Case Number: BC684207 Hearing Date: June 01, 2018 Dept: 31

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One, is GRANTED as to each discovery request at issue. The parties are ordered to meet and confer regarding any proposed changes to the Los Angeles Superior Court Confidential Only Protective Order.

Plaintiff moves the court for an order compelling Defendant to provide further responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One Nos. 7, 12-13, 18-19, 24-25, 28-37, 79-83, and 96

Plaintiff describes these requests as encompassing two categories: (1) those relating to Defendant’s internal investigation and analysis of the defects plaguing Plaintiff’s vehicle and establishing that Defendant previously knew of such defects (Nos. 12-13, 18-19, 24-25, and 28-37) and (2) those relating to Defendant’s warranty and vehicle repurchase policies, procedures, and practices (Nos. 7, 79-83, and 96.)

As an initial matter, while the court finds the meet and confer effort sufficient (barely) to reach the merits of the motion, the court notes that neither party put forth any meaningful effort to actually resolve the issues, instead relying upon counsels’ standard, regurgitated meet and confer letters that are used in virtually every Lemon Law action. The court is familiar with the lemon law law firms, attorneys, motion practice, trial preparation, and trial practice given that fully 10% of its docket constitutes lemon law cases. As a result, it has seen the same so-called meet and confer letter that is sent in each and every case where the attorneys don’t have the good sense to resolve these issues without court intervention. The court has ruled on the very same issues in many lemon law cases previously. The court, in fact, has ruled on the very same issues with the same law firms representing the parties previously. Yet, here we are again. This practice seems primarily designed to generate billable hours rather than resolve discovery disputes that have already been ruled upon by this court (and that are easy to resolve). The parties are on notice that if and when the court is presented with an attorney’s fees motion in this case or any other case, the court will take into consideration the tepid meet and confer effort in this case (and others) and the fact that the motion could have been easily avoided if the attorneys had actually paid attention and reviewed previous rulings by this court. Needless discovery motions in a class of cases where the same discovery issues are presented over and over is simply not a good use of the court and the parties’ time and energy especially given the limited resources of the court.

Plaintiff’s motion and separate statement make the requisite showing of factual relevance as to each request at issue. Moreover, as noted by Plaintiff, none of Defendant’s responses are code-compliant. (CCP § 2030.240(b)(2) (objecting party must “[i]dentify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made.”); CCP § 2030.240(c)(1) (“If an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log.”).)

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant has waived all objections to electronically stored information (ESI). However, Defendant did not object in its responses “on the grounds that [electronically stored information] is from a source that is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or expense.” (CCP 2031.210(d).) Therefore, Defendant has not waived its objections to all electronically stored information.

While the majority of Plaintiff’s requests are properly limited to the year, make, and model of Plaintiff’s vehicle, as well as documents relating to the purchase request made in California, the court notes that Requests Nos. 24, 25, 28-29, and 83 are overbroad as they are not limited to documents applicable to California. Therefore, these Requests are properly limited to documents applicable to California vehicles only. Similarly, Plaintiff first sought repairs in February 2017 (Tai Decl. ¶ 6), and requested a repurchase in August 2017. (Tai Decl. ¶ 22.) Therefore, the repurchase policies, repairs, and procedure discovery, Nos. 7, 79-83, and 96, are properly limited to documents applicable to 2017 repairs and repurchases only.

Discovery may properly extend beyond Plaintiff’s specific vehicle. (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 136; Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 186 (“A decision made without the use of reasonably available information germane to that decision is not a reasonable, good faith decision.”).) Similarly, Defendant’s repurchase policies are relevant to a determination of whether Defendant acted in good faith. (See e.g. Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1105 (finding car manufacturer’s internal policy relevant to whether it evidenced an “unreasonable and not a good faith effort to honor its statutory obligations to repurchase defective cars.”).) The remedies available under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act are derived from those available under the applicable state law. (Romo v. FFG Ins. Co. (C.D. Cal. 2005) 397 F.Supp.2d 1237, 1239 (“In drafting the Magnuson–Moss Act, Congress, while providing a substantive right of action to consumers, did not specify the appropriate measure and type of damages that are available. As such, a number of courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have turned to the applicable state law to determine what remedies are available under the Act, which of necessity informs the potential amount in controversy.”).) Thus, Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly discovery remains relevant.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s requests also encompass trade secret information that must be protected by a protective order. Plaintiff indicated a willingness to enter into a protective order, but the parties disagree over which designation is sufficient. The court notes “a manufacturer . . . has a legitimate interest in protecting its trade secrets and other confidential proprietary information.” (Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Newman & Holtzinger (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1209.) Additionally, courts protect “quality system procedures” and “complaint handling procedures,” which are at issue also at issue here. (McGuan v. Endovascular Technologies, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 974, 988.) Defendant indicates it intends to move for a protective order to protect its trade secret documents. The court finds that a protective order is warranted and the parties are ordered to meet and confer regarding any proposed changes to the Los Angeles Superior Court Confidential Only Protective Order. The court implores the court to resolve this issue without court intervention.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.