Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED in its entirety.

BACKGROUND:

Plaintiff commenced this action on 2/5/13, against defendant, for: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) breach of oral contract; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) dissolution; and (6) accounting. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on 12/4/13 alleging the same six causes of action.

As early as May 2010, plaintiff began to perform services in connection with projects undertaken by defendant Pigg. (FAC ¶ 7.) Plaintiff also brought business opportunities to Pigg to be undertaken by Pigg and plaintiff. (Ibid.) Plaintiff worked with defendant until the latter part of 2012. (Ibid.) While plaintiff was paid some money for his work from May 2010 through the early part of 2012, those payments eventually stopped. (Id., ¶ 9.) Pigg then insisted that plaintiff would not be paid, even for work already performed, unless plaintiff executed a “consulting agreement” that would entitle plaintiff to only a fraction of what he was already owed and a smaller portion of future revenues. (Ibid.) Plaintiff did not execute this agreement or ever agree to a different compensation structure. (Ibid.) Pigg has ignored plaintiff’s demands for appropriate payment. (Id., ¶ 10.)

ANALYSIS:
Defendant seeks to strike plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. The standard of proof for recovery of punitive damages is “clear and convincing” evidence of malice, fraud, or oppression. (Civil Code § 3294(a).) Under Civil Code 3294(c),

[¶] (1) ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. [¶] (2) ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. [¶] (3) ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

“In determining whether a complaint states facts sufficient to sustain punitive damages, the challenged allegations must be read in context with the other facts alleged in the complaint. Further, even though certain language pleads ultimate facts or conclusions of law, such language when read in context with the facts alleged as to defendants’ conduct may adequately plead the evil motive requisite to recovery of punitive damages.” (Monge v. Superior Court (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 503, 510.) The inquiry is generally fact specific to the nature of the claim raised and the context in which the damages are sought, but “the critical element is an ‘evil motive’ of the defendant.” (Ibid.) “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff’s rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.'” (American Airlines v. Sheppard (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1051.)

Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support the request for punitive damages. At most, plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to pay plaintiff for work performed and tried to renegotiate their partnership agreement. (See FAC ¶¶ 9-10.) Defendant’s communication with a client that plaintiff’s departure from the business was imminent is not enough to support a claim for punitive damages. (See id., ¶ 15.) These facts do not establish that defendant intended to injure plaintiff or engaged in despicable conduct. There are no allegations that defendant committed oppression or fraud.

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED in its entirety. However, today’s ruling is without prejudice to plaintiff amending his complaint should future discovery show the predicate facts for punitive damages.