David E. R. Woolley vs Timothy J Trager et al
Case No: 17CV04863
Hearing Date: Wed Apr 04, 2018 9:30

Nature of Proceedings: Motion: Attorney Fees; Case Management Conference

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 is granted. Defendants are awarded $24,379.00 in fees and $116.00 in costs.

BACKGROUND:

This is an action for malicious prosecution brought by attorney-plaintiff David R. Woolley (“Woolley”) against attorney-defendant Timothy J. Trager (“Trager”) and his law firm, defendant Reicker, Pfau, Pyle & McRoy, LLP (“RPPM”). Woolley was the counsel of record for the plaintiffs in an underlying legal malpractice lawsuit entitled Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. BakerHostetler, et al., Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 146617. Shortly before the underlying action settled, Woolley was terminated as counsel for the plaintiffs. Woolley thereafter filed a “Notice of Attorney Lien” in the case for $1,680,120.00. In response to the fee claim, the plaintiffs hired Trager and RPPM to resolve the fee dispute. When Woolley refused to withdraw his lien, Trager filed a motion to terminate the lien. The court denied the motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the fee claim and that the plaintiffs’ remedy was to file a separate declaratory relief action against Woolley.

On June 22, 2017, Woolley filed the instant action for malicious prosecution against Trager and RPPM. On September 15, 2017, Trager and RPPM filed a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 (the “anti-SLAPP” statute), arguing that their actions in the underlying lawsuit involved a protected activity (the filing of a motion) and that Woolley could not establish his malicious prosecution claim as a matter of law. On January 10, 2018, the court granted the special motion to strike and ordered the complaint stricken.

Defendants now move for an award of attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing party on their special motion to strike. Plaintiff opposes the motion on the ground that most of the fees incurred were unnecessary.

ANALYSIS:

Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), the prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike “shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” The award of attorney’s fees to a successful defendant on a special motion to strike under Section 425.16 is “mandatory.” Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131. As the California Supreme Court explained, the purpose of the mandatory fee-shifting provision is to both discourage meritless lawsuits and to provide financial relief to the victim of a SLAPP lawsuit “by imposing the litigation costs on the party seeking to ‘chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for redress of grievances.’” Ibid.

Only those attorney’s fees and costs related to the special motion to strike are recoverable under Section 425.16. Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 92. The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and the hourly rates. Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320. However, the trial court is obligated to award attorney’s fees sufficient to compensate the prevailing party for all matters directly related to the special motion to strike, including any hours reasonably spent on the fee motion. Id., at 92-93; see also, Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 556 (fee award should include compensation for all the hours reasonably spent on the motion and the fee claim). A defendant who prevails on a special motion to strike under Section 425.16 may seek an attorney’s fee award as part of the motion, by a subsequent noticed motion, or as part of its cost memorandum at the conclusion of the litigation. Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corporation (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 461.

In Ketchum v. Moses, supra, the California Supreme Court held that the “lodestar” is the appropriate method for determining reasonable attorney’s fees in an anti-SLAPP motion. “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including . . . (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” Id., at 1132; see also, PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”). The determination of the appropriate amount of fees to be awarded using the lodestar method rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless it was clearly wrong. Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc., supra, at 557.

In this case, defendants seek $17,968.00 in fees related to their successful anti-SLAPP motion, plus $6,411.00 in fees for preparing the current motion, for a total fee award of $24,379.00. Attorney Jared M. Ahern spent 52.2 hours preparing the anti-SLAPP papers, including 30.2 hours reviewing the complaint and background documents, formulating arguments, and preparing the motion, 20.6 hours preparing the reply papers, and 1.4 hours assisting attorney Timothy W. Fredricks in his preparation of oral argument and preparing the notice of ruling after hearing. (Ahern Dec., ¶3.) Mr. Ahern also spent 21.9 hours preparing the motion for attorney’s fees, supporting documents, and reply papers. (Ahern Dec., ¶4; Ahern Reply Dec., ¶7.) Mr. Ahern’s billing rate is $190.00 per hour. (Ahern Dec., ¶5.) Mr. Fredricks spent 32.2 hours on matters related to the anti-SLAPP motion, including revisions to the moving and reply papers and preparing for and attending the hearing on the motion via court call. (Fredricks Dec., ¶3.) Mr. Fredricks also spent, and will spend, 1.0 hour assisting in the preparation of the motion for fees, 3.0 hours preparing for the hearing, and 5.0 hours traveling to and attending the hearing on the motion. (Fredricks Dec., ¶5; Fredricks Reply Dec., ¶3.) Mr. Fredricks’s billing rate is $250.00 per hour. (Fredricks Dec., ¶6.)

In addition to the attorney’s fees, defendants incurred costs of $116.00 for the court call appearance on the special motion to strike. (Ahern Dec., ¶4.)

Plaintiff opposes defendants’ fee motion, arguing that the hours expended by counsel on the anti-SLAPP motion (52.2 hours by Mr. Ahern and 32.2 hours by Mr. Fredricks) are excessive and unsupported by proper documentation. Plaintiff claims that fees for a reply in support of the anti-SLAPP motion were unnecessary because he offered to dismiss the case after defendants filed their special motion to strike. Plaintiff also claims that defendants are seeking to recover fees for two anti-SLAPP motions, the first, filed in Los Angeles Superior Court, where this action was originally venued, and the second, filed in Santa Barbara Superior Court after the action was transferred to this court. Neither argument, however, has merit. First, plaintiff only offered to dismiss the case without prejudice, with each party bearing their own costs. (Woolley Dec., ¶2, Ex. 9.) Defendants declined to accept the offer because they believed their anti-SLAPP motion would likely be granted and they would recover their fees. Second, defendants filed their anti-SLAPP motion in Los Angeles Superior Court to avoid any issue with regard to the timeliness of the motion while the court was deciding whether to transfer the case to the Santa Barbara Superior Court. After the case was transferred, defendants simply filed an amended notice so the motion could be heard by this court. There was no “double” motion, as plaintiff claims.

Plaintiff’s argument that counsel’s declarations do not constitute adequate evidence to support the fee request is equally without merit. The declarations specify the number of hours expended on the anti-SLAPP motion, the anti-SLAPP reply, and the fee motion. Nothing more is required. “Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records.” Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559. Further, the trial court can makes its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of the work done in light of the nature of the case and its familiarity with the attorney’s services on the underlying motion. Weber v. Langhotz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587. Here, the court is very familiar with the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to defendants’ special motion to strike and is able to evaluate the value of the legal services provided. There is no need for detailed billing records.

Having reviewed the record, the court finds that defendants’ requested fees and costs are entirely reasonable given counsel’s experience, the type of work involved, and the complexity of the case. Anti-SLAPP motions require more attorney time than most motions because the moving defendant has a substantial burden. The defendant must first show that the acts of which the plaintiff complains were done “in furtherance of the [defendant’s] right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” Code Civ. Proc. §425.16, subd. (b)(1). If the defendant carries that burden, he or she must then show that there is no “probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” Ibid. Also, the factual background giving rise to this action was quite complex as it involved an underlying legal malpractice lawsuit with numerous parties and an extensive record. (See, Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike Complaint; Timothy J. Trager Declaration and Exhibits; Russ Howard Declaration and Exhibits.)

Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Defendants are awarded attorney’s fees in the sum of $24,379.00 and costs in the sum of $116.00.