Case Number: 16K12055 Hearing Date: May 30, 2018 Dept: 94

Defendant Abram Gonzalez’s Motion for Terminating Sanctions is GRANTED. This action is hereby dismissed with prejudice pursuant to CCP § 2023.030(d)(3).

On September 28, 2016, Plaintiff Celia Rodriguez Cabrera (“Plaintiff “) filed this action against Defendant Abram Gonzalez (“Defendant”) for alleged damages arising from a September 30, 2014 vehicle collision. On November 28, 2016, Defendant filed an Answer. On April 3, 2018, the Court granted motions to compel plaintiff’s deposition and responses to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and request for production of documents, and ordered Plaintiff to pay monetary sanctions to Defendant (the “April 3, 2018 Order”).

On April 23, 2018, Defendant filed a Motion for Terminating Sanctions because Plaintiff failed to obey the April 3, 2018 Order.

Legal Standard

The court may impose a terminating sanction by one of the following orders:

An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process.

An order staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed.

An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party.

An order rendering a judgment by default against that party.

(CCP § 2023.030(d).)

The Court may impose terminating sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process. (Id.) Misuse of the discovery process includes failure to respond to an authorized method of discovery or disobeying a court order to provide discovery. (Id. §§ 2023.010(d), (g).) The court should look to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether terminating sanctions are appropriate. (Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1229.) There are, however, circumstances where imposition of terminating sanctions is appropriate without first imposing issue and/or evidentiary sanctions. (See Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 481, 490-91.) Ultimate discovery sanctions are justified where there is a willful discovery order violation, a history of abuse, and evidence showing that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with discovery rules. (Van Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1516.)

Discussion

As noted in the April 3, 2018 Order, Plaintiff was abusing the discovery process by failing to respond to Defendant’s discovery requests and to attend her noticed deposition. As a result, the Court ordered Plaintiff to comply with her discovery obligations on April 3, 2018, and the Order was served on Plaintiff. (Exh. A.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff still has not complied with any part of the April 3, 2018 Order (Messina Decl. ¶¶ 7-13), nor has Plaintiff filed an opposition to this Motion to explain her failure to comply with the Court’s Order and her discovery obligations. This long pattern of abuse of the discovery process and disobedience with this Court’s Order by Plaintiff cannot reasonably construe as anything less than willful disobedience.

Since Plaintiff filed her Complaint on September 28, 2016, she has not made any general appearance in this action other than to deposit her jury fees on November 28, 2016. It appears, therefore, that Plaintiff is no longer interested or willing to prosecute her claims.

In view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court is persuaded that less severe sanctions would not bring Plaintiff into compliance with the discovery process. “The court [is] not required to allow this pattern of abuse to continue ad infinitum.” (Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 280.) The Court, therefore, finds that terminating sanctions are appropriate here. Accordingly, the Motion is GRANTED. This action is hereby dismissed with prejudice pursuant to CCP § 2023.030(d)(3).

Moving party to give notice.