The court DENIES the motion to compel further responses as to Request For Production No. 24, GRANTS as to Request For Production Nos. 142-143, and DENIES as to sanctions.

DENY: Request For Production No. 24

As a preliminary matter, the court OVERRULES all Plaintiff’s objections except for the right to privacy. Absent a claim of privilege or attorney work product, the moving party has shown good cause simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. Once good cause is shown, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify the objection. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal. App. 4th 92, 98.) Here, Plaintiff has placed her innocence at issue by contending that she was arrested because of something her estranged husband had allegedly done. With respect to objections not asserting a privilege, Plaintiff has failed to justify them in her opposition. As for the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, Plaintiff did not identify in her privilege log any documents withheld on those grounds.

As for Plaintiff’s withholding of her bank records on the ground of privacy, the court SUSTAINS the objection.

The bank records at issue are most relevant to Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant violated Lab. Code, Section 432.7. Subdivision (a) of that section provides in relevant part, an employer shall not

“seek from any source whatsoever, or utilize, as a factor in determining any condition of employment including hiring, promotion, termination, or any apprenticeship training program or any other training program leading to employment, any record of arrest or detention which did not result in conviction, . . .. Nothing in this section shall prevent an employer from asking an employee or applicant for employment about an arrest for which the employee or applicant is out on bail or on his or her own recognizance pending trial.”

While an employer may ask an employee about an arrest for which she is awaiting trial, it may not “use the information of a mere arrest for disciplinary purposes. To hold otherwise would violate the fundamental presumption of a suspect’s innocence prior to the contrary being proved.” (Pitman v. City of Oakland (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1044.) “The clear purpose of section 432.7 is to prevent the misuse of criminal offender records information, not to shelter an employee from an investigation by his employer for serious misconduct. . . .

The obvious intent of the legislation is to prevent the adverse impact on employment opportunities of information concerning arrests where culpability cannot be proved.” (Ibid.) It thus appears that, unless there is a conviction, Plaintiff’s guilt or innocence is not material to whether Defendant violated Section 432.7.

Nor does Defendant’s after-acquired-evidence defense support disclosure of Plaintiff’s bank records. “In general, the after-acquired-evidence doctrine shields an employer from liability or limits available relief where, after a termination, the employer learns for the first time about employee wrongdoing that would have led to the discharge in any event. Employee wrongdoing in after-acquired evidence cases generally falls into one of two categories: (1) misrepresentations on a resume or job application; or (2) posthire, on-the-job misconduct.” (Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 620, 632.) This case does not fall into either of the two recognized categories.

Neither party provides legal authority on the interplay between Section 432.7 and the after-acquired-evidence defense. Considering their underlying purposes, it appears that the policies underlying Section 432.7 prevails. Even if Defendant could show in this action that Plaintiff laundered money outside her employment and that Defendant would have fired her for it, it does not appear that Defendant would escape liability under Section 432.7. Defendant still is liable under Section 432.7 if it fired Plaintiff solely based on her arrest and Plaintiff ultimately is not convicted of the charges. (Pitman v. City of Oakland, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at 1044.)

GRANT: Request For Production Nos. 142-143.

The court OVERRULES all objections to these requests. Plaintiff’s privilege log does not identify any documents withheld as to these categories on privilege or privacy grounds. Plaintiff cannot maintain generalized privilege objections that do not actually protect disclosure of any privileged documents. As for Plaintiff’s remaining objections, they fail for the same reasons stated above in Request For Production No. 24. Within 21 days of this hearing, Plaintiff shall serve further responses that comply with Code Civ. Proc., Sections 2031.210 and 2031.230 and produce responsive documents.

DENY: Attorney fees.

The court “shall” impose monetary sanctions unless it finds the losing party and/or attorney “acted with substantial justification” or other circumstances make imposition of sanctions “unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., Section 2031.310, subd. (h).) Because neither party substantially prevailed over the other on this motion, the request is DENIED.

Moving Party is to serve notice of this order.