Motion for Summary Judgment and/or SAI

Tentative Ruling: Given the Dismissals filed by Plaintiff on February 24, 2014, the only remaining claim against Defendants is the Third COA for Defamation. As the Court finds insufficient evidence to demonstrate malice, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

The Court notes, initially, that Defendants sufficiently demonstrated the application of the “common interest privilege” articulated in Civil Code section 47(c). Mr. Quan, a Defendant in this action and Senior Vice President of Operations at Quinn Company (¶1 of Quan Dec.), declares that the managers of the Power Systems Division had an interest in knowing the reasons for Plaintiff’s termination, as the termination affected the staffing and ongoing projects in that Division. (¶8 of Quan Dec.) Likewise, Mr. Quan declares “it would have been important for [him] as the Interim General Manager, to advise the management of the Division of the reasons for Mr. Kloepfer’s termination to assure them that managers are not terminated for arbitrary reasons and to remind them of the importance Quinn places on the integrity of its leadership.” (¶8 of Quan Dec.) Finally, Mr. Quan declares that Cody DeCamp was Quinn’s Director of Human Resources and had an interest in the termination of employees from Quinn. (¶9 of Quan Dec.)

Plaintiff does not dispute this testimony. Similarly, Plaintiff provides no argument, demonstrating the alleged defamatory statements were not made between individuals with a “common interest.”

Additionally, while Plaintiff’s Opposition references further statements made to Blake Quinn (the owner of Quinn Company) and Raymond Smith (Engineering Services Manager), these statements cannot take this claim outside the “common interest” privilege as: (1) Plaintiff concedes Blake Quinn is the owner of Quinn Company and, necessarily, the owner has a common interest in the termination of his employees; and (2) Plaintiff concedes Raymond Smith was a Manager at Quinn Company (and, thus, Quan’s testimony appears to apply).

Regardless, as the case law indicates, generally, that statements of this nature, made between an employer and employee, are privileged, the privilege applies absent evidence of malice. (King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 440.) Further, pursuant to Jackson v. Paramount Pictures Corp. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 10, Summary Judgment is a favored remedy, where there is an insufficient showing of malice to warrant submission of that issue to the jury. (Id. at 14-15.)

Here, Plaintiff relies on testimony indicating “Mr. Quan had issues with [Plaintiff’s] involvement in two projects.” (¶7 of Kloepfer Dec.) More specifically, Plaintiff indicates that: (1) Mr. Quan was “fearful” of a “Califco project” and eventually caused Quinn Power Systems to pull out of the transaction. (¶8 of Kloepfer Dec.); and (2) Mr. Quan initially told Plaintiff to purchase 5 generators, but later changed his mind and instructed another employee to purchase 10. (¶9 of Kloepfer Dec.)

Based on the above, Plaintiff concludes Mr. Quan “appeared to be looking for a way to terminate [Plaintiff] based on alleged performance or some other grounds.” (¶10 of Kloepfer Dec.)

Significantly, neither of the anecdotes offered by Plaintiff demonstrate “hatred or ill will,” sufficient to indicate malice. (Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 686, 729.)

Likewise, Plaintiff’s testimony that Mr. Quan stated “I have only had to speak with two people regarding their expenditures, and you are the second one,” (¶12 of Kloepfer Dec.) fails to demonstrate “hatred or ill-will.”

While Plaintiff asserts malice can be inferred, by virtue of the fact that Defendant provided any reasons for termination, when Plaintiff was an at-will employee, this assertion does not appear to be supported by case law.

Indeed, if Plaintiff’s position was correct, it would not be true that “an employer’s statements to employees regarding the reasons for termination of another employee generally are privileged.” (King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 440.)

Last, as Plaintiff concedes that: “Quan did not believe that Kloepfer had been honest with him with respect to the vehicles he rented during the June Business Trips and believed that Kloepfer had tried to hide the fact that he rented three luxury vehicles,” (See SSUF No. 465), Plaintiff cannot assert an inference of malice on the basis Quan knew the statements to be untrue.

Based on all of the above, Plaintiff has produced insufficient evidence of malice, to justify submission of this issue to a jury. Thus, Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

The Court rules as follows, on the Evidentiary Objections submitted by Defendants:

Objections to the Declaration of Joel W. Baruch:

· OVERRULED: Nos. 2-7;

· SUSTAINED: No. 1.

Objections to the Declaration of Hans Kloepfer:

· OVERRULED: Nos. 2, 3-15 and 17-22.

· SUSTAINED: Nos. 2 and 16.