2018-00224835-CU-PA

Shakuntala Singh vs. Abid Ali

Nature of Proceeding: Motion Contesting Good Faith Settlement Determination

Filed By: Woller, John S.

Defendant Abid Ali’s (“Ali”) Motion Contesting Good Faith Settlement Determination is denied.

The Court finds the settlement to be in good faith. CCP 877.6.

This action arises out of an automobile accident in which plaintiff Shakuntala Singh (“Singh”) was a passenger in her own vehicle being driven by Ali. The parties were involved in a two vehicle accident at the intersection of SR 16 and Eagles Nest Road in Sacramento. Cross defendant Gregory S. Lagoda was driving a vehicle on Highway 16 that hit plaintiff’s vehicle as plaintiff was proceeding through the intersection. Plaintiff alleges that Ali failed to stop completely and proceeding through the intersection in a negligent manner. Ali contends that he stopped the vehicle at the intersection stop sign, and was thereafter struck in the intersection by Lagoda as Ali proceeded through the intersection. Ali contends he had the “right of way” and that co-defendant failed to yield.

Plaintiff’s Complaint names Lagoda, Suyunshaliyev (owner of Lagoda’s vehicle), and Ali as defendants. Plaintiff’s MediCal lien is $102,350.91. Lagoda and Suyunshalliyev settled for their respective policy limits of $50,000 each, for a total settlement with plaintiff in the amount of $100,000.

Ali contests the settlement, contending there has not been sufficient discovery to determine whether the settlement is in good faith. Ali contends that the terms of the settlement are vague and that he has not seen the settlement agreement. Ali contends plaintiff has been evasive as to the facts concerning the accident. Ali contends that there is no evidence that the settlement reflects payment of the co-defendants’ policy limits

In opposition, plaintiff Singh states that the settlement is reasonable because Ali was at fault for the accident for proceeding across the intersection without stopping. Plaintiff contends that Lagoda told the police that he noticed at approximately 100 feet before he reached the intersection that Ali was driving through the intersection at 10 miles per hour and that there was nothing he could do to avoid the accident. Plaintiff contends that settling parties’ proportionate liability is proportionate to their settlement and that $100,000 is within the ballpark of reasonableness even if plaintiff’s total approximate recovery may reach $1,000,000. Ali has been provided the Declaration Sheets for the defendants’ respective insurance policies showing their $50,000 policy limits, as well as a copy of the settlement agreement and a copy of the MediCal lien. (Declaration of Judge Exs. A and B)

Plaintiff also contends Lagoda’s carrier has previously settled Ali’s claim against Lagoda for Lagoda’s $50,000 policy limit, at a time when Lagoda was represented by former counsel. Although Geico’s $50,000 check was cashed, the release was never sent back to Geico. (Declaration of Judge Ex. C)

The motion is also opposed by settling defendants, who also join in Singh’s opposition. Settling defendants have attached a copy of the CHP report that found Ali to be responsible for the accident for failing to yield the right of way.

In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal. 3d. 488, 494, the California Supreme Court recognized the strong policy favoring settlement of lawsuits and established a standard for determining when a settlement is made in good faith. The California Supreme Court laid out the analysis that should be employed by courts when evaluating a settlement under CCP § 877.6. The following factors are to be considered by the court when determining if settlement was made in good-faith:

1. A rough approximation of the plaintiffs total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability.

2. The amount paid in the settlement.
3. The allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs.
4. The financial conditions and insurance policy limits of the settling defendants.
5. The existence of collusion, fraud or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of non-settling defendants. Ibid., at 499.

The proportionate liability of a settling defendant is a critical factor. “The ultimate determinant of good faith is whether the settlement is grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would estimate the settlor’s liability to be.” City of Grand Terrace v Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1262. Even

after carefully weighing these elements, the judge is not expected to calculate the “reasonable range” with precision. “An educated guess is the best a judge can do when deciding whether a settlement is made in good faith.” No. County Contractor’s Assoc. v. Touchstone Ins. Servs. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1095. Furthermore, the Court must determine, based on the evidence presented, “whether the settlement is grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would estimate the settlor’s liability to be.” City of Grand Terrace v. Sup. Ct. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1262.

Where, as here, good faith is contested, the settling party is required to make a sufficient evidentiary showing of all the Tech Bilt factors. City of Grand Terrace v Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1262. Once the settling party has presented a prima facie showing of good faith by addressing the Tech-Bilt factors, the nonsettling defendant has the burden of proving that the settlement is out of the ballpark. Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., supra, 38 Cal.App.3d at pp. 499-500.

Settling parties and plaintiff have presented evidence of their policy limits and evidence that Ali caused the accident by failing to yield the right of way. The facts of the accident, even under Ali’s set of facts, establish that he did not have the right of way at the time of the accident, even if he did stop at the stop sign. Ali is therefore primarily liable for the accident. The 100,000 settlement, in light of settling defendants minimal degree of fault, is well within the ballpark of reason. Ali has not met his burden of proof to show that the settlement is “out of the ballpark” under the Tech-Bilt factors.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Counsel for moving party is directed to contact counsel for opposing party forthwith and advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure. If counsel for moving party is unable to contact counsel for opposing party prior to hearing, counsel for moving party shall be available at the hearing, in person or by telephone, in the event opposing party appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

Cross-Defendant Lagoda shall prepare a formal order for the Court’s signature pursuant to C.R.C. 3.1312.