Case Number: TC028993 Hearing Date: July 24, 2018 Dept: A

# 7. Jose Hidalgo v. Monica Hidalgo, et al.

Case No.: TC028993

Matter on calendar for: Hearing on motion for summary judgment

Tentative ruling:

I. Background

On December 7, 2017, Plaintiff Jose Hidalgo filed a Complaint against Monica Hidalgo, Joe B. Silva, and Betty L. Silva for:

(1) Quiet Title

(2) Breach of Contract

(3) Promissory Estoppel

(4) Constructive Trust

(5) Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Plaintiff alleges that the subject property belonged to Plaintiff’s and Defendant Monica Hidalgo’s (“Monica”) father. Their father transferred the property to Monica because Plaintiff was unable to have the property in his name at the time due to personal difficulty. All parties agreed the subject property belong to Plaintiff; there are witnesses to these conversations. Their father passed away on March 27, 2016. Monica had previously agreed both in person and in text to quitclaim the property. Monica has now sold the property to Defendants Joe B. Silva and Betty L. Silva (collectively “the Silvas.”)

On April 20, 2018, Defendants filed this motion for summary judgment.

II. Standard

A “motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (CCP § 437c(c).) Once the moving party has met its burden of demonstrating that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the opposing party cannot rest upon the mere allegations of the pleadings but must present admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Company (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 844.) “In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom… and must view such evidence… in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” (Id. at 844-845; CCP § 437c(p)(2).)

III. Analysis

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because (1) the alleged agreement, which has as its object the intent to defraud a creditor, is illegal, void, and unenforceable as a matter of law, (2) the illegal agreement is the sole basis supporting relief in each cause of action, and (3) the doctrine of unclean hands.

Agreement

The essential elements of a contract are (1) parties capable of contracting, (2) their consent, (3) a lawful object, and (4) a sufficient cause or consideration. (Civ. Code § 1550; Emphasis added.) Unlawful is defined as contrary to an express provision of law, contrary to the policy of express law, though not expressly prohibited, or otherwise contrary to good morals. (Id. at § 1667.)

“No rule of law is more strictly adhered to than the rule that equity will not lend its aid to establish a trust or enforce a contract which is tainted with fraud. He who executes a conveyance of property for the purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding his creditors, cannot by an action in equity obtain a reconveyance from his grantee, nor can anyone claiming under him, except an innocent purchaser. The authorities supporting this well-known rule are legion, and we need cite only the following: Allstead v. Laumeister, 16 Cal. App. 59 [116 Pac. 296]; Anderson v. Nelson, 83 Cal. App. 1-6 [256 Pac. 294, 296].” (Saint v. Saint (1932) 120 Cal.App. 15, 22.) If the admitted purpose of a transfer was to defeat an existing creditor, then the fraudulent scheme was fully consummated upon the conveyance of the property. (See Tognazzi v. Wilhelm (1936) 6 Cal.2d 123, 125.)

Here, Defendants have presented sufficient evidence to prove that the alleged 2008 oral agreement, that was thereafter put into a written agreement on September 26, 2013, between Plaintiff, Monica, and their father was unlawful and is void. The agreement was to temporarily transfer the property to Monica because Plaintiff owed child support and did not want the property to be seized from a creditor. (Exhs. 1-2; Complaint, ¶¶ 18-19.) Accordingly, the agreement between Plaintiff, Monica, and their father was for an unlawful object and was tainted with fraud.

However, Plaintiff also alleges in or around July and again in September (presumably 2017) there was an agreement between himself and Monica to transfer the property to him now that he can have the property in his name. (Complaint, ¶¶ 54-55.)

Defendant argues that this agreement also is void because California is a step-transaction state for purposes of determining illegal transactions. (See Civ. Code § 1608.) However, this second agreement is a separate transaction from the 2008/2013 agreement. Plaintiff did not owe child support at the time that this agreement was made and was only an agreement between Plaintiff and Monica. Therefore, this agreement may not be unlawful, against public policy, or immoral.

The defense of unclean hands also would be inapplicable to the 2017 agreement between Plaintiff and Monica to transfer the property to him.

Therefore, there is triable issue of material fact as to enforcement of the 2017 agreement to transfer the property from Monica to Plaintiff.

IV. Ruling

The Court denies the motion for summary judgment.