16-CIV-01825 RYAN S. FANTER VS. DAWN F. WINEINGER, ET AL.

RYAN S. FANTER DAWN F. WINEINGER CATHOLIC CHARITIES CYO
CHRISTOPHER B. DOLAN JAMES R. PICKER WAYNE WATTEN

DEFENDANT, CATHOLIC CHARITIES CYO OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF SAN FRANCISCO’S NOTICE OF MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TO SIGN RECORD RELEASE AUTHORIZATIONS FOR PRODUCTION OF VA RECORDS; REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY OF RECORD TENTATIVE RULING:

The Motion of Defendant Catholic Charities CYO of the Archdiocese of San Francisco (“Defendant”) to Compel Plaintiff to Sign Record Release Authorizations for Production of VA Records is DENIED.

Defendant has not provided any authority to support that a motion may be brought to compel a party to sign a record release authorization. Although Defendant cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010 as authority for this motion, this section addresses production of documents from a party that has possession, control or custody over the documents. Defendant is not seeking to compel production of documents in Plaintiff Ryan S. Fanter’s (“Plaintiff”) possession, custody or control though. Rather, Defendant seeks to obtain documents based on subpoenas of Plaintiff’s medical records from the San Francisco Veterans Affairs Medical Center and VA Palo Alto Health Care System (“VA Records”).

Further, Defendant also relies on Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, to support that this motion is proper. In Miranda though, the defendant filed a motion to compel compliance with the subpoena for the plaintiff’s medical records from Kaiser after Kaiser indicated it needed a signed release for the medical records. (Id. at 917-918.) The “compliance” sought by the defendant was an order compelling the plaintiff to sign the authorizations for release of her Kaiser medical records. (Id. at 918.) A motion to compel compliance is provided for by statute under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1. (See C.C.P. § 1987.1.) In this case though, Defendant has not brought a motion to compel compliance with the subpoenas of Plaintiff’s medical records. Moreover, while the court may treat this motion as seeking compliance, Defendant has not provided a copy of the subpoenas with this motion. Thus, the court cannot compel compliance with these subpoenas at this time.

Lastly, even if Defendant had brought a motion to compel compliance with the subpoenas, it appears that Defendant could have also sought an order simply directing compliance with the subpoenas instead of seeking to compel Plaintiff to sign the records release authorizations. (See 38 C.F.R. §1.511(c)(1), (c)(3).)