03AS00061

The People of the State of Ca. vs. Jerome Sprague

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Validate, Correct & Assess Damages Caused by Fraudulent

Filed By: Sprague, Jerome H.

Defendant in pro per James Sprague’s (“Defendant”) “motion to validate, correct, and assess damages caused by fraudulent liens filed in Sacramento and San Diego County’s Clerk and Recorder’s Office, including the Sacramento Superior Court” is DENIED.

Defendant has indicated the incorrect address in its notice of motion. The correct address for Department 53 of the Sacramento County Superior Court is 813 6th Street, Sacramento, California 95814. Defendant shall notify responding party(ies) immediately.

First, the legal basis for the motion is entirely unclear. A “motion to validate, correct, and assess damages caused by fraudulent liens filed in Sacramento and San Diego County’s Clerk and Recorder’s Office, including the Sacramento Superior Court” is not a recognized motion.

Second, the Court notes this instant motion raises several of the same issues raised in Defendant’s previous “motion to validate fraud and award damages,” which the Court denied on October 17, 2017. Accordingly, to the extent this is a motion for reconsideration of those issues, this is just the latest in a long series of motions for reconsideration filed by Defendant as to prior orders in this action.

Defendant, having already made this argument in multiple iterations and having lost, has failed to demonstrate any new facts or law to support reconsideration. And as has previously been explained, Defendant has failed to comply with both the substantive

and procedural requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. “This section specifies the court’s jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration. . .

.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(e); Garcia v Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 691.) Failure to comply with the timing requirements of § 1008 deprives the court of jurisdiction to reconsider its ruling. The moving party must offer some fact or circumstance not previously considered and some valid reason for not offering it earlier. (Gilberd v AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.) Once again, Defendant has failed to explain why he is repeating the same arguments, without any additional facts, circumstances or law.

Further, as noted in Plaintiff’s opposition, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s arguments because Defendant has appealed the Court’s October 17, 2017, Order. “[T]he perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 916(a).)

Moreover, the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on a motion for reconsideration after entry of judgment. (APRI Ins. Co. v Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 176, 181.) A motion for reconsideration cannot be ruled on after the final judgment is entered. ( Gaines v Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 25, 47. See Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial sections 9:332.1 et seq.)

Accordingly, to the extent the motion is seeking reconsideration, the motion is DENIED on these bases.

Although it is unclear, to the extent Defendant seeks disqualification of this Judge (David I. Brown) from hearing this motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, Defendant’s declaration does not meet the requirements of section 170.6. The challenge is also untimely. A motion to disqualify under section 170.6 must be made before a hearing is commenced on a contested issue. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 170.6(a)
(2).) On October 31, 2013, the Court conducted a hearing on Judgment Creditor’s motion to amend the receivership order. Defendant contested the issue of whether the receivership order should include an adjoining property owned by the judgment debtor that was inadvertently excluded from the order. As the Court determined this contested issue, the time for Defendant to have moved for disqualification has expired. Even if it had not expired, the instant motion is effectively a reconsideration motion. On a motion for reconsideration, CCP §1008(a) requires the original judge to hear the motion, and no peremptory challenge may be exercised. (Deauville Restaurant, Inc. v Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal App 4th 843, 847-852. This provision overrides a party’s right to exercise a peremptory challenge to prevent the judge from hearing the reconsideration motion.

The Court would further note that Defendant has filed suit against this judge in federal court. It is further understood that the suit was dismissed by the federal court. In any event, this is not a basis for the Court’s self-disqualification. (See, e.g. First Western Dev. Corp v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal. App. 3d 860, 867 [“The courts of this state cannot permit a litigant to “shop” for a judge through the device of filing a lawsuit against those judges who enter rulings adverse to the litigant. Such procedure would make it possible for a litigant who obtains an unfavorable decision from a trial court or from an appellate court to cause that court to become disqualified or to recuse itself

merely by filing a lawsuit naming the judicial officers as defendants. Such an obvious attempt to manipulate the legal system will not be condoned.”]; see also Rothman, California Judicial Conduct Handbook, § 7:60, pp. 481-483.) This judge has no personal animus against Mr. Sprague; the Court is simply making rulings on the legal and factual issues before the court; this is not a ground for disqualification. (CCP § 170.2(b).)