2011-00096116-CU-OE
Wendy L. Williams vs. IL Fornaio America Corporation
Nature of Proceeding:
Filed By:
Motion to Strike
Case, Hope

Defendant Il Fornaio America Corporation’s Motion to Strike portions of the 1st amended complaint is granted, with leave to amend.
Plaintiff Wendy Williams (“Plaintiff) worked as a restaurant server for Il Fornaio from
October, 2008 to December, 2009. Her putative class action lawsuit asserts various
wage and hour employment claims.

Defendant contends that the class definition and subclass definitions are impermissibly
vague and not ascertainable and seeks to strike those allegations. Defendant also
specifically challenges the definition of the sub-class of employees who were required
to wear uniforms, which is defined as ” All Class Members who received a uniform
(hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Indemnification Subclass A.”); (FAC 41(g))
Class certification “requires a class definition that is precise, objective and presently
ascertainable.” Global Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Superior Court (2003)113
Cal.App.4th 836, 858. In attempting to define an ascertainable class, the goal is to
use terminology that will convey sufficient meaning to enable persons hearing it to
determine whether they are members of the class plaintiffs wish to represent. The
putative class representative has the burden to describe an ascertainable class
identifiable through “specific and objective criteria” without “unreasonable expense or
time.” Sevidal v. Target Corp.(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 95, 918-19. Courts reject
certification where “plaintiff offers no means by which only those class members who
have claims can be identified from those who should not be included in the class.” Id.
at 921.

In opposition, plaintiff concedes the propriety of the motion except as to one sub-class
definition. Plaintiff contends that the sub-class concerning persons who received
uniforms is sufficiently ascertainable and not subject to being stricken.

Plaintiff has proffered a proposed 2nd amended complaint that she contends cures all
defects in the class and sub-class definitions except the alleged defect concerning the
uniform subclass. Plaintiff contends that the uniform policy based on job titles renders
the sub-class easily ascertainable. Plaintiff contends that all employees who received
uniforms which required special cleaning could have been subject to paying out of
pocket for the cleaning that was required. However, Plaintiff’s proposed Second
Amended Complaint contains the same definition of the sub-class as the FAC. (SAC ¶
41(g))

Plaintiff contends that all persons who received a uniform should be in the sub-class
because uniforms were required to be cleaned. Plaintiff contends that whether or not
a particular employee was required to spend money to clean the uniform goes only to
the issue of damages. The Court disagrees. The definition of the subclass as those
who received uniforms includes those who did not incur any expense that the
employer is required to reimburse. The subclass cannot include persons who suffered
no injury.

The Court agrees with defendant’s argument that the umbrella class definition is too
broad because it includes persons who do not belong to any sub-class and therefore
are persons who were not damaged and do not claim to have been harmed. The
umbrella class cannot be defined to include persons who do not allege any cause of
action against defendant.

Plaintiff should be permitted to amend the class definition. See, e.g. Marler v. E.M.
Johansing, LLC, (2011) 199 Cal. App. 4th 1450, 1462. Plaintiff may file and serve a 2nd amended complaint that cures all of the defects on or before April 14, 2014.

Response to be filed and served within 20 days of service of the 2nd Amended
Complaint, 25 days if the amended complaint is served by mail.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule
3.1312 or further notice is required.