As an initial matter the Court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition exceeds the page limits set forth in Rule of Court 3.113(d). While the Court has exercised its discretion to consider the entire opposition, Plaintiff is directed to abide by the Rules of Court in the future. There are not separate standards for parties who chose to represent themselves in litigation. See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985 “A doctrine generally requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.”

The Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) by Defendant County of Santa Clara (“County”) on the ground that the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against it and is uncertain is SUSTAINED with 10 days’ leave to amend as this is the first challenge to the pleading by the County.

The FAC does not state any recognized cause of action. Plaintiff’s central allegation continues to be that the remaining defendants (the County and the Santa Clara County Board of Registrar) have charged him what he considers an improperly high pro rata share of the costs associated with his decision to have an optional candidate statement included in the voter information packet for the June 2012 primary congressional election for the 19th congressional district. He requests that the Court reduce the cost charged to him to an amount of his choosing without citing any authority that would allow the Court to take such an action. Elections Code §13307 provides that if a candidate chooses to prepare a statement to be included in the voter pamphlet the local agency “may” estimate the total cost of “printing, handling, translating, and mailing the candidate’s statements filed pursuant to this section, including costs incurred as a result of complying with the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended.” §13307(c). The agency “may” then require each candidate who chooses to file a statement to pay their “estimated pro rata share as a condition of having his or her statement included in the voter’s pamphlet.” The statute clearly states that “the local agency is not bound by the estimate and may, on a pro rata basis, bill the candidate for additional actual expense or refund any excess paid depending on the actual final cost.” See Elections Code §13307. Elections Code §13307.5 makes this system applicable to congressional elections. A candidate like Plaintiff who establishes that they are indigent pursuant to Elections Code §13309 need not pay the estimated pro rata cost of the statement in advance of the election but “[n]othing in this section shall prohibit the local agency from billing the candidate his or her actual pro rata share of the cost after the election.” Elections Code §13309(f).

Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action by alleging that the County Defendants’ decision to exercise an option expressly given to them by statute, the option to estimate the costs of statements and require each candidate—even indigent ones after the election—to pay the pro rata costs associate with printing, handling, and mailing candidates statements in compliance with federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended, constitutes a violation of that same statutory scheme. It is irrelevant that other counties in which Plaintiff states that he has been a candidate for election may have chosen not to exercise that option.

Plaintiff’s reference to and claims regarding the legislative history of the relevant elections code provisions does not help him state a cause of action. No legislative history materials have been properly submitted for judicial notice. Even if they had been, they would not be relevant here. “[W]e note that resort to legislative history is appropriate only where statutory language is ambiguous. As the California Supreme Court has said, ‘Our role in construing a statute is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. In determining intent, we look first to the words of the statute, giving the language its usual, ordinary meaning. If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain language of the statute governs.’” Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal App 4th 26, 29, internal citation omitted. The language of Elections Code §§13307, 11307.5 and 13309 is not ambiguous and clearly permits the procedure followed here by the County Defendants.

Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition that among other things “the County, and specifically the ‘election official’ can ‘bill’ the candidate, but if the candidate is not able to pay, the County has no option but to create a fair and applicable fee that they can prove is payable by the indigent candidate,” and that if the County wishes to charge the cost permitted by the statute it “has the burden to prove that their budget and calculations for the entire cost of the official voter guide was done correctly and that there was no surplus for the entire guide, not just a single election,” Opp. at 7:6-18, are not supported by citation to any authority and do not reflect the plain language of the Elections Code provisions. These provisions do not provide for judicial oversight of the cost calculations by the “local agency.” If such oversight was intended by the Legislature it presumably would have provided for such oversight in the statutory scheme.