Case Name: Richard Blenio v. Mission Trail Waste Systems, et al.

Case No.: 17CV310979

I. Background and Discovery Dispute

This is a disability discrimination action filed against defendant Mission Trail Waste Systems (“Mission”), a waste management company, by plaintiff Richard Blenio (“Plaintiff”), a former employee of Mission.

As alleged in the Complaint, around 1999, Plaintiff began working for Mission as a front load driver. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) He was a capable and conscientious employee who regularly received raises. (Id. at ¶ 8.) However, around June 2015, he was forced to go on medical leave due to a degenerative neck injury. (Id. at ¶ 9.) About a year later, Plaintiff’s doctor cleared him to return to work without any restrictions but Mission refused to accept his doctor’s return to work note because it saw him as a liability. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.) Over the next three months, Plaintiff obtained notes from three doctors, including an independent doctor selected by Mission, each of whom stated Plaintiff could return to work without any restrictions. (Id. at ¶ 12-13.) Despite this fact, for months, Mission continued to refuse to permit his return, effectively depriving him of the income his family depended upon. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.) As a result, Plaintiff was forced to constructively terminate his employment in September 2016. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges causes of action for disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

Currently before the court are: (1) Mission’s motion to quash deposition subpoenas for the production of business records; and (2) Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to his Second Set of Special Interrogatories (“SI”) and Second and Third Sets of Requests for Production of Documents (“RPD”).

II. Motion to Quash

A. Procedural Background

Around January 2018, Plaintiff deposed three of Mission’s employees – namely, Cameron Comick (“Comick”), Gabriel Rellamas (“Rellamas”), and Ralph Malloy (“Malloy”) – to compare their experiences of returning from medical leave with his own. Comick, Rellamas and Malloy had all taken medical leave during their employment with Mission and underwent fitness for duty exams with Alliance Occupational Medicine (“Alliance”) and/or US HealthWorks Medical Group (“HealthWorks”) (collectively the “Clinics”) before returning to work. (Lucas Decl., ¶¶2-5; Exhs. A-C.) The Clinics are occupational medicine providers that, among other things, administer pre-employment physicals and drug screening, treat Mission employees’ injuries, administer fit for duty exams authorizing a return to work after a medical leave, and perform physicals for commercial drivers. (See Lau Decl., Exhs. N, O.)

Around March 2018, Plaintiff served both Clinics with five deposition subpoenas for the production of business records. (Lucas Decl., Exhs. D-M.) The subpoenas seek documents relating to their medical treatment of each of the three deposed employees and two additional ones, Roger Princeau, a current Mission employee, and Robbie Hampton, a former one (collectively the “Mission Employees”). (Lucas Decl., Exhs. D-M.)

Mission objected to the deposition subpoenas, arguing they violated the Mission Employees’ privacy rights and sought documents not relevant to Plaintiff’s claims for disability discrimination, retaliation and wrongful termination. (Lucas Decl., ¶ 16.) In response, Plaintiff asserted the documents requested were relevant and discoverable. (Ibid.)

Unable to resolve the dispute, Mission filed the instant motion to quash the subpoenas directed to the Clinics, which Plaintiff opposes.

B. Merits of the Motion

Mission moves to quash the subpoenas to the Clinics pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, which authorizes a court to quash entirely or modify a subpoena and “make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right to privacy of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)

Each subpoena contains three requests for production of documents (“RPD”). (See (Lucas Decl., Exhs. D-M.) RPD No. 1 requests all records relating to the medical evaluation, examination or treatment of one of the five Mission Employees. (Ibid.) RPD No. 2 seeks documentation of all communications between Alliance or HealthWorks and any third party, including Mission, relating to that employee. (Ibid.) RPD No. 3 seeks documentation of all communications between Alliance or HealthWorks and that employee. (Ibid.)

Mission argues the RPD violate the Mission Employees’ constitutional right to privacy because they seek the complete medical records of third parties to this lawsuit which have no relevance to Plaintiff’s claims.

Generally, the party resisting discovery bears the burden of substantiating his or her objections to a discovery request. (See, e.g., Fairmont Insurance Co. v. Super. Ct. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.) When a person objects on the ground of privacy, he or she must demonstrate disclosure of the information sought would invade a legally protected privacy interest. (See Alch v. Super. Ct. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1423.) If the discovery sought invades a cognizable privacy interest, the proponent of the discovery must demonstrate the information sought is directly relevant to a claim or defense. (Id. at 1426-27, 1433.) If direct relevance is established, a court must then balance the right to privacy against the countervailing right to discover relevant information to litigate the case. (Id. at 1426-27.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks all of the Clinics’ medical records relative to the Mission Employees along with any correspondence between the Clinics and third parties, including Mission, or between the Clinics and the employees themselves. It is well-established that medical information is covered by the right to privacy. (See Heda v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 525, 527 (“Heda”) [constitutional right to privacy extends to the details of an individual’s medical history]; see also Cutter v. Brownbridge (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 836, 842; Wood v. Superior Court (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1138, 1147; Jones v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 534, 548–550.) Plaintiff does not argue otherwise but asserts in his opposition that the Clinics’ communications with Mission or the Mission Employees are not medical records protected by the privacy interest and likely contain little private information. He does not elaborate further and cites no authority for the proposition correspondence from a medical provider is not medical information covered by the right to privacy. As such, Plaintiff’s argument is unsubstantiated.

Thus, Mission sufficiently establishes a privacy interest and it is incumbent upon Plaintiff to demonstrate that the information sought is directly relevant to a claim or defense. (See Harris v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 665.)

Plaintiff asserts the medical records sought are directly relevant to the issue of whether Mission’s nondiscriminatory explanation for barring his return to work (i.e. his failure of the fit for duty exam) was mere pretext. In particular, he contends the documents sought could tend to show Mission’s unequal application of policy relative to other employees seeking to return from medical leave. (See Opp. at p. 5:27-6:2; 6:22-7:9.) Because all employees go to the same Clinics to get cleared to return to work after medical leave, Plaintiff asserts the “medical records will demonstrate how the [Mission Employees’] medical condition may have affected Mission’s decision to return the employee back to work immediately or to resist his return to work.” (Opp. at p. 7:6-9.) In addition, he contends that some employees also testified that Mission exerts influence over the Clinics’ decisions regarding whether an employee will be permitted to return to work. (See, e.g., Lau Decl., Exhs. J, K.) As such, he further argues the documents sought are directly relevant to the issue of whether Mission influenced the Clinics’ decisions regarding the employees’ return to work, which would tend to demonstrate whether it deliberately and discriminatorily prevented his return. This argument is well-taken and Plaintiff sufficiently establishes the direct relevance of the records sought in RPD No. 1. The medical records of other employees seeking to return to work after a medical leave and the procedures Mission required them to undergo has direct bearing on the issue of whether it discriminated against Plaintiff in constructively preventing his return.

With respect to RPD Nos. 2 and 3, Plaintiff argues the communications between the Clinics and Mission or between the Clinics and the employees are directly relevant to the issue of whether Mission exerted influence over the Clinics’ decisions to permit or not permit an employee’s return to work. The Court agrees. Documents relating to these communications are directly relevant to the issue of whether Mission acted with any type of discriminatory intent in the procedures by which employees were cleared to return to work after a medical leave of absence.

In opposition, Mission asserts it is unclear what relevance the documents sought would have to the issue of whether it should have allowed Plaintiff to return to work. This argument is not well-taken because it misstates the crux of Plaintiff’s complaint, which is not predicated on the accuracy of the Clinics’ assessment of his fitness for duty but on the fact its stated reason for constructively prohibiting his return was mere pretext. With respect to Comick, Rellamas and Malloy, Mission also contends Plaintiff has already deposed them and obtained testimony regarding their medical leaves of absence, the nature of their injuries and the steps Mission required them to take before allowing them to return to work. This fact has no bearing on whether the RPD seek information that is directly relevant.

As such, Plaintiff sufficiently establishes direct relevance for RPD Nos. 1 through 3 and the final issue remaining is whether his countervailing right to discovery of this information outweighs the Mission Employees’ right to privacy.

Mission argues Plaintiff’s right to this information does not outweigh the employees’ right to privacy because the employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their medical records which Mission is legally required to protect against disclosure because it is highly personal and sensitive. It further asserts production of these records would amount to a serious invasion of the employees’ privacy because Plaintiff is not just seeking records regarding their return to work but all records, including conditions they may have been diagnosed with or medications they are taking. In opposition, Plaintiff contends the Mission Employees have a lower expectation of privacy in these medical records because the Clinics provide limited occupational health services to the employees and not comprehensive primary care. He further argues his interest in this discovery outweighs any limited privacy interests held by the Mission Employees because there is a protective order in place and they themselves had notice of but did not object to the deposition subpoenas. Plaintiff’s contentions are generally well-taken.

“[T]he right of privacy protects the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370 (“Pioneer”), emphasis added.) “Privacy concerns are not absolute; they must be balanced against other important interests.” (Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 37.) Such interests include the public interest in the ascertainment of truth in all legal proceedings, which is accentuated in cases of discrimination. (Alch, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at 1437.) As acknowledged by many courts, California “unquestionably has a legitimate and compelling state interest generally in the battle against discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, national origin, or other invidious categories of discrimination.” (Ibid., internal citations and quotation marks omitted; see also Pacific–Union Club v. Superior Court (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 60, 79; Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 896, 905.) In balancing these disparate interests, the court may also consider whether to grant partial disclosure. (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 658.) “Protective measures, safeguards and other alternatives may minimize the privacy intrusion.” (Pioneer, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 371.) “For example, if the intrusion is limited and confidential information is carefully shielded from disclosure except to those who have a legitimate need to know, privacy concerns are assuaged.” (Ibid.)

Here, it appears the intrusion into the Mission Employees’ privacy will be limited given the Clinics are not their comprehensive primary care providers but merely the occupational health clinics that work with them relative to their employment with Mission. Moreover, it otherwise appears there have been sufficient safeguards that will further address any privacy concerns. Specifically, Plaintiff has indicated there is a protective order in place and has further stated he provided notice to all the Mission Employees of the deposition subpoenas and none of them have objected to production of the documents requested. Finally, there is a strong public interest in promoting the ascertainment of truth in legal proceedings relating to issues of discrimination in particular, including disability discrimination, which is alleged in the present lawsuit. As such, on balance, Plaintiff has demonstrated a countervailing right to discovery that outweighs the privacy interests of the Mission Employees.

In reply, Mission asserts Plaintiff’s countervailing interests in the discovery are not legitimate because his discrimination claim and assertion of pretext lack merit. It cites no authority supporting the proposition a party’s determination of the potential viability of a claim is a factor that may be considered in determining if a countervailing interest outweighs a privacy concern. As such, its position is unsubstantiated. (See People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282 [a point asserted without citation to authority requires no response from the court].) Mission also contends it is informed two of the Mission Employees have objected to the Clinics’ production of documents in response to the subpoena. (Supp. Lucas Decl., ¶ 3, Exhs. B, D.) It bases this assertion on written objections it received from Alliance in which Alliance states Rellamas and Comick have indicated they do not consent to the production of their private medical records. This fact is worth taking into consideration.

Though, on balance, the Court finds the interests weigh in favor of permitting Plaintiff to obtain this discovery, it observes that the requests as currently framed are overly broad. For example, as Mission points out, RPD No. 1 seeks “all records” relating to the treatment of the employees and not just documents relating to their medical leaves and subsequent returns to work. (See Lucas Decl., Exh. N.) Given that medical information is generally of a more sensitive nature (see, e.g., Pioneer, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 372), the Court believes the RPD should be limited to request only those documents that could have bearing on Plaintiff’s claims.

Accordingly, Mission’s motion to quash the subpoenas in their entirety is DENIED. However, to the extent RPD Nos. 1-3 in each of the subpoenas seek documents unrelated to the Mission Employees’ medical leaves of absences and subsequent returns to work, they are modified to cover only those issues.

III. Motion to Compel

A. Procedural Background

Around February 2018, Plaintiff served Mission with the SI. As relevant here, SI No. 17 requested that Mission identify employees who had requested medical leave from January 2000 to the present. (Lau Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. P.) Several days later, he served Mission with the RPD which requested, among other things, documents relating to Mission drivers who had taken medical leave. (Id. at ¶ 5.) These drivers included Comick, Rellamas and Malloy, the drivers that had been deposed, as well as other drivers identified during their depositions. (Ibid.) The documents sought include the drivers’ personnel files, job descriptions, communications, and Mission’s decision regarding their return from medical leave. (Ibid.)

Mission responded to SI No. 17 with objections only. (Lau Decl., ¶ 6, Exh. P.) With respect to the RPD, Mission initially provided responses consisting only of objections but, several days later, provided responses consisting of objections and some substantive responses. (Id., Exh. Q.)

Shortly thereafter, counsel for the parties met and conferred regarding Mission’s discovery responses and were able to narrow some of the discovery issues in dispute. (Lau Decl., ¶ 9, Exh. T.) Among other things, Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to narrow the time frame of some of the information requested in the SI. (Ibid.) He also presented authority to Mission’s counsel which purportedly supported his assertion Plaintiff was entitled to documents relating to “similarly situated” employees in discovery. (Ibid.) Mission then provide supplemental responses to the SI. (Lucas Decl., ¶ 7, Exh. E.) It continued to object, however, to the production of documents on the grounds of privacy and relevance. (Ibid.)

Two weeks later, the parties’ counsel met and conferred again regarding the outstanding issues in dispute. (Lau Decl., ¶ 10, Exh. V.) They further narrowed some of the issues but were unable to completely resolve their dispute.

As such, Plaintiff filed the present motion to compel, seeking further responses to SI No. 17 and RPD Nos. 46-63. Mission opposes the motion.

B. Merits of the Motion

Plaintiff’s motion to compel is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, subdivision (a) (“Section 2030.300”), and 2031.310, subdivision (a) (“Section 2031.310”), which authorize a party to seek an order compelling further responses to special interrogatories or requests for production of documents. Mission opposes the motion.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not distinguish between the grounds for his motion to compel a further response to SI No. 17 and his motion to compel further responses to RPD No. 46-63. Instead, he states in his notice of motion that the motion is being “made pursuant to [Sections 2030.300 and 2031.310] based on [three enumerated] grounds.” (Notice of Mtn. at p. 1:13-14.) These grounds are: (1) the information and documents sought are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, (2) Mission has refused to provide responsive documents and information; and (3) good cause exists for production of the documents and information sought.

None of these are grounds upon which a motion to compel further responses under either Section 2030.300 or Section 2031.310 can be based. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (a); 2031.310, subd. (a).) With respect to Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to SI No. 17, despite the lack of a clearly articulated ground, the Court is able to reasonably discern the basis upon which the motion is brought. However, with respect to the portion of the motion seeking further responses to RPD Nos. 46-63, the lack of clarity in Plaintiff’s presentation is problematic for the reasons that will be discussed below.

1. Special Interrogatories

A party propounding interrogatories may move for an order compelling further responses if that party deems an answer is evasive or incomplete, the exercise of the option to produce documents is unwarranted, or an objection is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) As stated, Plaintiff does not articulate one of these bases relative to his motion to compel a further response to SI No. 17 but states his motion is predicated on the fact the information sought is relevant, Mission withheld responsive information and good cause exists. With that said, it is otherwise apparent to the Court he seeks a further response because he deems Mission’s objections to this request to be without merit or too general.

SI No. 17 requests the identity of all Mission employees from January 1, 2000 to the present who requested or received medical leave, and information relating to the person to whom the requests were made, the dates of the requests, and Mission’s decision regarding whether to grant or deny the requests.

Mission objected to this interrogatory on the grounds it seeks irrelevant information; implicates the privacy rights of third parties under the California Constitution, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and/or the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Civil Code section 56.20 et seq.; is overbroad and therefore unduly burdensome and harassing; is compound and contains a disjunctive question and subparts in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060, subdivision (t); and is vague and ambiguous. It provided no substantive answer. As such, Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to this interrogatory must necessarily be based on the objections lacking merit or being too general.

In its opposition, Mission asserts the discovery requests are improper because they violate the right to privacy, seek irrelevant information, and are overbroad. With respect to the remaining objections, it does not attempt to defend them. As such, they are overruled. (See Kirkland v. Sup. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98 (“Kirkland”) [responding party must justify its objections].)

With respect to its privacy objection, Mission contends that information relating to medical leaves of absence is protected by the constitutional right to privacy and Plaintiff fails to demonstrate the discovery sought is directly relevant to his claims. This argument is well-taken.

As previously discussed, it is well-established that medical information is covered by the right to privacy. (See Heda, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at 527.) As such, it is incumbent upon Plaintiff to demonstrate the information sought is directly relevant to a claim or defense. (See Alch, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at 1423.) Here, Plaintiff asserts the identities of other employees who took medical leave is relevant to showing that Mission treated some drivers who sought to return to work differently from other drivers seeking to return from leave. This contention lacks merit. As framed, Plaintiff does not only seek the identities of Mission drivers who went on medical leave but all Mission employees who went on medical leave, without respect to the positions they held and the medical conditions from which they suffered. Moreover, even if SI No. 17 only requested the identities of Mission drivers, he fails to explain how information relating to the dates requests for leave were made, the individuals to whom they were submitted and Mission’s decisions relative to those requests, are directly relevant to the issue of whether Mission acted with pretext in prolonging his return to work.

Thus, the privacy objection has merit and it is unnecessary for the Court to address any additional objections to this request. Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to SI No. 17 is therefore DENIED.

2. Requests for Production of Documents

Upon receipt of a response to a request for production, the requesting party may move for an order compelling a further response if the party deems the responding party’s objections are too general or lack merit or its substantive responses are inadequate, incomplete or evasive. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to RPD Nos. 46-63. However, as with the SI, he does not state a recognized ground for bringing such a motion. Relative to RPD Nos. 46-56 and 59-60, which Mission responded to with objections only, the Court construes the motion as being predicated on the ground the objections lack merit or are too general. With respect to RPD Nos. 57-58 and 61-63, Mission responded with both objections and substantive responses. Moreover, its substantive responses to these requests consisted of a statement that it had “already produced all non-privileged documents responsive to [the] request relating to Plaintiff for the period of January 2012 to the present.” (Lau Decl., Exh. U.)

Accordingly, the Court cannot determine the ground on which Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to RPD Nos. 57-58 and 61-63. Because Mission indicates in its response that it has already produced responsive documents, it is unclear if Plaintiff believes this substantive response to be inadequate, incomplete or evasive, or if it merely takes issues with the objections to these requests. Therefore, the Court will summarily deny the motion as to these requests as it is unable to discern the basis for Plaintiff’s motion.

As for the balance of the requests, the Court will address them below.

In moving to compel further responses to request for production of documents, the propounding party must first demonstrate good cause for the discovery sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) Once good cause is established, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify any objections and responses. (Kirkland, supra, (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

a. Good Cause

To satisfy its burden of demonstrating good cause for the discovery sought, the moving party must make “a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (Glenfeld Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) Discovery is allowed for any matters not privileged that are either relevant to the subject matter involved in the action or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Information is relevant to the subject matter if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546 (“Gonzalez”).) “Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Ibid.) Courts liberally construe the relevance standard and any doubts as to whether a request seeks information within the scope of discovery are generally resolved in favor of discovery. (Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790 (“Colonial Life”.)

RPD No. 46 seeks the entire personnel files maintained by Mission relative to eight named employees: the five Mission Employees, discussed above, in addition to three others (collectively the “Comparators”). Plaintiff argues good cause exists because the documents sought are relevant to showing Mission discriminated against him and acted in pretext when it prolonged its evaluation of him when he tried to return from medical leave. He generally asserts these documents could enable him to demonstrate Mission’s actions were motivated by its perception of his disability and the cost risk he represented by allowing him to compare its treatment of him with its treatment of other drivers who both were and were not permitted to return to work. This argument is not well-taken. Plaintiff does not state the personnel files contain medical leave information or otherwise articulate how the entire personnel files of the Comparators would reasonably assist him in the evaluation of his case and preparation for trial. As such, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate good cause for this request.

RPD Nos. 47-55 seek all documents relating to the job descriptions and job duties of the Comparators during their employment with Mission; documents relating to communications regarding the Comparators’ medical leave, including communications between Mission and the Clinics; documents that evidence or relate to protests or complaints by any of the Comparators concerning Mission’s refusal to let them return to work after their leave; documents evidencing or relating to any decision by Mission to require the Comparators to submit to any physical examination; and documents relating to any actual or contemplated decision by Mission to not permit the Comparators to return to work.

Plaintiff advances the same argument of good cause relative to these requests as the contention advanced in support of RPD No. 46 – namely, that these documents are relevant to the issue of whether Mission treated employees with certain medical conditions differently in the process by which it permitted or did not permit them to return from leave. With respect to documents relating to communications between Mission and the Clinics in particular, he additionally asserts they are relevant because he has obtained evidence indicating many Mission employees believed it exerted influence over the Clinics’ assessment of whether an employee was fit to return to work after medical leave. Plaintiff also contends documents relating to the physical exams Mission required the Comparators to undergo is relevant to the issue of whether it treated different employees differently because he was required to undergo a six-hour fit for duty exam while some of these employees were not. In opposition, Mission argues these documents are not relevant because injuries, medical conditions and medical leaves are, by nature, highly variable, complex situations requiring individualized assessment. As such, it contends that even if the documents demonstrated Plaintiff was required to undergo more extensive testing, this would not tend to show pretext. This argument is not well-taken.

Good cause does not hinge on whether the documents sought are likely to prove a plaintiff’s case but on whether they might, among other things, reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case and preparing for trial. (Gonzalez, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at 1546.) The standard is liberally construed and anything, not privileged, that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is discoverable. (Colonial Life, supra, 31 Cal.3d 785 at 790.) Moreover, as Plaintiff points out in his motion to compel, relative to discrimination cases in particular, courts generally find that information regarding internal inconsistency in a defendant’s handling of similarly situated employees meets this standard. (See, e.g., Kelleher v. Fred Meyer Stores Inc. (E.D. Wash. 2014) 302 F.R.D. 596, 598 (“Kelleher”), citing Smothers v. Solvay Chemicals, Inc. (10th Cir. 2014) 740 F.3d 530, 541.) Though not controlling, the reasoning of these courts is persuasive. As such, Plaintiff sufficiently establishes good cause for the production sought in RPD Nos. 47-55.

RPD No. 56 seeks all documents relating to any legal, union or other action or proceeding involving the Comparators.

Plaintiff advances the same argument regarding the relevance of these documents to the issue of whether he and other employees were treated differently by Mission in the procedures they had to undergo to return to work. Additionally, he asserts good cause exists for these documents because some of the Mission employees who had been deposed identified certain legal and administrative proceedings as being relevant to his claims. This argument is not well-taken. It is not even clear what legal and administrative proceedings the Comparators were purportedly involved in much less how they would reasonably assist Plaintiff in the evaluation of his case and preparation for trial. As such, Plaintiff fails to make a fact-specific showing of relevance (see Glenfeld, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 1117) and no good cause has been shown for RPD No. 56.

RPD Nos. 59-60 request all documents relating to any Mission employee’s formal or informal complaint against Mission regarding harassment, discrimination or retaliation on the basis of disability or perceived disability, and all documents relating to any harassment, discrimination or retaliation lawsuits, and administrative complaints or charges that have been filed against Mission with any agency or court by any Mission employee.

Plaintiff asserts good cause exists for these documents because Mission’s treatment of other employees is relevant to the issue of whether his perceived disability and medical condition was a substantial factor in its decision to constructively prevent his return. The Court agrees. Documents relating to other employees’ complaints or lawsuits of discrimination could reasonably assist Plaintiff in the evaluation of his case, especially with regards to the issue of whether Mission acted with pretext in requiring him to undergo an extensive fit for duty evaluation.

Accordingly, good cause exists for RPD Nos. 47-55 and 59-60. Good cause does not, however, exist for RPD No. 46 and 56; thus, relative to these requests, Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought.

b. Objections

Mission objected to the RPD on various grounds, including that they seek irrelevant documents; implicate the privacy rights of third parties under the California Constitution, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and/or the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Civil Code section 56.20 et seq.; are overbroad and therefore unduly burdensome and harassing; are compound; are vague and ambiguous; seek documents protected by the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product doctrine; assume facts not in evidence; are duplicative; call for a legal conclusion; and/or seek documents that are equally available to Plaintiff.

However, it only attempts to substantiate its objections on the grounds of privacy, relevance and overbreadth. As to the undefended objections, they are overruled, with the exception of the objections based on the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine which are preserved. (See Best Products, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1188-1189; Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at 98.) Moreover, with respect to its objection to RPD Nos. 47-55 and 59-60 on the ground of relevance, because the Court has found good cause exists for these requests, the relevance objection is overruled. (See Glenfeld, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 1117 [in order to demonstrate good cause, a party must make a showing of relevance].)

i. Privacy

A. RPD Nos. 47-55

Mission does not discuss the privacy objection in connection with the specific RPD at issue but generally contends the “personnel files; medical leave of absence information; and communications regarding ability to return to work” fall squarely within the realm of private information protected by the California Constitution. (Opp. at p. 8:17-18.) The Court notes that RPD Nos. 47-55, which seek documents related to other Mission employees’ leaves of absence, are implicated in the categories listed in this statement.

Mission argues the documents sought violate the employees’ right to privacy and the balance of interests weighs against compelling production. Specifically, it contends the documents sought serve no legitimate purpose because the circumstances governing the medical leaves of different employees are highly individualized. It also asserts any production of these documents will have little impact on Plaintiff’s case because the evidence gathered thus far “cannot show” or “will not show” Mission acted with discriminatory motive. (Opp. at p. 12:18-24.)

As discussed, when a party objects on the ground of privacy, it must demonstrate disclosure of the information sought would invade a legally protected privacy interest. (See Alch, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at 1423.) If the discovery sought invades a cognizable privacy interest, the proponent of the discovery must demonstrate the information sought is directly relevant to a claim or defense. (Id. at 1426-27, 1433.) A court must then balance the right to privacy against the countervailing right to discover relevant information to litigate the case. (Id. at 1426-27.)

Medical information is covered by the right to privacy. (Heda, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at 527.) However, for the same reasons discussed in connection with the motion to quash the Clinics’ deposition subpoenas, the Court finds the documents requested in RPD Nos. 47-55 are directly relevant to the claims at issue in this litigation and the balance of interests weighs in favor of compelling production. Documents relating to the medical leaves taken by the Comparators, the circumstances under which they were permitted or not permitted to return, and any communications between Mission and others regarding their leaves is directly relevant to the issue of whether Mission acts in a discriminatory manner regarding these decisions. Moreover, the state has a compelling interest in the battle against discrimination and there are other protections in place that assuage the privacy concerns, such as the protective order. (See Alch, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at 1437; Pioneer, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 371.) With respect to Mission’s contention regarding the strength of the evidence it currently has that purportedly disproves Plaintiff’s claims, it cites no authority supporting the proposition this may be considered in weighing whether Plaintiff has a countervailing interest in the documents sought. As such, its position is unsubstantiated. (See Dougherty, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at 282.)

Accordingly, on balance, the interests of Plaintiff in obtaining this discovery outweigh the privacy concerns. As such, the privacy objection is overruled.

B. RPD Nos. 59-60

Mission does not substantiate its privacy objection relative to these requests, which seek documents related to other employees’ complaints or lawsuits of discrimination against it. Instead, it states in its opposition that “[t]o the extent Plaintiff seeks complaints regarding disability discrimination made by other employees, that information has already been provided.” (Opp. at p. 13-14.) As such, this undefended objection is overruled. (See Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at 98.)

ii. Overbreadth

Mission argues the requests are overbroad in that they span a period of eighteen years. (Opp. at p. 13:1-2.) It does not discuss this argument in reference to any specific RPD and it does not appear this contention can apply to all the RPD at issue. Among RPD Nos. 47-55 and 59-60, only RPD Nos. 59-60 include the eighteen-year date range as they seek all documents relating to discrimination complaints or lawsuits from January 1, 2000 to the present.

The Court agrees these requests are overbroad. Moreover, Plaintiff represents in his separate statement in support of the motion that he is willing to “voluntarily shorten the range of documents and information sought [in RPD Nos. 59-60] to span just five years.” (Sep. Statement at p. 44:1-4; 46:22-25.)

Thus, the overbreadth objection is sustained as to RPD Nos. 59-60. The Court’s ruling does not preclude Plaintiff from serving amended RPD that are tailored in accordance with what Plaintiff has represented he is amenable to in his separate statement.

3. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the motion to compel further responses to RPD Nos. 47-55 is GRANTED. As for RPD Nos. 46 and 56-63, the motion to compel further responses is DENIED.