The demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it fails to join Octavio Preciado is not opposed, as Plaintiffs agree to “amend and add Octavio Preciado to the Complaint.” (See Pls.’ opposition to demurrer (“Opposition”), p.9:1-2.) The demurrer to the complaint on this ground is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend.

Defendants also demur to the fourth and fifth causes of action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, respectively, on the ground that they are not pled with sufficient particularity. Indeed, these claims fail to “allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.” (Lazar v. Super. Ct. (Rykoff-Sexton, Inc.) (1996) 12 Cal. 4th 631, 645; see also Cadlo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 513, 519 (stating same requirements apply to negligent misrepresentation cause of action, with exception of intent element).) In opposition, Plaintiffs make a number of arguments but do not address the issue of particularity. The demurrer to the fourth and fifth causes of action is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend.

As to the first cause of action for set aside of trustee sale and second cause of action for cancellation of trustee’s deed, the parties both make arguments that are dependent on the fraud claims. (See Defs.’ memorandum of points and authorities in support of demurrer (“Defs.’ memo”), pp.4:24-28, 5:1-2; see also Pls.’ memorandum in opposition to demurrer (“Opposition”), p.9:8-19 (stating that “Plaintiffs in their Complaint has [sic] stated facts to show that Trustee Deed is void or voidable due to the fact it was obtained through fraud, accident or mistake… particularly in their Fourth Cause of Action for Fraud, as argued in Part III C 4 of this Response and their Complaint”); see also Defs.’ reply brief, pp.2:23-28, 3:1-5.) For reasons stated above, the fraud claims are not sufficiently pled. Accordingly, the demurrer to the first and second causes of action is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend.

Likewise, as stated by Plaintiffs in their Opposition, the third and seventh causes of action for quiet title and injunctive relief are also dependent on the claim for fraud. (See Opposition, pp.10:9-17 (stating that “[t]he only way to make Plaintiffs whole after the illegal sale of their property to Set Aside the Trustee Sale, Cancel the Trustee’s Deed and Quiet Title”), 15:1-11 (reiterating prior arguments).) Accordingly, the demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend.

Defendants demur to the sixth cause of action for declaratory relief, asserting that the claim impermissibly seeks to redress a past wrong. (See Defs.’ memo, pp.8:18-27, 9:1-13.) Indeed, “[d]eclaratory procedure operates prospectively, and not merely for the redress of past wrong… [and is not proper] when the rights of the complaining party have crystallized into a cause of action for past wrongs, all relationship between the parties has ceased to exist and there is no conduct of the parties subject to regulation by the court.” (Roberts v. Los Angeles County Bar Assn. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 604, 618.) In opposition, Plaintiffs fail to address this argument. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976)18 Cal. 3d 335, 349 (stating that “Plaintiff [or a defendant answering a complaint] must show in what manner he can amend his complaint [or answer] and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading”), quoting Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co. (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 627, 636; see also Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 723, 742 (stating that “the burden is on the plaintiff [or answering defendant]… to demonstrate the manner in which the complaint [or answer] might be amended”).) The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

As to the eighth cause of action for accounting, Defendants correctly note that “[a] cause of action for an accounting requires a showing that a relationship exists between the plaintiff and defendant that requires an accounting, and that some balance is due the plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting.” (Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 179, citing Brea v. McGlashan (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d 454, 460.) “An action for accounting is not available where the plaintiff alleges the right to recover a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by calculation.” (Id.) Here, the allegations and the facts presented by Plaintiffs in opposition fail to demonstrate that any purported balance can only be ascertained by an accounting. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976)18 Cal. 3d 335, 349 (stating that “Plaintiff [or a defendant answering a complaint] must show in what manner he can amend his complaint [or answer] and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading”), quoting Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co. (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 627, 636; see also Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 723, 742 (stating that “the burden is on the plaintiff [or answering defendant]… to demonstrate the manner in which the complaint [or answer] might be amended”).) The demurrer to the eighth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

The ninth cause of action for unfair business practices and tenth cause of action for conspiracy are necessarily dependent on the prior causes of action. Accordingly, the demurrer to the ninth and tenth causes of action is SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend.