1. Defendant The Regents of the University of California’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication, is GRANTED.

The MSJ with respect to the 1st cause of action for defamation is GRANTED.

Defendant has met its initial burden of establishing that the privilege under Civil Code Section 47(c) applies. Defendant has established that it has qualified immunity to communicate to other persons who have a common interest in the subject matter of the communication. (Defendant’s Material Facts, at paragraphs 8-21). Therefore, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish that the statement was made with malice. Although Plaintiff contends that Nurse Po was rude, that she was improperly placed on “security alert”, that she was improperly terminated from her volunteer position, that she was targeted for being middle eastern and perceived to be Muslim similar to the “UCI-11,” and that the ombudsman also believed that Plaintiff did not do anything, all of this is insufficient to establish that the publication was motivated by hatred or ill will toward her, or that Defendant lacked reasonable ground for belief in the truth of the publication. (Dec. of Said, at paragraphs 10-43.) Moreover, there is email evidence of Plaintiff apologizing for her behavior in the ER room, and her requesting a second chance at the volunteer position. (Defendant’s Evidence, Exhibits E-G.) Thus, the evidence reflects that Defendant’s communication was privileged and was not made with malice. Therefore, the MSJ with respect to this cause of action is GRANTED.

The MSJ with respect to the 10th cause of action for violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act is GRANTED.

Defendant has met its initial burden to establishing that Plaintiff is not an “employee” under the California Whistleblower Protection Act. Defendant has sufficiently established that Plaintiff’s position was a volunteer position and that she was not an employee. Plaintiff was not paid for her employment, nor did she receive any monetary compensation for her services. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraph 40-42.) Although Plaintiff received free vaccines, all volunteers received free health clearance prior to their volunteer services. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 43, 45.) Moreover, Defendant has established that Plaintiff’s position was not an “apprenticeship” position because her research and volunteer position does not lead her into medical school. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 44, 46.)

The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to establish a triable issue. Plaintiff cites to Labor Code Section 3357 in support of her contention that she was an “employee.” Section 3357 is distinguishable because it is under the division that governs Workers’ Compensation and Insurance. Plaintiff also cites to Mendoza v. Town of Ross (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 625. Mendoza is distinguishable because it does not pertain to a violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act. Moreover, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence which would create a triable issue as to whether she was employed by Defendant.

Further, Defendant has sufficiently established that there is no evidence that it committed any improper governmental activity under the California Whistleblower Protection Act. (Defendant’s Material Facts, at paragraphs 89-125.) Plaintiff has failed to establish a triable issue that Defendant engaged in improper activity that falls under the California Whistleblower Protection Act.

The MSJ with respect to the 16th cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act is GRANTED.

Defendant correctly contends that California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act does not apply to employer-employee relationships. (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 500.)

In addition, Defendant has met its initial burden of establishing that Plaintiff was not denied full and equal accommodations as a result of her race, religion, ancestry and/or national origin. Rather, Plaintiff exhibited insubordination and wrongfully refused to leave the critical trauma room when ordered to do so. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 165-185.) Further, Defendant has established that Plaintiff lacks evidence showing that she was discriminated against based on her race, religion, ancestry and/or national origin. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 195-200.) Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently produce any evidence which establishes at triable issue. (Plaintiff’s Disputed Material Fact, at paragraphs 165-203.)

The MSJ with respect to the 17th cause of action for violation of Civil Code Section 51.5 is GRANTED.

For the same reasons set forth above with respect to the 16th cause of action, the MSJ with respect to the 17th cause of action is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Joy Po: The evidentiary objection is OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections Interlineated in her Separate Statement: The evidentiary objections fails to comply with CRC 3.1350 and are therefore OVERRULED in their entirety.

Moving party is to give notice.

2. Defendant Terry Belmont’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication, is GRANTED.

First, the court notes that on 1/17/14, it SUSTAINED Defendant Terry Belmont’s demurrer to the 2nd, 4th-7th, and 11th-14th causes of action of Fourth Amended Complaint without leave to amend. Thus, the Motion for Summary Judgment as to those causes of action is MOOT.

The MSJ with respect to the 1st cause of action for defamation is GRANTED.

Defendant Belmont has sufficiently met his initial burden of establishing that there is no evidence showing any misrepresentation or defamatory statement made by Belmont about Plaintiff. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 1-12.) The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to establish a triable issue. Here, Plaintiff has failed to present any admissible evidence establishing a triable issue that Belmont has made a defamatory statement about Plaintiff, or that he authorized/instructed another individual to make a defamatory statement about Plaintiff. (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement, at paragraphs1-12.) Therefore, the MSJ with respect to this cause of action is GRANTED.

The MSJ with respect to the 3rd cause of action for breach of contract is GRANTED.

Defendant has met his initial burden of establishing that there is no evidence of a contract between Belmont and Plaintiff. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 55-74.) Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence showing the existence of a written agreement between the parties, and has therefore failed to establish a triable issue. Moreover, although Plaintiff alleges an alter ego theory of liability in her Memorandum of Points and Authorities, she has failed to present sufficient evidence establishing a triable issue that the Regents is an alter ego of Belmont.

The MSJ with respect to the 8th cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations is GRANTED.

Defendant has met his initial burden of establishing that there is no evidence showing that he engaged in intentional acts to disrupt a contractual relationship between Plaintiff and a third-party. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 230-249.) The burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish a triable issue. Here, Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient admissible evidence to establish a triable issue as to whether Defendant engaged in intentional acts to disrupt a contractual relationship, or evidence showing that Defendant Belmont engaged in a conspiracy to disrupt a contractual relationship between Plaintiff and a third-party.

The MSJ with respect to the 9th cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage is GRANTED.

Defendant has met his initial burden of establishing that there is no evidence showing that he engaged in intentional acts to disrupt a prospective economic relationship. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 250-271.) The burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish a triable issue. Here, Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient admissible evidence to establish a triable issue as to whether Defendant engaged in intentional acts to disrupt a prospective economic relationship, or evidence showing that Defendant Belmont engaged in a conspiracy to disrupt a prospective economic relationship.

The MSJ with respect to the 10th cause of action for violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act is GRANTED.

First, Defendant has sufficiently established that Plaintiff was not an employee of Belmont. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 272-310.) The burden shifts to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has failed to establish a triable issue that Plaintiff was an employee of Belmont. In addition, although Plaintiff alleges in her memorandum of points and authorities that Belmont “conspired” with Regent’s administration to retaliate against her, Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence supporting this contention.

Second, Defendant Belmont has sufficiently established that Plaintiff’s position with the Regent was a volunteer position and that she was not an employee. Plaintiff was not paid for her employment, nor did she receive any monetary compensation for her services. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 293-295.) Although Plaintiff received free vaccines from the Regent, all volunteers received free health clearance prior to their volunteer services. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 296, 298.) Moreover, Defendant has established that Plaintiff’s position was not an “apprenticeship” position because her research and volunteer position does not lead her into medical school. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 299-300.)

Thus, Defendant Belmont has met his initial burden to establishing that Plaintiff is not an “employee” under the California Whistleblower Protection Act. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence which would create a triable issue as to whether she was employed by Defendant Belmont.

In addition, Defendant Belmont has sufficiently established that there is no evidence showing that he committed any improper governmental activity under the California Whistleblower Protection Act. (Defendant’s Material Facts, at paragraphs 308-310.) Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to establish a triable issue that Defendant Belmont engaged in improper activity that falls under the California Whistleblower Protection Act.

The MSJ with respect to the 15th cause of action for unfair business practices is GRANTED.

The pleading serves as the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment motion. (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1258.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Company (2013) 213 Cal. App. 4th 486, 493.) Here, the wrongful conduct alleged in the subject complaint were disposed of and found in Defendant’s favor on demurrer as reflected in the court’s 1/17/14 Minute Order or by way of this Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the remaining causes of action. Therefore, Defendant has sufficiently established that he has not engaged in any unlawful conduct under the UCL. Moreover, Defendant has sufficiently established that there is no evidence of any wrongful conduct by him to support the UCL claim. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 368-406.)

The burden therefore shifts to Plaintiff to establish a triable issue. Here, Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient admissible evidence to establish a triable issue in support of the UCL claim. In addition, although Plaintiff alleges that Belmont “conspired” with Regent’s administration to commit an unlawful and/or unfair conduct, Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence supporting this contention.

The MSJ with respect to the 16th cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act is GRANTED.

Defendant correctly contends that California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act does not apply to employer-employee relationships. (Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 500.)

In addition, Defendant has met his initial burden of establishing that Plaintiff was not denied full and equal accommodations as a result of her race, religion, ancestry and/or national origin. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 436-445.) Indeed, Defendant has presented evidence showing that he has not engaged in any wrongful conduct in violation of the California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. (Id.) Rather, the evidence reflects that Plaintiff exhibited insubordination and wrongfully refused to leave the critical trauma room when ordered to do so. (Defendant’s Material Fact, at paragraphs 407-427.) Further, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently produce any evidence which establishes at triable issue with respect to this cause of action. (Plaintiff’s Disputed Material Fact, at paragraphs 407-445.)

The MSJ with respect to the 17th cause of action for violation of Civil Code § 51.5 is GRANTED.

For the same reasons set forth above with respect to the 16th cause of action, the MSJ with respect to the 17th cause of action is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Joy Po: The evidentiary objection is OVERRULED.

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections Interlineated in her Separate Statement: The evidentiary objections fails to comply with CRC 3.1350 and are therefore OVERRULED in their entirety.

Moving party is to give notice.