is OVERRULED as to both asserted causes of action. Upon reviewing the SAC’s allegations and the Court’s 4-26-18 Minute Order that sustained a previous Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint, the Court finds the SAC’s declaratory relief and quiet title causes of action are sufficiently plead at the Demurrer stage. The Court generally agrees with Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendants’ arguments pertain primarily to the ultimate merits of Plaintiffs’ claims rather than the threshold question of whether the SAC sufficiently pleads a cause of action. The parties are neighbors who dispute the scope/width of an easement running along Grandview Dr. in Woodside, Ca. Although the SAC asserts several legal theories as to why its width should be roughly 10-18 feet (consistent with the width of the road) rather than 50-feet (as apparently referenced in several of the recorded grant deeds at issue), Plaintiffs’ asserted claims withstand the Demurrer so long as the alleged facts support any legal theory on which the quiet title and declaratory relief claims may be based. Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1167.

First, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ adverse possession/prescriptive easement claim is sufficiently plead. SAC, ¶¶ 46-47; Vieira Enterprises v. McCoy (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1057; Popovich v. O’Neal (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 553. Regardless of what easement the grant deeds in question may have conveyed, an easement’s scope/width can be altered through adverse possession/prescriptive easement. Code Civ. Proc. § 321 et. seq. The SAC alleges Plaintiffs’ predecessors erected a fence/partition that apparently blocked/inhibited access to the disputed portion of the easement—that is, it allegedly permitted access only to the paved road and about three feet of land immediately adjoining the road, but not the entire 50-foot expanse. ¶¶ 46-47. While Plaintiff may or may not be able to ultimately prove the elements for adverse possession (requirements such as “open and notorious,” “hostile,” “substantial enclosure,” etc.), enough facts are alleged at the pleadings stage to state a claim. Defendants cite Vieira Enterprises for the proposition that as a matter of law, an erected fence by itself cannot support an adverse possession claim. The Vieira decision, however, did not a pleadings motion; it involved an appellate court’s review of a Judgment following a trial, based on evidence. Whether Plaintiffs’ prescriptive easement claim here will have sufficient evidentiary support cannot be decided on Demurrer.

The SAC also pleads enough facts to support the asserted claims based on theories of abandonment and/or estoppel principles. It alleges that all Defendants and/or their predecessorsin-interest failed to object, over the course of years, to successful applications to the Town for building permits that encroached on the alleged 50-foot easement. SAC ¶34. Plaintiffs contend that regardless of whether a particular Defendant applied for such a permit as to their specific property is not dispositive, because their failure to object to object to such encroachments into the 50-foot alleged easement over a long period of time evidences an intent/decision to abandon the claimed easement. The SAC alleges many such permits were approved without variances, because the Deputy Town Attorney affirmed a 2012 ruling by the Town Attorney that the easement’s scope is limited to the width of the paved road, rather than the asserted 50 feet. SAC, ¶¶38, 39, Ex. N, O. The SAC further alleges that the portion of the alleged 50-foot easement beyond the 10-18 foot road has not been used for approximately 100 years, that Plaintiffs purchased their property with plans to build on the disputed portion of the property, and have applied to the Town for a permit to do so, all in alleged reliance on Defendants’ apparent abandonment and/or waiver of any rights to an easement greater than the 10-18 feet in width. SAC, ¶¶14, 33-35, 38-39. Without passing on the ultimate merit of these abandonment and estoppel arguments, and while they may be difficult to prove, the Court finds the SAC alleges sufficient facts to support these arguments.

Given the foregoing, the Court need not reach Plaintiffs’ alternative argument regarding alleged ambiguity in the relevant grant deeds. Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at 1167.

Defendants’ Demurrer based on alleged uncertainty (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(f)), which is not sufficiently argued/explained in the moving papers, is OVERRULED as to both causes of action. A demurrer for uncertainty generally will be sustained only where the complaint is so poorly drafted that the defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her. Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 (1993). Defendants have not sufficiently articulated the alleged uncertainty here, and the Court finds the SAC’s allegations are adequately plead.

Contrary to Defendants’ contention, the SAC appears verified. Code Civ. Proc. § 761.020; see last page to SAC.

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice of the 5-8-15 recorded Grant Deed is GRANTED. Evid. Code § 452(c).

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.

17-CIV-00361 STEVE PETERSON, ET AL. VS. TERILYNN LANGSEF, ET AL.

STEVE PETERSON TERILYNN LANGSEF
LOUIS A. BASILE DOMINIC V. SIGNOROTTI

HEARING ON DEMURRER TENTATIVE RULING:

On the Court’s own motion, the hearing on Defendants Louise Addis (Doe 8), et. al.’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs Steve Peterson’s and Rachelle Nichols’ Second Amended Complaint (SAC), filed 620-18, is continued to Oct. 5, 2018 at 9 a.m. in the Law & Motion Department.

Demurrers have been filed by several different Defendants in this case. The rationale set forth in the Court’s ruling on the Demurrer filed by co-Defendants Scott Allan Larson, et. al., which is set for a hearing on 9-10-18, may apply to the arguments asserted by the Defendants Louise Addis et. al. The Louise Addis et. al. Defendants are requested to review the Court’s 9-10-18 ruling on the Demurrer filed by co-Defendants Larson et. al. If they believe their Demurrer should be taken off calendar in light of the Court’s prior ruling(s), the Court requests that they contact the Court to do so.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.