Case Name: Kathy Hughes v. Target Corporation, et al.

Case No.: 17CV317411

(1) Motion to Compel Defendant Target Corporation Answer Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set One, Post Court Ruling on Defendant Target Corporation’s Objections; Motion for Court Order to Require Defendant Target Corporation to Properly Verify Discovery, Plaintiff’s Set One Special Interrogatories; Request for Monetary Sanctions Against Defendant Target and/or Counsel for Defendant Target Corporation
(2) Motion to Compel Defendant Target Corporation Responses to Plaintiff’s Inspection and Production Demand, Set One, Categories 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 13; For Court Order Requiring Defendant Target Corporation Properly Verify Discovery, Plaintiff’s Set One Inspection and Production Demand; Request for Monetary Sanctions Against Defendant Target Corporation and/or Defendant Target Corporation’s Counsel

Factual and Procedural Background

On October 14, 2015, defendant Target Corporation’s (“Target”) security profiled, approached, and confronted plaintiff Kathy Hughes (“Hughes”) while she was shopping in defendant Target’s store on El Camino Real in Santa Clara, causing plaintiff Hughes to suffer personal injuries. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ¶GN-1; see also FAC, ¶IT-1.) Defendant Target was negligent in hiring and/or training their security and management. (FAC, ¶GN-1; see also FAC, ¶IT-1.)

On October 4, 2017, plaintiff Hughes filed a Judicial Council form complaint against defendant Target asserting causes of action for:

(1) General Negligence
(2) Intentional Tort
(3) False Imprisonment
(4) Defamation of Character

On December 18, 2017, plaintiff Hughes dismissed the third and fourth causes of action.

On January 9, 2018, plaintiff Hughes filed a FAC which now asserts causes of action for:

(1) General Negligence
(2) Intentional Tort

VIII. Plaintiff Hughes’ motion to compel defendant Target’s further response to special interrogatories, set one, etc. is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

A. Discovery Dispute.

On or about January 18, 2018, plaintiff Hughes served defendant Target with special interrogatories (“SI”), set one.

On or about February 16, 2018, defendant Target served plaintiff Hughes with its responses to SI, set one.

Between February 27, 2018 and March 5, 2018, plaintiff Hughes’ counsel and defendant Target’s counsel met and conferred with regard to SI, set one, by exchanging letters.

On March 28, 2018, plaintiff Hughes filed the first of two motions now before the court, a motion to compel defendant Target’s further response to SI, set one, including a request that defendant Target properly verify its response to SI, set one, and a request for monetary sanctions.

B. Merits.

As a preliminary matter, plaintiff Hughes contends the verification by defendant Target is invalid or improper because it is purportedly signed by a “Lead Paralegal of Target Enterprise, Inc.” Plaintiff Hughes contends the responses carry less evidentiary weight or that the agent can later disavow the responses. Plaintiff Hughes cites to no legal authority in support of her argument other than Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.250 which states, in relevant part:

(a) The party to whom the interrogatories are directed shall sign the response under oath unless the response contains only objections.
(b) If that party is a public or private corporation, or a partnership, association, or governmental agency, one of its officers or agents shall sign the response under oath on behalf of that party. If the officer or agent signing the response on behalf of that party is an attorney acting in that capacity for the party, that party waives any lawyer-client privilege and any protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010) during any subsequent discovery from that attorney concerning the identity of the sources of the information contained in the response.

(Emphasis added.)

The court is aware of no authority which prohibits defendant Target from designating any individual, including a Lead Paralegal, as an agent to verify discovery on its behalf. Accordingly, plaintiff Hughes’ motion for court order to require defendant Target to properly verify discovery is DENIED.

“On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete. (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate. (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., §2030.300, subd. (a).)

Plaintiff Hughes seeks to compel defendant Target’s further response to SI, numbers 2 – 4, 8 – 9, 11 – 13, 15 – 18, 22 – 23, 25 – 26, and 28 – 29. In addition to providing substantive responses to each of these SI (except number 9) defendant Target also asserted various general objections including objections, among others, that the SIs were “vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.” Plaintiff Hughes contends the responses themselves are evasive/incomplete and the objections are without merit.

In reviewing defendant Target’s substantive responses, the court finds defendant Target’s responses to SI, numbers 2 and 28, to be evasive or incomplete. SI, number 2, asks defendant Target to, “State the name of the El Camino Real Santa Clara Target store manager in October 2015.” Defendant Target objected but also provided the following substantive response: “The subject Target store has various personnel who act as ‘store manager’ depending on the shift and the day. Assuming plaintiff is seeking the identity of the Leader on Duty at the subject Target store on the date and time of the incident, Chris Beagle.” SI, number 28, asks defendant Target to, “List the name of each person working in management at the Target store on El Camino Real in Santa Clara in the year 2015 along with their position.” Defendant Target objected but also provided the following substantive response: “the Leader on Duty at the time of the incident was Chris Beagle.”

“Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (a).) To the extent defendant Target acknowledges multiple “store managers” besides Chris Beagle, defendant Target shall provide the names of those other store managers. SI, numbers 2 and 28, do not limit the response to the date and time of the specific incident.

The party objecting to a discovery request bears the burden of explaining and justifying the objections. (See Coy v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221; see also Weil & Brown et al., CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: CIV. PRO. BEFORE TRIAL (The Rutter Group 2017) ¶8:1179, p. 8F-68.) In reviewing defendant Target’s objections to the SI at issue, the court finds merit to defendant Target’s objection to SI, numbers 3, 8, 11 – 13, and 29. For example, SI number 13 asks defendant Target to, “List each person by name that has ever had any contact with plaintiff Kathy Hughes at a Target store along with each person listed’s affiliation with Target.” As phrased, the interrogatory is indeed overbroad and calls for speculation.

Accordingly, plaintiff Hughes’ motion to compel 2 – 23, 25 – 26, and 28 – 29 is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. As discussed above, defendant Target shall provide a further response, without objection, in compliance with the Code of Civil Procedure to SI, set one, numbers 2 and 28. Defendant Target shall provide an amended response withdrawing objections to SI, numbers 4, 9, 15 – 18, 22 – 23, 25 – 26, and 29, but need not provide any further substantive response.

C. Sanctions.

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., §2030.300, subd. (d).) As neither party entirely prevailed, plaintiff Hughes’ and defendant Target’s requests for monetary sanctions are DENIED.

IX. Plaintiff Hughes’ motion to compel defendant Target’s further response to demand for inspection and production of documents, set one, etc. is DENIED.

A. Discovery Dispute.

On or about January 18, 2018, plaintiff Hughes served defendant Target with a demand for inspection and production of documents (“RPD”), set one.

On or about February 16, 2018, defendant Target served plaintiff Hughes with its responses to RPD, set one.

Between February 26, 2018 and March 8, 2018, plaintiff Hughes’ counsel and defendant Target’s counsel met and conferred with regard to RPD, set one, by exchanging letters.

On March 28, 2018, plaintiff Hughes filed the second of two motions now before the court, a motion to compel defendant Target’s further response to RPD, set one, and production thereof including a request that defendant Target properly verify its response to SI, set one. Plaintiff Hughes also requests monetary sanctions.

B. Merits.

As a preliminary matter, plaintiff Hughes contends the verification by defendant Target is invalid or improper because it is purportedly signed by a “Lead Paralegal of Target Enterprise, Inc.” Plaintiff Hughes contends the responses verified by a “Lead Paralegal” are not believable or that the agent can later disavow the responses. Plaintiff Hughes cites to no legal authority in support of her argument other than Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.250 which states, in relevant part:

(a) The party to whom the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is directed shall sign the response under oath unless the response contains only objections.
(b) If that party is a public or private corporation or a partnership or association or governmental agency, one of its officers or agents shall sign the response under oath on behalf of that party. If the officer or agent signing the response on behalf of that party is an attorney acting in that capacity for a party, that party waives any lawyer-client privilege and any protection for work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010) during any subsequent discovery from that attorney concerning the identity of the sources of the information contained in the response.

(Emphasis added.)

The court is aware of no authority which prohibits defendant Target from designating any individual, including a Lead Paralegal, as an agent to verify discovery on its behalf. Accordingly, plaintiff Hughes’ motion for court order to require defendant Target to properly verify discovery is DENIED.

Upon receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, including requests for the production of documents, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply:

1. A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.
2. A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.
3. An objection in the response is without merit or too general.

(Code Civ. Proc., §2031.310, subd. (a)(1) – (3).)

The motion for order compelling further responses “shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., §2031.310, subd. (b)(1); Kirkland v. Sup. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98 (Kirkland).) To establish “good cause,” the burden is on the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter (e.g., how the information in the documents would tend to prove or disprove some issue in the case) and specific facts justifying discovery (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). (Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.4th 1113, 1117.) Where the moving party establishes “good cause,” the burden shifts to the responding party to justify its objections. (Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.)

Plaintiff Hughes seeks to compel defendant Target’s further response to RPD, numbers 4 – 5, 7 – 10, and 13. The court finds plaintiff Hughes has not made a sufficient showing of good cause for the production of the documents requested. For example, RPD, number 4 seeks, “The resume for each Target store security employee at the El Camino Real, Santa Clara Target store, on October 14, 2015.” In her separate statement, plaintiff Hughes contends, “Obviously, nothing could be more relevant. Facts are set forth by Plaintiff Kathy Hughes she was profiled as a Portuguese female by Target security and Defendant Target management. Defendant Target’s counsel claims: ‘Target spends a significant amount of time and money developing and updating its training policies and procedures…’ The resumes for Target store security are solely in Defendant Target Corporation’s custody, discoverable, just as in a motor vehicle collision on the drivers licensing and training of the involved drivers are discoverable. It is elementary. Objections are in bad faith. Laughable; Plaintiff intends to prove that Defendant Target made the decision with Defendant’s intentional acts, including structure, hiring and training, to allow Plaintiff Kathy Hughes to be a victim.”

Plaintiff Hughes does not explain how the resume for each security employee at the subject Target store on the date of the incident has a tendency to prove or disprove that defendant Target profiled plaintiff Hughes or any other issue in this case. Plaintiff Hughes offers an incomplete analogy by comparing the discovery sought here to discovery concerning a driver’s licensing and training in a motor vehicle collision. Presumably, plaintiff Hughes is seeking discovery with regard to whether a particular Target security employee(s) met a particular standard of care. However, plaintiff Hughes does not explain how this is relevant to any issue involving corporate defendant Target’s liability in this case. Moreover, there is no explanation as to how the resume for “each security employee” bears any relevance. The burden is on plaintiff Hughes to demonstrate and not the court’s burden to surmise good cause.

In short, plaintiff Hughes has not adequately demonstrated good cause for production of the documents requested. Accordingly, plaintiff Hughes’ motion to compel defendant Target’s further response to RPD, numbers 4 – 5, 7 – 10, and 13 and production thereof is DENIED.

C. Sanctions.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (h) mandates an award of monetary sanctions “against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

Since plaintiff Hughes did not successfully make this motion to compel, plaintiff Hughes’ request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

In opposition, defendant Target requests monetary sanctions against plaintiff Hughes. Defendant Target’s counsel declares she spent eight hours at the rate of $200 per hour to review letters from plaintiff’s counsel and to prepare the papers in opposition to this discovery motion. Since defendant Target prevailed, defendant Target is entitled to sanctions, but the court finds the amount requested unreasonable. Defendant Target’s request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED. Plaintiff Hughes shall pay $600 to defendant Target within 30 calendar days from entry of this order.