RAFFI DER GERIGORIAN VS MARY SHAW

Case Number: BC662042 Hearing Date: August 09, 2018 Dept: 4

MOVING PARTY: Defendants Narek David Abrahamian and Astghik Hartoonian

RESPONDING PARTY:None

Motion for an Order Determining Good Faith Settlement

The court considered the moving papers. No opposition was filed.

BACKGROUND

On May 19, 2017, plaintiff Raffi Der Gerigorian filed a complaint against defendants Mary Shaw, Narek David Abrahamian, and Astghik Hartoonian for motor vehicle negligence based on a three-vehicle incident that occurred on June 19, 2015.

DISCUSSION

Defendants Narek David Abrahamian and Astghik Hartoonian request that the court determine that the settlement between moving defendants and plaintiff was made in good faith.

CCP § 877.6(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that, on noticed motion, “[a]ny party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or . . . and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors . . . .” “A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” CCP § 877.6(c). Although a determination that a settlement was in good faith does not discharge any other party from liability, “it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated” by the settlement. CCP § 877(a).

In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499, the California Supreme Court identified the following nonexclusive factors courts are to consider in determining if a settlement is in good faith under section 877.6: “a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.”

The evaluation of whether a settlement was made in good faith is required to “be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement.” Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal.3d at 499. “‘[A] defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.’ [Citation.]” Id. at 499.

“Thus, Tech-Bilt held that in determining whether a settlement was made in good faith for purposes of section 877.6, a key factor a trial court should consider is whether the amount paid in settlement bears a reasonable relationship to the settlor’s proportionate share of liability. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499–500 . . . .) This is because one of the main goals of section 877.6 is ‘allocating costs equitably among multiple tortfeasors.’ (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 502 . . . .).” TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166. “Accordingly, a court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor’s potential liability to the plaintiff, but it must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to be responsible for the same injury. Potential liability for indemnity to a nonsettling defendant is an important consideration for the trial court in determining whether to approve a settlement by an alleged tortfeasor. [Citation.]” Id. at 166.

Here, although there is no opposition, the court considered the Tech-Bilt factors as applied to the settlement between plaintiff and moving defendants.

This case arises out of a multi-car motor vehicle accident on June 18, 2015.

First, as to a rough approximation of plaintiff’s total recovery, plaintiff’s is claiming past medical expenses of $161,901 and pain and suffering. He also contends that he will require future surgery.

Second, as to moving defendants’ proportionate liability, moving defendants contend that Abrahamian was travelling through an intersection and defendant Shaw was making a left hand turn, when they collided with each other. The force of the collision caused their vehicles to collide with plaintiff, whose vehicle was stopped at a red light. Abrahamian contends that Shaw took an unsafe left hand turn against a yellow light. Shaw contends that Abrahamian was speeding. Plaintiff testified that he saw that Abrahamian had a green light when he approached the intersection and that it turned yellow when he entered the intersection. Moving defendants assert that Shaw began her left turn against a yellow light. Hartoonian is statutorily liable as the registered owner of Abrahamian’s vehicle.

Third, as to the amount paid in settlement, moving defendants agreed to settle for $25,000.

Fourth, as to the allocation of settlement proceeds, there is only one plaintiff.

Fifth, the court recognizes that defendants should pay less in settlement than if they were found liable after a trial.

Sixth, as to defendants’ financial condition and insurance policy limits, defendants’ tendered the applicable policy limit. According to defendants’ declarations, they do not have assets of their own to contribute to the settlement.

Seventh, there is no evidence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the other defendant. Defendants contend that the settlement was reached at arm’s length negotiations between counsel.

After considering the Tech-Bilt factors, the court finds and determines that the settlement entered into between plaintiff and moving defendants was made in good faith within the meaning of CCP § 877.6. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED.

The court orders that any joint tortfeasor or co-obligor to this action is hereby barred from initiating or maintaining any claims against defendants Narek David Abrahamian and Astghik Hartoonian.

The cross-complaint filed by Mary Shaw against moving defendants is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 9, 2018

_____________________________

Dennis J. Landin

Judge of the Superior Court

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