Case Number: SC128419 Hearing Date: April 13, 2018 Dept: O

SC128419

MALEK v. PFEIFFER

Defendant Jon A. Pfeiffer’s Motion for Mandatory Attorney’s Fees in the Amount of $71,770 as Prevailing Party against Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to CCP §425.16 is GRANTED in the amount of $20,800.

ANALYSIS: “A court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney … involved in the presentation of the case. The lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including … (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services…Anchoring the calculation of attorney fees to the lodestar adjustment method is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts. When using the lodestar method to calculate attorney fees the ultimate goal is to determine a ‘reasonable’ attorney fee.” Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271-72 (trial court improperly reduced fee request by 70% across the board based on finding that 70% of the billing entries were block billed or too vague to determine what tasks had been performed; mere fact that 70% of entries were flawed in form did not establish that 70% of the total hours spent were unreasonable).

“The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” Id. The calculation of attorney fees and costs is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court. PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 198, 997 P.2d 511; Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623–624.

A prevailing party on an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs only for the anti-SLAPP motion itself, not for the entire action. See Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1381, 1383. This holding has been slightly expanded, to the extent that it has been interpreted to mean that a prevailing party is entitled to fees “incurred in connection with” the anti-SLAPP motion. See Wanland v. Law Offices of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 15, 21.

Defendant Pfeiffer prevailed on his SLAPP motion as to the only two causes of action alleged against him—the 1st c/a for civil extortion and the 5th c/a for IIED. The only conduct alleged against him in the complaint was drafting a letter to Plaintiffs informing them of Plaintiff Richard Malek’s various breaches of the Operating Agreement. Although the underlying complaint is complex and voluminous, the allegations against Pfeiffer were extremely limited and discrete. Defendant Pfeiffer requests $71,770 in connection with the SLAPP motion based on 146.1 hours of attorney and paralegal time based on hourly rates ranging from $250 to $650 per hour. Using the lodestar method and considering the legal and factual complexity of the issues presented in Defendant Pfeiffer’s SLAPP motion, the Court finds a reasonable fee to be $20,800 (48 hours @ $425/hr).