Case Number: TC029033 Hearing Date: July 24, 2018 Dept: A

# 8. Marzieh Amidnamin, et al. v. City of Compton, et al.

Case No.: TC029033

Matter on calendar for: CMC, OSC re: dismissal, hearing on motion for attorney’s fees and motion to be relieved as counsel

Tentative ruling:

I. Background

This action arises from Defendant City of Compton’s alleged failure to respond to Plaintiffs’ Public Records Act requests in violation of Gov. Code §§ 6250-6253. The PRA requests purportedly pertain to City ordinances prohibiting construction of convenience and liquor stores to prevent nuisance activities. Plaintiffs own a shopping center and a business that operates a 7-Eleven. The City allegedly issued a permit to another entity to build another 7-Eleven in violation of the ordinances.

II. Analysis:

Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Entitlement

Plaintiffs argue that Government Code section 6259(d) provides, “[t]he court shall award costs and reasonable attorney fees to the plaintiff should the plaintiff prevail in litigation filed pursuant to this section.” An award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to this provision is mandatory if plaintiff prevails. (Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 427, citing Belth v. Garamendi (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 896, 899-900.) Further, a plaintiff prevails within the meaning of subdivision (d) when he or she files an action which results in defendant releasing a copy of a previously withheld document. (See Belth v. Garamendi, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at 829.)

Plaintiffs argue that they are the prevailing party. City did not respond to the written Public Records Act request submitted by Plaintiffs on December 21, 2017. (Racek Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. A.) Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against City to obtain the documents. On March 14, 2018, City produced records in court, but they were not complete. On June 13, 2018, City confirmed that responses were complete and it would not be producing any further documents under the Public Records Act. (Racek Decl., ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs attach emails between their counsel and the Deputy City Attorney, City of Compton, evidencing that documents were being produced. (Racek Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. G.) Further, there is evidence that at the March 14, 2018 CMC, City Attorney produced a flash drive containing responsive documents. (Racek Decl., ¶ 13.)

Defendants do not oppose.

The evidence presented by Plaintiffs is sufficient to establish that they are the prevailing parties. Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees.

Reasonableness (Lodestar)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.) In exercising its discretion, the court should consider several factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in handling the matter, the attention given, the success or failure, and the resulting judgment. (Ibid.)

In determining the proper amount of fees to award, courts use the lodestar method. The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the total number of reasonable hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate. “Fundamental to its determination … [is] a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney … in the presentation of the case.” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48 (Serrano III).) A reasonable hourly rate must reflect the skill and experience of the attorney. (Id. at 49.) “Prevailing parties are compensated for hours reasonably spent on fee-related issues. A fee request that appears unreasonably inflated is a special circumstance permitting the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 635 (Serrano IV); see also Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587 (“The trial court could make its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of the work done in light of the nature of the case, and of the credibility of counsel’s declaration unsubstantiated by time records and billing statements.”))

Reasonable attorney fees should be based on an objective standard of reasonableness, i.e., the market value of services rendered, not on the notion of cost incurred. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1090.) The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. (Id. at 1096.) The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony. (Ibid.) The trial court makes its determination after consideration of several factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs request a total amount of $37,828.50 for attorney’s fees and $2,388.02 in costs.

The Court accepts the billing rates in this matter for the respective attorneys. The Court was provided with a redacted billing printout and cannot ascertain how much time each attorney spent on each task. Nonetheless, the Court concludes that the overall number of hours appears somewhat higher than was necessary to complete the tasks necessary for this matter. Accordingly, Mr. Trutanich’s time is reduced to 7 hours, Mr. Dance’s time is reduced to 10 hours, and Mr. Racek’s time is reduced to 40 hours.

Attorney’s fees are awarded in the total amount of $25,015.

Plaintiffs have stated that they have incurred costs, “including copy costs, travel and parking for meeting and hearings, mail in and service costs, and filing fees for a total of $2,388.02.” Although back-up was not provided, the Court accepts the total of costs set forth by counsel under penalty of perjury.

The total amount awarded to Plaintiffs in attorney’s fees and costs is $27,403.02.

Motion to be Relieved as Counsel

Rule of Professional Conduct 3-700(A)(2) requires counsel, before withdrawing from employment, to take “reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client…”

A motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a supporting declaration showing why a substitution of attorneys by consent could not be obtained. (CRC, Rule 3.1362(c); Code Civ. Proc. § 284(1); see Vapnek et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Professional Responsibility (The Rutter Group 2010) ¶ 10:97.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel has submitted the required motion, supporting declaration, and order. Counsel states that a lack of communication is the reason for this motion. The clients have been served properly. There are no future hearings other than this July 24, 2018 hearing and Plaintiffs have prevailed in this matter. Accordingly, there is no prejudice to the clients.

The Court grants the unopposed motion.

III. Ruling

The motion for attorney’s fees and costs is granted and reduced to $27,403.02.

The motion to be relieved as counsel is granted, effective upon filing of proof of service of the Court’s order upon the clients.