Robert Turner vs. Ampac Fine Chemicals, LLC

By: Joost, Shawn M.

The demurrer filed by Defendant AMPAC Fine Chemicals LLC is ruled upon as follows.

The Request for Judicial Notice is granted.

This putative class action was filed on March 25, 2015, alleging Defendant unlawfully classified Plaintiff and members of the putative class, all Associate Chemists, as being exempt from overtime. The operative complaint alleges claims for failure to pay overtime, failure to provide accurate wage statement, failure to timely pay wages, unfair competition and a violation of the Private Attorney General’s Act (PAGA) (Cal. Labor Code 2698 et seq.)

On October 18, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. Thereafter, Plaintiff sought leave to amend the First Amended Complaint to add two

new plaintiffs, Sarah Abdallah and Nicholas Dindio. Both proposed Plaintiffs would assert the same claims as Plaintiff Turner, each in his or her individual capacity. On December 4, 2017, the Court granted leave to amend to add Ms. Abdallah and Mr. Dindio as Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint on December 19, 2017. According to the Second Amended Complaint, neither Ms. Abdallah or Mr. Dindio have worked for Ampac since 2013.

Defendant now demurs to the Second Amended Complaint on the grounds that the individual claims asserted by Ms. Abdallah and Mr. Dindio are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, none of which is greater than four years.

As a general principle, when a new party plaintiff wishes to join a lawsuit to enforce his own independent rights, the amended pleading does not relate back to the date of the original complaint, and the statute of limitations defense may be raised. (SeeBartalo v. Superior Court(1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 526, 533.) As the Court noted in its order permitting Plaintiffs to add Ms. Abdallah and Mr. Dindio as individual parties to the Second Amended Complaint:

“This rule also applies to a plaintiff who seeks to intervene in an existing law [Citation.] Therefore the proposed new plaintiff cannot rely on the relation b doctrine such that their 2ndAmended Complaint claims would relate back to date of the filing of the original complaint.However, this is not the end of inquiry, because pursuant toAmerican Pipe & Constr. Co v. Utah(1974)

U.S. 538, 554, “the commencement of a class action suspends the applic statute of limitationsas to all asserted members of the class.”(Order of Dec 2017, emphasis added.) Ultimately, this Court concluded that the “the mo [to amend the complaint] will not be denied on the basis that no cause of ac is stated due to the bar of the statute of limitations.” (Id.) As a parenthetical, Court also noted in the Order of December 4ththat “the better practice is permit plaintiffs to amend the complaint and then let the parties test its l sufficiency in other appropriate proceedings. [Citation.] Indeed, the validity o proposed amendment is generally not considered in deciding whether to g leave to amend. [Citation.] Such challenges to the pleadings are more prop addressed in a demurrer rather than in an opposition to a motion to amend Id.)

Defendant, now relying on the Court’s observations as to procedural propriety in asserting arguments regarding statutes of limitation, now reiterates essentially the same arguments that it did in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to amend the First Amended Complaint. As this Court previously ruled:

“The ‘tolling rule for class actions is not inconsistent with the purposes ser by statutes of limitations’ because the purpose of the statute of limitations

‘met when a class actions is commenced.’ [Citation] AMPAC relies on a si sentence from theJolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.(1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1118 case support its claim that there is no tolling if a class certification motion is de based on lack of commonality of claims. However, that case is inapposite that case tolling was held not to apply since the earlier filed class ac (Sindell) only sought declaratory relief and did not give defendant notice that individual putative plaintiffs were seeking personal injury damages. In this c AMPAC has always been aware of what damages were being sought by putative members of the class. InBangert v. Narmco Materials, INc.(1984)

Cal.App.3d 207, the court, citingAmerican Pipe,held that the filing of complaint told the running of the statute of limitations for all members of purported class until class action certification was denied, eve though, un American Pipe,denial was not for lack of numerosity but for insuffic community of interest. [Citation.]” (Order at p. 2.)

In summary, the Court has already ruled on the issue now presented by the instant motion. For the same reasons that the Court permitted the addition of Ms. Abdallah and Mr. Dindio as Plaintiffs in the Second Amended Complaint, the Court now overrules Defendant’s demurrer. There is no dispute that Ms. Abdallah and Mr. Dindio were members of the putative class from the outset of this action. As explained above, while the relation back doctrine would not save the individual claims of either Ms. Abdallah or Mr. Dinio because they are new parties, the statutes of limitations applicable to their individual claims nevertheless were tolled at the moment that this lawsuit was filed in 2015. The Court denied class action status to this case in December 2017, thus reviving the statute of limitations clock as to the named Plaintiffs’ individual claims. Defendant argues only that every statute of limitations applicable to Abdallah and Dindio have expired, but makes no argument as to specific statutes of limitation to their claims that would have been tolled but now revived.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s demurrer is overruled. Defendant shall file an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on or before March 30, 2018

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