18-CIV-00308 DENNISON V. RAVAL, ET AL. VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., ET AL.

DENNISON V. RAVAL WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
PRO/per ADAM N BARASCH

HEARING ON DEMURRER TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

The claims asserted by Plaintiffs against the demurring Defendants are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. That rule has been set forth as follows:

“‘The doctrine of res judicata rests upon the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated, or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and vexation of his opponent. Public policy and the interest of litigants alike require that there be an end to litigation.’ ” (Citizens for Open Access etc. Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Assn. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1065, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 77.) “[R]es judicata benefits both the parties and the courts because it ‘seeks to curtail multiple litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted effort and expense in judicial administration.’ ” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 897, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 51 P.3d 297.)

“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a valid, final judgment on the merits is a bar to a subsequent action by parties or their privies on the same cause of action…. In California, a ‘cause of action’ is defined by the ‘primary right’ theory. ‘The most salient characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible: the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action.’ . . . In particular, the primary right theory provides that a cause of action consists of (1) a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, (2) a corresponding duty devolving upon the defendant, and (3) a delict or wrong done by the defendant which consists of a breach of the primary right…. ‘ “If the matter was within the scope of the action, related to the subject matter and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is conclusive on it…. The reason for this is manifest. A party cannot by negligence or design withhold issues and litigate them in consecutive actions. Hence the rule is that the prior judgment is res judicata on matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated or litigable….”’” (Amin v. Khazindar (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 582, 589–590, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, citations

October 9, 2018 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 9 Judge: HONORABLE SUSAN GREENBERG, Department 3 ________________________________________________________________________ omitted.)

“The fact that different forms of relief are sought in the two lawsuits is irrelevant, for if the rule were otherwise, ‘litigation finally would end only when a party ran out of counsel whose knowledge and imagination could conceive of different theories of relief based upon the same factual background.’ … ‘[U]nder what circumstances is a matter to be deemed decided by the prior judgment? Obviously, if it is actually raised by proper pleadings and treated as an issue in the cause, it is conclusively determined by the first judgment. But the rule goes further. If the matter was within the scope of the action, related to the subject-matter and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is conclusive on it despite the fact that it was not in fact expressly pleaded or otherwise urged…. “… [A]n issue may not be thus split into pieces. If it has been determined in a former action, it is binding notwithstanding the parties litigant may have omitted to urge for or against it matters which, if urged, would have produced an opposite result….” ’ ” (Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto. Club v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 177, 181–182, 257 Cal.Rptr. 37, citations & italics omitted.)

“‘In California the phrase “cause of action” is often used indiscriminately … to mean counts which state [according to different legal theories] the same cause of action….’ … But for purposes of applying the doctrine of res judicata, the phrase ‘cause of action’ has a more precise meaning: The cause of action is the right to obtain redress for a harm suffered, regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal theory (common law or statutory) advanced…. ‘[T]he “cause of action” is based upon the harm suffered, as opposed to the particular theory asserted by the litigant…. Even where there are multiple legal theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury gives rise to only one claim for relief. “Hence a judgment for the defendant is a bar to a subsequent action by the plaintiff based on the same injury to the same right, even though [the plaintiff] presents a different legal ground for relief.” …’ Thus, under the primary rights theory, the determinative factor is the harm suffered. When two actions involving the same parties seek compensation for the same harm, they generally involve the same primary right.” (Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 798, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 806, 230 P.3d 342, citations omitted.)

Villacres v. ABM Indus. Inc., 189 Cal. App. 4th 562, 575–77, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 398, 408–10 (2010).

The issues raised in this matter were litigated, or could have been litigated, in Plaintiffs’ 2013 action against Defendant Wells Fargo and NDEX West (CIV 520635). As in those proceedings, Plaintiffs’ claims in the present action stem from the allegation that Defendants are barred from engaging in foreclosure proceedings because they are not lawful holders of a beneficial interest in Plaintiffs’ Deed of Trust. Indeed, in the present action, Plaintiffs assert that “the purchase mortgage on the Property, the debt or obligation evidenced by the Note and the Deed of Trust executed by Plaintiffs in favor of the original lender was not properly assigned and/or transferred to Defendants operating the pooled mortgage funds,” and that “as of the date of the filing of this Complaint, the Deed of Trust had not been legally assigned to any other party or entity.” [FAC, ¶¶ 26, 27] Plaintiffs further assert that “any assignment of a Deed of Trust without proper transfer of the obligation that it secures, is a legal nullity.” [FAC, ¶ 28]

Plaintiffs received a judgment on the merits in CIV 520635 when Defendant Wells Fargo’s demurrers to Plaintiffs’ causes of action for violation of Civil Code § 2923.6, wrongful foreclosure, and violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 were sustained without leave to amend for failure to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [CIV 520635; 3/17/14 Order on Wells Fargo’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint; 6/25/14 Order on Wells Fargo’s Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint] Plaintiffs attempted to re-litigate these claims in their 2016 lawsuit against the demurring Defendants (16-CIV-01562), and seek to do so again in the present action. Each of the demurring Defendants in the present case is identical to, or in privity with, the defendants in Plaintiffs’ 2013 action. As a result, Plaintiffs’ claims against the demurring Defendants are barred by res judicata.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, counsel for Defendants shall prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.