DAVID CHRISTENSEN V. DREAM WORLD PARTNERS

Case Number: BC679925 Hearing Date: May 31, 2018 Dept: 73

5/31/18
Dept. 73
Rafael Ongkeko, Judge presiding

DAVID CHRISTENSEN V. DREAM WORLD PARTNERS (BC679925)

Counsel for plaintiff/moving party: Todd Friedman; Adrian Bacon (L.O. of Todd Friedman)
Counsel for defendant/opposing party Dream World Partners, Inc.: Lee Miller; Ilana Kaufman (Miller Law Partners)

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (filed 5/7/18)

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a First Amended Complaint is GRANTED. The FAC is deemed served. Defendant’s responsive pleading shall be filed and served no later than June 15, 2018.

DISCUSSION (Please note: Unfortunately, the court’s tentative ruling website, which is the source of this version, is not able to show certain formatting that may be contained in the original, such as the court’s use of footnotes, boldface, italics, or the underscoring of case citations. A hard copy will be available for review in court before the hearing.)

On May 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed this motion for leave to file a First Amended Complaint to add a cause of action for Remedies under California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. [The FAC lists the PAGA violation as C/A 9, bumping Plaintiff’s cause of action for Unfair Business Practices to C/A 10 and Plaintiff’s wrongful constructive discharge in violation of public policy cause of action to C/A 11.]

On May 16, 2018, Defendant filed an opposition, arguing: (1) per Code of Civil Procedure section 340, Plaintiff does not have standing to bring a PAGA claim; and (2) Plaintiff’s letter to the LWDA fails to meet the notice requirements under Labor Code section 2699.3. Regarding the latter, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient facts and theories to satisfy notice requirements because the notice Plaintiff sent to the LWDA and Defendant on March 26, 2018, only contained boilerplate accusations and conclusions and did not contain enough specific factual support to apprise the LWDA or Defendant of the alleged Labor Code violations. Defendant claims the letter was insufficient to apprise them of the “facts and theories” supporting Plaintiff’s Labor Code claims. However, Plaintiff’s LWDA notice is more akin to the notices in Green and Conde than the notices in Alcantar and Gunn. Although Plaintiff’s letter is two pages long, and singled-spaced, Plaintiff’s notice sets forth the specific statutes Defendant purportedly violated; facts showing how Defendant purportedly violated those statutes; facts as to what position Plaintiff held; and facts as to when Plaintiff held the position and was employed by Defendant. The letter also attaches the underlying 19-page complaint that was filed on 10/16/17.

On May 23, 2018, Plaintiff filed a reply, arguing: (1) he sufficiently detailed the facts surrounding the violation of the Labor Code in his notice letter; and (2) has standing.

Merits
California Civil Procedure allows liberal amendment of pleadings. California Code of Civil Procedure section 473 states that the court may allow a party to amend any pleading if amendment is in the furtherance of justice. When ruling on a motion for leave to amend a pleading, the trial court has “wide discretion” and the ruling will be upheld “unless a manifest or gross abuse of discretion” is shown. (Record v. Reason (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 472, 486.) Leave to amend at any time is liberally allowed in the interests of justice and in the absence of prejudice to another party, even up to the time of trial. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 473, subd. (a)(1) & 576; Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487.) “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.” (Morgan v. Super. Ct. (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.)

Whether Plaintiff Has Standing to Bring a PAGA Claim?

The Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) allows employees to initiate a civil action against their employers for violations of the Labor Code. (Lab. Code, § 2698; Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 370, 374–375.) Per Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (a), PAGA penalties are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. (See also Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1199.) However, a plaintiff must file an administrative LWDA notice as a prerequisite of bringing suit under Labor Code section 2699.3, which must be filed within one year after the workplace wage violation at issue. (Temple v. Guardsmark LLC (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011) 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21100, 25.) The statute of limitations “is calculated from the time that the precondition of suit [of filing an administrative LWDA notice] is met.” (Ibid.) After filing the written notice to the LWDA, the LWDA has 30 days to notify the employer and employee that it intends to investigate, or, if the LWDA does not provide notice within 33 days, the plaintiff may file a civil action. (Lab. Code, § 2699.3, subd. (a)(2)(A).) A plaintiff may amend an existing complaint to add a PAGA claim within 60 days of the one-year-and-33-day period under Labor Code section 2699.3, subdivision (a)(2)(C), and may do so “as a matter of right.”

Once the LWDA provides a response or, as in this case, 33 days passed without a response, Plaintiff’s administrative remedies were effectively exhausted, and he had 60 days to file the (amended) complaint (i.e., May 25, 2018). Defendant did not stipulate to the amendment, resulting in this motion, which was filed on May 7, 2018. Thus, Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is not barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, Plaintiff may amend his complaint “as a matter of right” with a relation-back to the filing of the original complaint. Moreover, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff did not reside in California during the relevant statute of limitations period is fact-based, disputed, and not sufficiently prejudicial to the Defendant at this stage so as to preclude leave to amend.

Whether the LWDA Letter is Sufficient?

Before an employee can bring a civil action to recover civil penalties for violations of the Labor Code, the employee must follow the administrative procedures set forth in Labor Code section 2699.3. (See Lab. Code, § 2699(a); Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 374-76.)

Section 2699.3 provides that a civil action by an aggrieved employee shall commence only after (1) the aggrieved employee or representative gives written notice by online filing with the LWDA and by certified mail to the employer of the specific provisions of this code alleged to have been violated, including the facts and theories to support the alleged violation and pays a $75 filing fee; and (2) the agency notifies the employer and the aggrieved employee or representative by certified mail within 60 days that it does not intend to investigate the alleged violation, or the agency notifies the employer and aggrieved employee or representative by certified mail of its decision within 65 calendar days of its intent to investigate and subsequently determines no citation will be issued. (See id., § 2699.3(a).) An aggrieved employee may also commence a civil action pursuant to section 2699 if the agency fails to provide timely or any notification. (See id., § 2699.3(a)(2)(B).) The purpose of section 2699.3 is to ensure the LWDA has sufficient information to conduct an investigation and for the employer to have an opportunity to cure any violations. (See Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545-46; see also Willner v. Manpower Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2014) 35 F.Supp.3d 1116, 1135.)

With respect to cases dealing with the sufficiency of LWDA notices, courts have recognized that such notices are sufficient so long as they contain some basic facts about the violations. (See, e.g., Green v. Bank of America, N.A. (9th Cir. 2015) 634 Fed.Appx. 188, 191.) California courts have found LWDA notices containing the specific statutes the defendant allegedly violated, facts about the plaintiff’s position and period of employment, and facts supporting the legal theory underpinning the plaintiff’s claims to be sufficient. (See Conde v. Open Door Marketing, LLC (N.D. Cal. 2017) 223 F.Supp.3d 949, 971-72; Stevens v. Datascan Field Services LLC (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19289 at *7-12.)

While courts have found that LWDA notices containing specific identities of aggrieved employees are sufficient, the LWDA notices in these cases also contained some facts and theories. (See e.g., Green, supra, 634 Fed.Appx. at 191; Cardenas v. McLane Food Services, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2011) 796 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1259-61; Moua v. IBM (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11081 at 14-15.) Given the sufficiency of LWDA notices has been recognized without requiring the specific identities of aggrieved employees, Green, Cardenas, and Moua do not stand for the proposition that the specific identities of aggrieved employees must be contained in a LWDA notice before the notice may be deemed sufficient.

In terms of finding LWDA notices insufficient, courts have held that notices containing only a string of legal conclusions with no factual allegations are insufficient because such notices did not provide sufficient information to permit the LWDA to “intelligently assess the seriousness of the alleged violations” and the employer “to determine what policies or practices are being complained of so as to know whether to fold or fight.” (See, e.g., Alcantar v. Hobart Service (9th Cir. 2015) 800 F.3d 1047, 1056-58; Gunn v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc. (S.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167785 at 5-10.)

While Plaintiff’s LWDA letter does not allege specific instances of each time he was alleged not to have been provided a meal or rest break, under California’s liberal pleading standards, a plaintiff is not required to plead all the evidence it may have with respect to his or her claims. Rather, a plaintiff need only put the defendant on sufficient notice of the allegations against them. Plaintiff’s notice is thus more than just legal conclusions without factual support. There is sufficient information to allow the LWDA to assess the seriousness of the violations and Defendant to determine what policies or practices are being complained of and how to respond accordingly. As such, Plaintiff’s LWDA notice is adequate to satisfy section 2699.3, particularly so when, as the reply shows, the notice attaches the underlying lengthy original complaint.

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint is GRANTED.

Unless waived, notice of ruling by moving party.

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