Lawzilla Additional Information
The Santa Clara Superior Court records indicate plaintiff’s attorney is Brian P. Moquin.

Defendants McDonald’s USA, LLC (“McDonald’s”) and Samantha Santana (collectively, “Defendants”) move for summary judgment and, in the alternative, summary adjudication of each cause of action in the Verified Complaint filed by plaintiff Tam Khac Nguyen (“Plaintiff”).

Plaintiff’s objections to evidence are OVERRULED for failure to comply with Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(c).

Defendant’s objection to evidence is OVERRULED for failure to comply with Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(c).

Plaintiff’s request for a continuance to conduct additional discovery is DENIED.

A. First Cause of Action (Violation of Labor Code, § 201)

Labor Code section 201 states, in relevant part: “If an employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately.” Plaintiff contends that McDonald’s should have paid Plaintiff all wages and vacation pay earned to date immediately upon suspending Plaintiff without pay for an indefinite period of time. (Complaint, ¶ 26.) Defendants argue that the plain language of Section 201 indicates that it only applies to a “discharge.” Defendants provide undisputed evidence that Plaintiff was suspended and not discharged. (Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication, as to Each of Plaintiff’s Causes of Action (“UMF”), Nos. 8, 10-11.)

Plaintiff argues that California employers have a duty to pay employees all accrued wages immediately upon suspending an employee without pay. Plaintiff contends that the term “discharge” in Labor Code section 201 encompasses more than just termination or separation. Plaintiff cites to several cases in support of his position. None of the cases cited by Plaintiff support Plaintiff’s argument. Plaintiff has not shown that he was entitled to be paid pursuant to Labor Code sections 201 and 203.

B. Second Cause of Action (Defamation)

“Defamation constitutes an injury to reputation; the injury may occur by means of libel or slander.” (Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 1230, 1242, citing Civ Code, § 44.) Defendants argue that (1) Plaintiff cannot establish any defamatory statement that is attributable to Defendants and (2) that any alleged defamatory statements are privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c). The first argument is dispositive.

One of the elements of the tort of defamation is “publication.” In general, each time the defamatory statement is communicated to a third person who understands its defamatory meaning as applied to the plaintiff, the statement is said to have been “published,” although a written dissemination, as suggested by the common meaning of that term, is not required. Each publication ordinarily gives rise to a new cause of action for defamation.

(Shively v. Bozanich, supra, 31 Cal. 4th at p. 1242.)

Defendants provide evidence that Plaintiff cannot identify anyone in McDonald’s management that said something defamatory about him. (UMF, Nos. 30-31.) Defendants also provide evidence that Plaintiff cannot identify any defamatory statement made by Santana about Plaintiff. (UMF, No. 29.) This evidence is undisputed. Plaintiff presents no evidence in opposition that demonstrates the publication of any defamatory statement by Defendants.

In sum, for the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.