Case Number: BC645137 Hearing Date: May 31, 2018 Dept: 47

Christine Castillo v. La Canada Unified School District

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

MOVING PARTY: Defendant La Canada Unified School District

RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Christine Castillo

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS:

Plaintiff alleges that she suffered sex discrimination as a result of notifying her employer that she was pregnant a month after she was hired to be principal of La Canada Elementary School.

Defendant La Canada Unified School District moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication as to the second amended complaint.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant La Canada Unified School District’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The alternative motion for summary adjudication is DENIED as to Issues Nos. 1 and 2.

DISCUSSION:

Requests For Judicial Notice

Defendant’s request that the Court take judicial notice of the second amended complaint filed in this action and the Court’s tentative ruling regarding Defendant’s demurrer to the second amended complaint is GRANTED per Evid. Code § 452(d)(court records).

Plaintiff’s request that the Court take judicial notice of the right to sue letter from the Department of Fair Employment and housing, dated March 28, 2017 is GRANTED. Pursuant to Evid. Code § 452(c), the Court may take judicial notice of official records of an administrative agency. Ordlock v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 897, 912.

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections

Pursuant to CCP § 437c(q), the Court declines to rule on Defendant’s evidentiary objections as they are directed to evidence which the Court does not deem to be material to the disposition of this motion.

Motion For Summary Judgment/Motion for Summary Adjudication

Because only one cause of action remains, there is no distinction between a motion for summary judgment and motion for summary adjudication in the instant case.

1. Issue No. 1: “The District I entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action for Retaliation. because plaintiff: (1) Has no evidence that she was subjected to an adverse action; (2) Has no evidence of causation; and (3) Plaintiff has no evidence refuting defendant’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for putting her on the 39-month list.”

Re: Plaintiff has no evidence that she was subjected to an adverse action.

Plaintiff allegedly discovered that she was supposedly terminated as of March 1, 2016 when she read the payroll document sent to her by the La Canada Unified School District (“LCUSD”), as the document read: “TERMINATION DATE / 03/01/16 / REASON / MISCELLANEOUS / OTHER.” Def’s Exh. H. Accordingly to Defendant, the LCUSD had no part in preparing the document, but rather, the Los Angeles County Office of Education (“LACOE”)—an entity which provides payroll services to the district—prepared the document. UF No. 21; Decl. of Wendy Sinnette, ¶ 7. However, Defendant has not offered an explanation as to how the LACOE got the information which led it to indicate “TERMINATED” on the payroll document. For instance, did the LACOE create the “TERMINATED” status out of thin air? As the moving party, it was Defendant’s burden to explain how this occurred, for instance, by obtaining the deposition testimony of someone at LACOE explaining why it utilized a “TERMINATED” status on the payroll document. The reasonable inference[1] is that Defendant LCUSD told the LACOE that Plaintiff’s status was “TERMINATED.” Because Defendant has not met its burden of explaining away this inference, Defendant has not met its initial burden on this subissue and the burden does not shift to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Re: Plaintiff has no evidence of causation.

Defendant argues that even if Plaintiff had been terminated on March 1, 2016, that adverse employment action occurred nearly a year after Plaintiff filed her complaint for pregnancy discrimination on April 5, 2015. However, there is no presumption that this year-plus period negates an inference of causation as a matter of law. The Court finds that it is a question of fact for a jury as to whether, if Defendant in fact informed the LACOE that Plaintiff’s employment had been terminated, such termination was motivated by pregnancy discrimination. Defendant has not met its initial burden on this subissue and the burden does not shift to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

Re: Plaintiff has not evidence refuting defendant’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for putting her on the 39-month list.

This subissue is inapposite to Plaintiff’s theory that she was terminated. As the Court previously ruled, to the extent Plaintiff’ claim was that being placed on the 39-month list was an adverse employment action, this achieved a degree of permanence and finality at the time she was placed on that list in March 2016. 2AC, ¶ 56. Yet, Plaintiff’s theory of termination is that she was terminated as of that date. Defendant explains why Plaintiff was placed on a 39-month list, but does not explain why LACOE had information reflecting that Plaintiff was “TERMINATED.” Thus, absent a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for informing LACOE that Plaintiff had been “TERMINATED,” Defendant’s proffered reason for placing Plaintiff on the 39-month list is insufficient to shift the burden on this subissue. The burden does not shift to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

The motion for summary adjudication as to Issue No. 1 is DENIED in its entirety.

2. Issue No. 2: “The District is entitled to Judgment on plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for retaliation because, even in plaintiff had been terminated by the District, the claim is still time-barred.”

The 2AC alleges at ¶ 68 that it was not until March 27, 2017 that Plaintiff first learned that she had been terminated from her employment with LCUSD. As pointed out by Plaintiff, Gov. Code § 12960(d)(1) provides:

(d) No complaint may be filed after the expiration of one year from the date upon which the alleged unlawful practice or refusal to cooperate occurred, except that this period may be extended as follows:

(1) For a period of time not to exceed 90 days following the expiration of that year, if a person allegedly aggrieved by an unlawful practice first obtained knowledge of the facts of the alleged unlawful practice after the expiration of one year from the date of their occurrence.

Here, because Plaintiff alleges that she did not learn of her purported termination until March 27, 2017, she would have had a year plus 90 days from the supposed March 1, 2016 terminated date reflect in the payroll document, which extended period would have expired on May 30, 2017. Plaintiff filed her DFEH complaint on March 28, 2017 and received her right to sue letter on that same date. Pltf’s RJN, Exh. A. Under this analysis, Plaintiff timely filed her DFEH complaint. Defendant has not met its initial burden on this issue and the burden does not shift to Plaintiff to raise a triable issue of material fact.

The motion for summary adjudication as to Issue No. 2 is DENIED in its entirety.

Moving party to give notice, unless waived.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 31, 2018 ___________________________________

Randolph M. Hammock

Judge of the Superior Court

Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

[1]

In ruling on the motion, the court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Id. at p. 843.) “We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. [Citation.]” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037 [32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436, 116 P.3d 1123] (Yanowitz).)

Kelley v. The Conco Companies (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 191, 202, superseded by statute on other grounds as state in Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239..