Case Name: J.A. v. Silicon Valley Monterey Bay Council, Inc.
Case No.: 2017-1-CV-311193

According to the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff J.A. (“Plaintiff”) joined Cub Scout Pack 220 in the summer of 2008. (See complaint, ¶ 9.) Plaintiff’s mother allowed his volunteer Webelos Den Leader, defendant Ronald David Guinto (“Guinto”), to drive Plaintiff home from Cub Scout meetings despite the Boy Scouts’ specific prohibition of one-on-one contact between Scout leaders and Scouts. (See complaint, ¶ 10.) In November 2008, Guinto arranged an overnight weekend camping trip for Pack 220 and obtained “parent proxies” from Plaintiff’s mother and another boy, “John Doe,” to permit him to act as their legal guardian. (See complaint, ¶ 11.) One evening during this trip, Plaintiff woke up in his tent to witness Guinto molesting and/or impermissibly touching John Doe’s genitals. (See complaint, ¶ 12.) Further, during this trip, Guinto played a game called “cup check” where he would hit young scouts in their genitals, including Plaintiff. (See complaint, ¶ 12.)

After this trip, in November 2008, a Cub Scout parent made a formal written complaint with defendant Silicon Valley Monterey Bay Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America (“SVMBC”), in part concerning Guinto’s inappropriate behavior; however, SVMBC did not reprimand Guinto in any manner. (See complaint, ¶ 13.) A few months after the camping trip, Guinto drove Plaintiff home after a Cub Scout meeting to his home and then molested Plaintiff. (See complaint, ¶ 15.) On June 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants SVMBC, Lincoln Glen Church, Mennonite Brethren (“LGC”), and Guinto (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting causes of action for:

1) Sexual assault and battery (against Guinto);
2) Negligence (against Defendants);
3) Negligent training, supervision, monitoring and retention (against Defendants); and,
4) Intentional infliction of emotional distress (against Guinto).

Defendants LGC and SVMBC separately move for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication.

DEFENDANT LGC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant’s burden on summary judgment

“A defendant seeking summary judgment must show that at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. … The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show there is a triable issue of material fact on that issue.” (Alex R. Thomas & Co. v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 66, 72; internal citations omitted; emphasis added.)

“The ‘tried and true’ way for defendants to meet their burden of proof on summary judgment motions is to present affirmative evidence (declarations, etc.) negating, as a matter of law, an essential element of plaintiff’s claim.” (Weil et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2007) ¶ 10:241, p.10-91, citing Guz v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334; emphasis original.) “The moving party’s declarations and evidence will be strictly construed in determining whether they negate (disprove) an essential element of plaintiff’s claim ‘in order to avoid unjustly depriving the plaintiff of a trial.’” (Id. at § 10:241.20, p.10-91, citing Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107.)

“Another way for a defendant to obtain summary judgment is to ‘show’ that an essential element of plaintiff’s claim cannot be established. Defendant does so by presenting evidence that plaintiff ‘does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence’ (because plaintiff must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to oppose the motion.) Such evidence usually consists of admissions by plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he or she has discovered nothing to support an essential element of the cause of action.” (Id. at ¶ 10:242, p.10-92, citing Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854-855.)

Defendant LGC meets its initial burden to demonstrate that the causes of action lack merit

Defendant LGC moves for summary judgment against Plaintiff, arguing that: LGC did not owe Plaintiff a duty to screen, train or supervise volunteer leaders; LGC did not breach any alleged duties of care because LGC did not negligently hire Guinto, LGC did not negligently supervise Guinto and negligent training does not apply to chartered organizations; LGC did not proximately cause Plaintiff’s injuries; Plaintiff cannot recover damages from witnessing the abuse of another scout or abuse or the molestation that allegedly occurred as it was unrelated to Scouting; and, Plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages because there is no evidence that establishes malice, oppression or fraud.

Here, it is undisputed that LGC was the Chartered Organization for Pack 220. (See Pl.’s opposition to LGC’s separate statement of material facts, undisputed material fact nos. (“LGC UMFs”) 8, 16-17.) Chartered Organizations create and operate Cub Scout Packs and provides a meeting place for the Pack, and helps it register with the Boy Scouts of America non-profit organization called a Council, created to serve a geographic region to help promote Scouting in that region. (See LGC UMFs 1-3, 9.) LGC was in defendant SVMBC’s geographic region, and prior to the merger creating SVMBC, it was in the region for the Santa Clara County Council (“SCCC”). (See LGC UMFs, 4, 8.) Chartered Organizations appoint a Pack Committee to administer the affairs of the units, including weekly meetings and outings. (See LGC UMF 11.) Based on the recommendation of the Pack Committee, Chartered Organizations review adult volunteer applications. (See LGC UMF 15.)

In 2006, LGC Pastor of Care Larry Albright was asked by local parents if LGC would sponsor Cub Scout Pack 220 by providing space for meetings to the Pack, and the LGC Church Leadership Council decided that LGC would provide space to the Pack free of charge. (See LGC UMF 16.) During the time LGC sponsored Pack 220, LGC employees helped the Pack complete its annual registration form, reviewed adult volunteer applications, and provided space for the Pack to meet. (See LGC UMF 17.) LGC employees did not attend Pack 220’s weekly meetings or its events and were not invited to do so. (See LGC UMF 20.) Because LGC did not attend Pack 220’s meetings, it had Pack 220 sign a “Facility Use Agreement,” which required Pack 220 to respect and maintain the LGC facilities and operate its activities safely—such as by having “two responsible adult supervisors present at all times.” (See LGC UMF 21.) Guinto was never an employee of LGC and LGC did not have any information regarding any criminal history of Guinto until his arrest in 2014. (See LGC UMFs 43, 45, 52, 56, 83.) Guinto had a background check completed immediately prior to his involvement with Pack 220, and the background check came back clean. (See LGC UMF 42.) During the time LGC served as Pack 220’s sponsoring organization, no LGC employees ever received any complaints, whether formal or informal, about Guinto, nor were made aware of any issues in the Pack. (See LGC UMF 53-55.)

In Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, a former Boy Scout sued Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (“BSA”), the San Francisco Bay Area Council (“BAC”) and Mary Help of Christians Church, a church of the Diocese of Oakland where Troop 255 held its meetings, asserting causes of action for negligence and premises liability. (Id. at p.384.) The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the church, which contended that there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute regarding their lack of prior knowledge or reason to know that Paz might be likely to sexually molest one of the scouts in Troop 255, arguing that the undisputed facts established that Paz’s sexual misconduct with Juarez could not have been foreseen. (Id. at pp. 384-386.)

Unlike here, the plaintiff in Juarez alleged acts of molestation that occurred on property owned by the church. (Id. at p.413.) However, the Juarez court nevertheless affirmed summary judgment in favor of the church because Juarez did not provide facts that put or should have put the church on notice of the molestation, and additionally did not claim that the Church could have taken effective steps to prevent the molestation. (Id.) The Juarez court noted that “[t]here was nothing about the nature of the activity—holding scout meetings—to characterize the activity as foreseeably dangerous… [n]or was there anything about the nature of the property owned by the Church to implicate liability—it was just a room in the Church… [n]or was there any evidence the Church had any duty or ability to oversee the activities conducted by Troop 255. (Id. at pp.413-414.)

Unlike Juarez, the purported acts in this case occurred at Camp Chesbrough, and at a sleepover at Guinto’s home, where Guinto picked up Plaintiff from Plaintiff’s home to take him to his home for the sleepover. (See LGC UMFs 68, 71, 79-82.) The Camp Chesbrough incident was that another scout was molested while Plaintiff was in the tent. (See LGC UMF 65, 71.) The Juarez court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of BSA and BAC on causes of action for negligent hiring, retention and supervision, stating that “there was nothing in Paz’s background and nothing that was made known to Scouts during his tenure as scoutmaster to Troop 255 that could be deemed a specific warning that Paz himself posed an unreasonable risk to minors.” (Id. at pp.395-397, citing Roman Catholic Bishop v. Super. Ct. (Jane D.) (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1556, 1565-1567, Federico v. Super. Ct. (Jenry G.) (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1213-1216 (stating that “statements made after the offenses against plaintiff occurred and had become known, recalled some conduct by Kaslar while at work that involved the touching of children in a manner which in hindsight they interpreted as inappropriate or indicative of Kaslar’s deviant sexual proclivities… [h]owever, there was no showing that any of these incidents was called to defendant’s attention at the time they occurred…the events described by plaintiff and the witnesses were not explicitly sexual, consisting of such occurrences as an unusually prolonged handshake, an overly friendly pat on the shoulder, or, on one occasion, Kaslar having a younger child sit in his lap… [s]uch contact was, at the time it occurred, ambiguous at worst and did not result in any complaints to defendant by the children involved or their parents… Defendant expressly denied having any knowledge that Kaslar acted inappropriately at work until after the charges involving plaintiff became known, and plaintiff has offered no evidence to the contrary… [t]hus, even if the incidents described could be deemed a warning sign that Kaslar’s continued employment might pose a risk to minors, they cannot be used to impose liability for negligence on defendant, who had no actual knowledge, or reason to suspect, that they had occurred”)), and Chaney v. Super. Ct. (Kennedy) (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 152, 158 (stating that “[i]t is not enough to allege that the sexual misconduct was conceivable…[t]he plaintiff must allege facts showing that it was foreseeable, i.e. facts from which it can be inferred that the defendant wife must have known that her husband was engaging in, or wished to engage in, acts of sexual misconduct with a minor”) (emphasis original).)

Here, LGC did not have any facts to provide any kind of notice to LGC that Guinto posed an unreasonable risk to minors. (See Z.V. v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 889, 902 (stating that “a plaintiff must show that a person in a supervisorial position over the actor had prior knowledge of the actor’s propensity to do the bad act”).) Defendant LGC meets its initial burden to demonstrate that it did not have a duty to Plaintiff to prevent the alleged molestation, and even if it did, it did not breach any such duty since it did not have notice of the molestation or facts that should have put the church on notice of the molestation.

In opposition, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to the existence of a duty or breach of the duty.

In opposition, Plaintiff concedes that it cannot hold LGC liable for negligent hiring. Plaintiff, however, argues that he had a special relationship with LGC since LGC was the owner and operator of the Pack, and LGC’s charter agreement with BSA requires it to supervise Pack and have a reporting mechanism for violation of BSA Youth Protection rules. (See Pl.’s memorandum in opposition to LGC’s motion for summary judgment, pp.7:18-28, 8:1-28, 9:1-14.) Plaintiff contends that “[i]n fulfilling its protective duty towards the children in its Pack, LGC should have sought a resolution at Council for direct reporting of all BSA Youth Protection violations to the paid Pack 220 Commissioner, Alan Young.” (Id. at p. 9:15-22.)
However, this argument does not address the issue regarding notice. In Romero v. Super. Ct. (Ryan N.) (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1068, the court established that a special relationship to protect a minor from a third party assault only arises if there is actual knowledge of the third party’s assaultive properties. (Id. at pp.1081-1083; see also Steven F. v. Anaheim Union High School Dist. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 904, 916 (absent knowledge that the teacher posed a threat to his students, no duty to investigate); see also Federico, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p.1216; see also J.L. v. Children’s Institute, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 388, 396-399 (stating that “even when a defendant has formed a special relationship with a plaintiff, courts uniformly hold that the defendant has no duty to protect the plaintiff from unforeseeable third party criminal conduct… [b]ecause there was no evidence showing CII had actual knowledge of E.Y.’s assaultive tendencies or that he posed any risk of harm, his conduct was not foreseeable and CII owed no duty to protect against the attack”).) Plaintiff also cites to certain instances in which Pack volunteers may have had concern; however, these acts do not demonstrate actual knowledge by those Pack volunteers as to Guinto’s assaultive properties, much less actual knowledge by LGC. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to defendant LGC. Accordingly, LGC’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s objection numbers 1 and 2 are OVERRULED.

DEFENDANT SVMBC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

SVMBC moves for summary judgment, arguing that it cannot be liable for negligent hiring, negligent supervision, negligent training because: it never hired Guinto; a criminal background check of Guinto was conducted and it did not have antecedent knowledge of Guinto’s criminal dangerousness; Pack 220 conducted a reasonable investigation of Guinto; Plaintiff cannot establish proximate cause based on any purported failure to properly screen Guinto; Plaintiff’s identified instances of notice—the car rides, the complaint by BSA parent Schneck about Guinto’s critical comments to her son, the tent sharing, the use of a parent proxy form, the game of “cup check”—were not reported to SVMBC or otherwise provide actual knowledge of a propensity to molest; SVMBC took reasonable steps to ensure that the Youth Protection Program was likely to be communicated; the Youth Protection Program was disseminated to Pack 220 and Plaintiff’s mother. SVMBC also moves for summary adjudication of the negligence causes of action to the extent that they are premised on the witnessing of abuse of another Scout and for abuse occurring at Guinto’s home, unrelated to a Scouting event. Finally, SVMBC moves for summary adjudication of punitive damages.

It is undisputed that SVMBC is a nonprofit corporation that serves the Santa Clara, Monterey, San Benito and Santa Cruz counties, and is a nonprofit organization separate and apart from the BSA. (See Pl.’s response to SVMBC’s separate statement of undisputed material facts, undisputed material facts nos. (“SVMBC UMF”) 4-6.) SVMC employs a small number of professionals who assist in supporting the Scouting program in the communities served by the Councils and maintains an organizational chart that identifies its staff. (See SVMBC UMFs 8-10.) Councils issue charters to chartered organizations such as Pack 220, and those organizations appoint a Pack committee to administer the affairs of the unit, including weekly meetings and outings, and is responsible for overseeing and administering the pack and recruiting necessary adult volunteers for the Pack. (See SVMBC UMFs 14-19.) Adults seeking to volunteer as a leader with a pack are required to fill out an “Adult Application,” which requires applicants to consent to a criminal background check, and include detailed background information, including their address, phone numbers, social security number, occupation, employer, experience with youth organizations, previous residences, current organizational memberships and references. (See SVMBC UMFs 21-23.) After the Adult Application is signed by the applicant, the Pack Committee chairperson, and the chartered organization representative, it is submitted to the Council for processing and the Council, after ensuring that is complete and does not have any issues, submits it to conduct a criminal background check of the applicant and screening against BSA volunteer screening records. (See SVMBC UMFs 24, 26-28.) If the applicant fails the Council’s or BSA’s checks, the applicant cannot serve as a registered adult leader. (See SVMBC UMF 29.)

Guinto went through this process, and after Den Leader and eventual Cubmaster Joseph Pate interviewed Guinto, noting that safety of kids was paramount, and after a background check came back clear, SVMBC did not have any information indicating that Guinto had any criminal history until his arrest in 2014. (See SVMBC UMFs 30-35, 37-41.) Schneck was the parent of a boy interested in being a Den Chief in Pack 220, and before she let her son be a Den Chief, she and her husband interviewed Guinto at their home for an hour. (See SVMBC UMFs 45-47.) Schneck and her husband did not have any concern with regards to Guinto’s propensity for deviant behavior and allowed her son to become a Den Chief. (See SVMBC UMF 48.)

Schneck met with Quicksilver District Director Dylan Hendrickson in person in “late December of either 2009, 2010 or 2011” and told him that she was “not a fan of Guinto” and was upset that Guinto provided “extremely negative comments” about her son. (See SVMBC UMFs 50-53.) Schneck did not have any suspicion that Guinto posed a threat to engage in child abuse until his arrest in 2014. (See SVMBC UMFs 48, 55.) Before Guinto’s arrest in 2014, Pate did not have any suspicions that Guinto posed a threat to molest children. (See SVMBC UMF 56.) Inga, a mother of a Cub Scout in Pack 220 also did not have any suspicions that Guinto posed a threat to engage in child sexual abuse prior to his arrest in 2014. (See SVMBC UMFs 57-58.) Nicolas Matulich, the Unit Commissioner for Pack 220, also did not have any suspicions that Guinto posed a threat to engage in child sexual abuse prior to his arrest in 2014. (See SVMBC UMFs 59-60.)

Prior to Guinto’s arrest in 2014, neither Plaintiff nor his parents attempted to notify SVMBC in any way that Guinto may have molested him. (See SVMBC UMF 71.) Prior to Guinto’s arrest in 2014, Tom Forst did not notify anyone that he saw Guinto enter a tent with scouts during the 2008 campout to Camp Chesbrough. (See SVMBC UMF 72.) Plaintiff’s mother signed a Youth Application that required her to read the program policies, such as the two-deep leadership rule, the no one-on-one contact rule and the no secret organization rule, and requiring the report of any suspected child abuse to the Scout executive. (See SVMBC UMFs 73-75, 78-82, 88.) Plaintiff also testified that Plaintiff received and brought home his Webelos Handbook, which includes a pamphlet that educates parents and Scouts about child abuse, called “How to Protect Your Children from Child Abuse: A Parent’s Guide.” (See SVMBC UMFs 76, 90.) The molestation of Plaintiff by Guinto occurred at Guinto’s home on a weekend night outside of Scouting activities, where Guinto picked Plaintiff up from Plaintiff’s home, during a sleepover approved by Plaintiff’s mother. (See SVMBC UMFs 99-102, 104-108.)

SVMBC meets its initial burden to demonstrate that it did not breach any duty with regards to any theory of negligent hiring. SVMBC, Pack 220 and BSA all appear to have conducted a criminal background check which came back as clear. There were interviews conducted that did not yield any suspicions as to a propensity to molest children. On the contrary, Guinto came across as nice, personable and good, making Pate comfortable with his suitability as a volunteer for Pack 220. Likewise, Schneck and her husband had no concerns and allowed their son to be a Den Chief. In 2010 and 2011, after the alleged molestation, Guinto’s background check by his employer, TalentWise, also revealed no problematic records. (See SVMBC UMF 49.) In opposition, Plaintiff does not make any arguments with regards to a negligent hiring theory.

SVMBC also meets its initial burden to demonstrate that it cannot be liable on a theory of negligent supervision, monitoring or retention because it did not have actual knowledge or facts such that it must have known that Guinto had a propensity to molest children. Here, the alleged misconduct providing notice include a game of “cup check” that no Pack leaders or parents witnessed, or was ever reported by Plaintiff (see SVMBC UMFs 41, 55, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 71), the provision of car rides to Scouts like Plaintiff with the parents’ express permission (see SVMBC UMFs 56, 65, 66), and Guinto’s sharing a tent with scouts witnessed by a Boy Scout/Den Chief where the Boy Scout did not notify anyone after seeing it (see SVMBC UMFs 61-62, 72). As noted by Plaintiff in his opposition, in Juarez, in discussing causes of action for negligent selection, supervision and retention, the court affirmed the trial court’s summary adjudication of those causes of action, stating that “there was nothing in Paz’s background and nothing that was made known to the Scouts during his tenure as scoutmaster to Troop 255 that could be deemed a specific warning that Paz himself posed an unreasonable risk to minors.” (See Pl.’s opposition to SVMBC’s motion for summary judgment, pp. 5:23-28, 6:1- 3, quoting Juarez, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p.397.) In reaching this conclusion, the Juarez court cited Roman Catholic Bishop v. Super. Ct. (Jane D.) (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1556, Federico v. Super. Ct. (Jenry G.) (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, and Chaney v. Super. Ct. (Kennedy) (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 152. Each of these cases acknowledge that it is not enough that sexual misconduct is conceivable; rather, it must be acts from which it can be inferred that SVMBC must have known that Guinto was engaging in or wished to engage in acts of sexual misconduct with a minor. (See Juarez, supra, 81 Cal. App.4th at pp. 395-397; see also Z.V. v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 889, 902 (stating that “a plaintiff must show that a person in a supervisorial position over the actor had prior knowledge of the actor’s propensity to do the bad act”); see also Federico v. Super. Ct. (Jenry G.) (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1213-1216 (stating that “statements made after the offenses against plaintiff occurred and had become known, recalled some conduct by Kaslar while at work that involved the touching of children in a manner which in hindsight they interpreted as inappropriate or indicative of Kaslar’s deviant sexual proclivities… [h]owever, there was no showing that any of these incidents was called to defendant’s attention at the time they occurred…the events described by plaintiff and the witnesses were not explicitly sexual, consisting of such occurrences as an unusually prolonged handshake, an overly friendly pat on the shoulder, or, on one occasion, Kaslar having a younger child sit in his lap… [s]uch contact was, at the time it occurred, ambiguous at worst and did not result in any complaints to defendant by the children involved or their parents… Defendant expressly denied having any knowledge that Kaslar acted inappropriately at work until after the charges involving plaintiff became known, and plaintiff has offered no evidence to the contrary… [t]hus, even if the incidents described could be deemed a warning sign that Kaslar’s continued employment might pose a risk to minors, they cannot be used to impose liability for negligence on defendant, who had no actual knowledge, or reason to suspect, that they had occurred”)), and Chaney v. Super. Ct. (Kennedy) (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 152, 158 (stating that “[i]t is not enough to allege that the sexual misconduct was conceivable…[t]he plaintiff must allege facts showing that it was foreseeable, i.e. facts from which it can be inferred that the defendant wife must have known that her husband was engaging in, or wished to engage in, acts of sexual misconduct with a minor”) (emphasis original).)

Here, no acts were witnessed by a SVMBC employee. As Plaintiff indicates, the acts that were actually witnessed by a Pack volunteer or adult, the provision of a car ride and the sharing of a tent, are a violation of the Youth Protection policies. However, it cannot be said that the provision of car rides or the sharing of a tent not reported to anyone are facts from which it can be inferred that SVMBC must have known that Guinto was engaging in, or wished to engage in, acts of sexual misconduct with a minor. On the contrary, the undisputed evidence shows that none of the Pack volunteers or adults had suspicions, much less knew that Guinto posed a threat to engage in child sex abuse. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Pack volunteers had a basis to suspect Guinto posed a threat because the provision of a car ride is a violation of the Youth Protection rule (see SVMBC UMF 56); however, the alleged misconduct at the behest of Plaintiff’s mother is at best the sort of “ambiguous at worst” misconduct that cannot form the basis of a negligent supervision cause of action. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to the complaint to the extent that it based on a theory of negligent supervision, monitoring and retention.

Lastly, SVMBC likewise meets its initial burden to demonstrate that it cannot be liable on a theory of negligent training. SVMBC demonstrates that volunteer leaders are required to watch a video regarding its Youth Protection Guidelines, which includes a set of rules that are designed to serve as barriers to child abuse, and pass a quiz to satisfy the Youth Protection Training requirement. (See SVMBC UMFs 73-75, 77, 87.) SVMBC hosted monthly Roundtable meetings for adult leaders and Youth Protection was constantly brought up at those meetings. (See SVMBC UMF 86.) It is undisputed that Pack volunteers in Pack 220 completed the Youth Protection Training. (See SVMBC UMFs 91-93, 96.) Pack parents were also knowledgeable of the Youth Protection rules, including the parent of one of the boys who Guinto gave a ride to. (See SVMBC UMF 95.) SVMBC required its volunteers to obtain recertification in Youth Protection Training every two years. (See SVMBC UMF 82.)

Plaintiff’s mother signed a Youth Application, which requires the parent to attest that they have read the information, including information about its program policies, the Two-Deep Leadership Rule, the No One-on-One Contact Rule and the No Secret Organization Rule, and the immediate contacting of the Scout executive in the event of any sort of suspicion of child abuse. (See SVMBC UMF 78-80, 88.) Plaintiff’s mother testified that Plaintiff received and brought home Plaintiff’s Webelos Handbook and showed it to Plaintiff’s mother; and the Webelos Handbook includes a pamphlet that educates parents and Scouts about child abuse, called “How to Protect Your Children from Child Abuse: A Parent’s Guide.” (UMFs 76, 90.) SVMBC meets its burden to demonstrate that the leaders of Pack 220 received appropriate training and that the Youth Protection Training policies were made available to Pack 220 parents and Scouts.

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that there was no oversight as to receipt of the Handbook, and that Plaintiff and his mother did not receive the Youth Protection pamphlet. (See Pl.’s opposition to SVMBC’s motion for summary adjudication, p.7:1-16.) Unlike Juarez, where the court reversed summary judgment on the negligent training cause of action, it is undisputed that the Pack leaders received appropriate training and that the Youth Protection Training policies were made available to Pack 220 parents and Scouts, as other parents were aware of those policies. (See also SVMBC UMF 139 (asserting “SVMBC educated its members on the Youth Protection Rules”).) Plaintiff’s mother also signed the Youth Application discussing its policies. However, Plaintiff is contending that there is a triable issue of material fact created because neither he nor his mother received the pamphlet, “How to Protect Your Children from Child Abuse: A Parent’s Guide,” that is included in the Webelos Handbook. Plaintiff also contradicts his mother’s testimony that he received or has seen the Handbook, despite receiving the Bobcat award requiring the reading of the pamphlet, because Guinto signed off on all activities in the Handbook, including the Bobcat badge, without Plaintiff’s mother’s involvement.

It is unclear how this demonstrates a triable issue of material fact as to SVMBC’s allegedly negligent training without SVMBC’s knowledge that Guinto was subverting the distribution of the Youth Protection pamphlet to parents and scouts by excluding access to that pamphlet without the parent’s, scout’s or SVMBC’s knowledge. As SVMBC notes in reply, Juarez does not require a council to ensure that a scout or parent actually know the Youth Protection Training policies; rather, Juarez addressed a situation in which the plaintiff presented evidence that BSA and BAC “failed to take reasonable steps to see that the information in the [Youth Protection] program was likely to be communicated to the scouts, parents, or adult leaders….” (Juarez, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p.412.) Absent SVMBC’s knowledge that a Pack volunteer within its area of service was essentially blocking communication of the information of the Youth Protection program, Plaintiff’s evidence fails to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact that SVMBC took reasonable steps to see that the information in its Youth Protection policies were likely to be communicated to scouts and parents.

Although the Court has great sympathy for Plaintiff for the terrible harm perpetrated by Guinto, the record does not demonstrate that SVMBC is liable for Guinto’s criminal misconduct. SVMBC’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

After Defendants have filed and served notice of entry of the order signed by the Court, Defendants shall submit a proposed judgment either approved as to form or with proof of compliance with Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

The Court shall prepare the Order.