v. Cal. Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 549; see also Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264-265 [stating that “a court may take judicial notice of the fact of a document’s recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document’s legally operative language … [and, f]rom this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect of the recorded document”].)
As an initial matter, to the extent that Plaintiff’s claims are predicated on conduct which occurred in connection with the origination and/or processing of Plaintiff’s loan from WaMu, they are untenable. The explicit terms of the judicially noticed Purchase and Assumption Agreement (“P&A Agreement”) (see RJN, Exhibit 9) indicates that Chase did not assume any liabilities related to WaMu’s lending activities that occurred prior to September 25, 2008. Accordingly, claims based on the origination of Plaintiff’s loan constitute “borrower claims” under Section 2.5 of the P&A Agreement, for which Chase cannot be liable. (See e.g., Armendariz v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (S.D. Cal. 2011) 2011 WL 1869914, *4; see also Ansanelli v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (N.D. Cal. 2011) 2011 WL 1134451, *4.)
Defendants’ demurrer to the first cause of action (Contractual Fraud) on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND. The elements of fraud are (1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure), (2) knowledge of falsity (or scienter), (3) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. (See Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) It is well-settled that fraud claims must be pleaded with particularity; this necessitates pleadings facts showing how, when, where, to whom and by what means the alleged misrepresentations were tendered. (Id. at 645.) Moreover, in actions for fraud against a corporation, a plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations and their authority to speak to speak for the corporation. (Id.; see also Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) The allegations of Plaintiff’s first cause of action fall woefully short of meeting the foregoing standard, with Plaintiff failing to plead what specific misrepresentations were made to her, when, by what means, and by whom. It is also unclear from the allegations of the Complaint how Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of Defendants’ conduct; her loss of the Property was occasioned by her own default. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition is replete with numerous allegations of fraudulent and deceitful conduct on the part of Defendants; however, none of these allegations are actually pleaded in the Complaint itself.
Defendants’ demurrer to the second cause of action (Quiet Title) on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND. Under California law, in order to maintain a cause of action for quiet title, the plaintiff must allege tender or ability to tender the amounts borrowed. (See Aguilar v. Bocci (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 475, 477 [stating that a mortgagor cannot “quiet title without discharging his debt. The cloud upon his title persist until the dent is paid”].) Here, Plaintiff has not made such allegations. Moreover, she has not pleaded Defendants’ adverse interest in the Property or the date on which the determination of title is sought. Both of the foregoing are necessary elements to state a claim for quiet title. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 761.020, subds. (c) and (d).)
Defendants’ demurrer to the third cause of action (Declaratory Relief) on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff fails to plead facts which establish the existence of an actual, present controversy between herself and Defendants. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1060 [requisites of pleading claim for declaratory relief]; see also Tiburon v. Northwestern Pac. R. Co. (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 160, 170.)
Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action (Equitable Relief) on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is SUSTAINED WITH 10 DAYS’ LEAVE TO AMEND. Equitable relief is not a cause of action; rather, it is a form of relief. Further, the nature of this claim is not entirely clear. While the allegations of the fourth cause of action make reference to violations of the “Rosenthal Act” (Complaint at p. 5:21), i.e., the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for unfair debt collection practices because the act of foreclosing upon a property does not qualify as the collection of a debt. (See e.g. Junger v. Bank of America, N.A. (N.D. Cal. 2012) 2012 WL 603262, *4.) Finally, “one who seeks equity must do equity,” i.e., a plaintiff is not entitled to equitable relief unless he or she “provides for the defendant’s equitable rights arising from the same subject matter.” (Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. Pole (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 436, 445.) Here, equity requires Plaintiff to tender the entire indebtedness to Defendants. However, as articulated above, she has not done so.
Defendants’ demurrer to the fifth cause of action (Injunctive Relief) on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. California courts have “consistently classified [claims for injunctive relief] as remedies and not valid causes of action.” (See e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Richter (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 164, 168.) Moreover, a valid cause of action is a prerequisite to obtaining injunctive relief. (See Baden v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 367, 372.) Here, for the reasons articulated above, Plaintiffs have failed to plead such a cause of action.