Case Name: Holly Wright, et al. v. Paul Alexander Da Silva, et al.

Case No.: 16CV296446

I. Background
II.
Plaintiffs Holly Wright, Richard Wright III, Jeremy Wright by and through his guardian ad litem Dan Snyder, and Arvelle Lanch (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against defendants Paul Alexander Da Silva, Joe Da Silva, Da Silva Dairy Farms, LP, Da Silva Dairy Management, Inc., American Honda Motor Co., Inc., Capitol Honda, and UAG Capitol, Inc. dba Capitol Honda for injuries arising out of a car accident. Paul Da Silva is an owner, partner, employee, and agent of Da Silva Dairy Farms, LP and Da Silva Dairy Management, Inc. Joe Da Silva, who was substituted as Doe #2, is an agent, servant, or employee of other defendants and ratified their actions.

On or about June 16, 2014, Paul Alexander Da Silva (“Paul Da Silva”), while acting in the course and scope of his employment by Da Silva Dairy Farms, LP, drove through a red traffic signal directly facing him without braking or swerving. He collided with the vehicle occupied by Holly Wright, Richard Wright III, Jeremy Wright (“Jeremy”), and decedents Ashleigh Wright and Curtis Lanch. As a result, Ashleigh Wright and Curtis Lanch died.

Paul Da Silva has a driving record preceding this collision which includes multiple DUIs, reckless driving, multiple accidents, and revocation(s) and/or suspension(s) of his driving privilege. Joe Da Silva and Da Silva Dairy Farms, LP knew of his driving record.

Plaintiffs assert the following causes of action: (1) Negligence (against Paul Da Silva, Joe Da Silva, Da Silva Dairy Management, Inc. and Da Silva Dairy Farms, LP); (2) Negligence (against American Honda Motor Co., Inc., Capitol Honda, and UAG Capitol, Inc. dba Capitol Honda); (3) Strict Products Liability (against American Honda Motor Co., Inc., Capitol Honda, and UAG Capitol, Inc. dba Capitol Honda); and (4) Breach of Express Warranty (against American Honda Motor Co., Inc., Capitol Honda, and UAG Capitol, Inc. dba Capitol Honda).

There are two discovery motions currently before the Court. The first is Da Silva Dairy Management, Inc. and Da Silva Dairy Farms, LP’s (collectively “Defendants”) motion to quash or modify deposition subpoenas for production of business records. The second is Jeremy’s motion to compel production of documents at a deposition and compel further deposition testimony.

II. Defendants’ Motion to Quash
III.
Defendants move to quash and/or modify the subpoena served on non-party Chase Bank pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, which authorizes a court to quash entirely or modify subpoenas and “make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right to privacy of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)

The subpoena seeks all documents from Chase Bank during the period of January 1, 2009 to June 1, 2015, concerning a specific credit card account held by Da Silva Dairy Farms, LP, including but not limited to signature cards, account statements, and debit or credit charges.

Defendants argue the subpoena is overbroad in time and scope, violates their and third parties’ constitutional right to privacy, and discloses trade secrets.

As a preliminary matter, Defendants request that the Court strike Plaintiffs’ opposition to this motion because they failed to serve it in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (c). This section provides that an opposition papers be served via personal delivery, express mail, or other means “reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to the other party or parties not later than the close of the next business day after the time the opposing papers [] are filed.” Defendants contend that Plaintiffs served their opposition via US Mail, which is not an authorized method of service, on January 23, 2019. As a result, they did not receive it until January 28th, one day before their reply was due. (Benkoski Obj. Decl., ¶¶ 2-5.) Defendants contend they were prejudiced by their inability to prepare a substantive reply brief due to Plaintiffs’ failure to serve the opposition in accordance with section 1005, subdivision (c). Defendants therefore request that the Court strike the opposition.

The Court declines to strike the opposition and instead will continue the hearing to give Defendants an opportunity to prepare a substantive reply. Their reply brief will be due at least five court days before the new hearing date. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).)

The motion is CONTINUED to March 5, 2019 at 9:00am in Department 19.

IV. Jeremy’s Motion to Compel
V.
Jeremy’s motion pertains to the deposition of Dennis Da Silva, Defendants’ custodian of records. Jeremy moves to compel the production of documents requested in the deposition notice and moves to compel further deposition testimony from Dennis Da Silva. Jeremy also requests sanctions in connection with the motion. Defendants oppose the motion.

The motion is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480, which authorizes a party to move the court for an order compelling the production of documents or that a deponent answer a question if he or she fails to produce the documents or answer a question at the deposition. The parties’ counsel met and conferred at the deposition and agreed on the record that they were at an impasse. Jeremy then filed the instant motion to compel.

A. Timeliness of Motion
B.
As a preliminary matter, Defendants contend the motion must be denied because it is untimely. A motion made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480, subdivision (b) must be made “no later than 60 days after the completion of the record of the deposition[.]” Defendants argue the motion is untimely because it was filed more than 60 days after the record was completed. Particularly, Defendants contend the motion had to be filed by December 13th but was not, as the docket reflects that the motion was rejected on December 3rd and December 13th.

The record of the deposition is deemed complete when the court reporter sent written notice to the deponent and the parties that the transcript was available. Section 2025.520, subdivision (a), requires a court reporter to do so: “If the deposition testimony is stenographically recorded, the deposition officer shall send written notice to the deponent and to all parties attending the deposition when the original transcript of the testimony for each session of the deposition is available for reading, correcting, and signing, unless the deponent and the attending parties agree on the record [otherwise].” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.520, subd. (a).)

Defendants’ argument is not persuasive. According to the parties, the court reporter completed the deposition transcript on October 4th. Thus, the deadline was actually December 3rd. The Court’s docket reflects that Jeremy did in fact successfully file this motion on December 3rd. The December 3rd rejection concerns a filing by the attorneys for American Honda Motor Co. and UAG Capitol, Inc. The December 13th rejection relates to Jeremy’s oversight in reserving a hearing date.

Consequently, the motion is timely and the Court will reach the merits of the motion.

C. Production of Documents
D.
Jeremy moves to compel the production of documents they specifically requested Dennis Da Silva produce at his deposition. For context, Jeremy’s amended deposition notice contained 36 requests for production (“RPD”). Prior to the deposition on October 2, 2018, Defendants served written objections to all the RPD except RPD No. 36. At the deposition, Defendants did not produce any responsive records and their attorney asserted, on the record, the same objections to the RPD as raised in their written objection.

1. Good Cause
2.
In the context of a motion to compel further responses relative to an inspection demand, the applicable statute mandates that the moving party preliminarily establish good cause for the discovery sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b).) In contrast, Section 2025.480 does not specifically contain a good cause requirement. That said, Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, which also addresses the failure to produce documents in compliance with a deposition notice, does include a good cause requirement. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude a showing of good cause must be made to compel document production under Section 2025.480.

To satisfy its burden of demonstrating good cause for the discovery sought, the moving party must make “a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (Glenfeld Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) Discovery is allowed for any matters not privileged that are relevant to the subject matter involved in the action or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Information is relevant to the subject matter if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) “Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Ibid.) Courts liberally construe the relevance standard and any doubts as to whether a request seeks information within the scope of discovery are generally resolved in favor of discovery. (Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.)

RPD Nos. 1-2, 4-6, 8-10, 12-14, 16-18, 20-22, 24-26, 28-30, 32-34, and 36 all request documents pertaining to the ownership, possession, or rental of certain properties on Defendants’ land between January 1, 2013 to present. RPD Nos. 3, 7, 11, 15, 19, 23, 27, 31, and 35 all request documents pertaining to utility bills and payments for certain properties on Defendants’ land between January 1, 2013 to present.

Jeremy argues that all the RPD are relevant to establish his alter ego allegations, namely that Defendants are the alter ego of Joe Da Silva for the purposes of establishing his liability. Jeremy contends the documents would demonstrate that personal assets are indiscriminately used for business purposes since Defendants house employees and/or family members at these properties. Jeremy maintains that such comingling would be indicative of Joe Da Silva misusing personal assets and a lack of separation between personal and business assets.

Jeremy has adequately established good cause for these documents. They could be a valuable source of information regarding whether Defendants are the alter ego of Joe Da Silva. Thus, the information is relevant to assisting Jeremy in evaluating his case for the purpose of establishing liability against Joe Da Silva.

Defendants’ argument in opposition does not support a contrary result. Defendants contend Jeremy fails to establish good cause because the requested documents do not concern Paul Da Silva’s activities on the night of the accident. Defendants’ argument is misguided because Jeremy is not limited to requesting documents only concerning the alleged tortfeasor’s actions at the incident. The sole issue in this case is not Paul Da Silva’s activities when the accident occurred. The relevance standard in determining if a party has good cause for requesting certain documents is broad. Jeremy may seek discovery of information that is relevant to the subject matter if it might reasonably assist him in evaluating his case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at 1546.) Here, Jeremy is seeking documents could assist him in determining if his alter ego allegations are supported by evidence.

Consequently, Jeremy has established good cause for RPD Nos. 1-36.

3. Objections
4.
Defendants objected to RPD Nos. 1-35 on the grounds they violate their and third parties’ right to privacy, are overbroad in time and scope, present an undue burden, are irrelevant, and concern financial information and assets that are not discoverable pre-trial. Jeremy asserts the objections lack merit. Defendants have the burden of justifying their objections. (See Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

As a preliminary matter, there is a question regarding whether Defendants properly objected to RPD No. 36. For context, Defendants failed to include a written objection to RPD No. 36. In their opposition, Defendants contend this was a clerical error and it intended to assert the same objection raised as to the other RPD. The written objections are the basis for all their objections since they “attached” them to the deposition transcript. (See Defilippis Decl., Exhibit 4.) Since Defendants failed to assert an objection to RPD No. 36 at the deposition and there was no actual objection to this request in the attached written objection, Defendant waived their objections to RPD No. 36. (See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 273.)

With regards to their asserted objections, Defendants do not attempt to substantiate their undue burden or temporal overbreadth objections. Thus, these objections are overruled. And as previously discussed, the requested records are relevant to the subject matter at issue. As a result, Defendants’ relevance objection is also overruled.

a. Privacy
b.
Defendants argue RPD Nos. 1-35 violate their privacy as well as the privacy of third parties. Defendants contend the RPD violate the right to privacy because they seek information about both their and third parties’ financial records.

While not rooted in the constitution, corporations nevertheless have a general right to privacy. (SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 741, 755-756.) “The corporate right to privacy is a lesser right than that held by human beings and is not considered a fundamental right.” (Ibid.) Because the corporate privacy right is not constitutionally protected, the determination of whether a document production request infringes that right is resolved by a balancing test. (Ibid.) “The discovery’s relevance to the subject matter of the pending dispute and whether the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is balanced against the corporate right of privacy. Doubts about relevance generally are resolved in favor of permitting discovery.” (Ibid. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)

Here, Defendants are operating under the flawed premise that the RPD request financial records in the first instance. Defendants attempt to classify the requested records as “real property financial records” (Opp., 4:26-27), presumably to establish that the records at issue are financial records. But the records at issue are not personal income records, subject to the right to privacy. (See Cobb v. Superior Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 543, 550.) Instead, Jeremy seeks documents related to Defendants’ ownership, rental, and possession of certain properties, as well as records related to utility payments for those properties. In any event, Defendants do not articulate how the general right to privacy in its corporate affairs outweighs Jeremy’s interest in determining if Joe Da Silva is an alter ego of Defendants, or how the records at issue implicate third parties’ right to privacy. As such, their position is unsubstantiated. (See People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282 [a point asserted without authority in support is without foundation and requires no discussion].)

Consequently, this objection is overruled. With that said, although Defendants did not properly substantiate their objection, the Court is sensitive to their concerns and will require the parties to meet and confer on the language of a protective order.

c. Overbreadth
d.
Defendants argue the RPD are overbroad in scope because they implicate matters beyond the issues in this case. Specifically, Defendant maintains that it is not clear how the real property records relate to whether Paul Da Silva acted within the course and scope of his employment. This argument is flawed.

A discovery request is overbroad if it encompasses irrelevant information but is not wholly irrelevant. (See, e.g., Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 542.) Here, Defendants takes a limited view of relevance by arguing Jeremy cannot demonstrate that the requested records concern whether Paul Da Silva acted within the course and scope of his employment. Jeremy is not limited to requesting documents relating only to that issue since it is not the sole and exclusive issue in this case. Jeremy may seek discovery of information that is relevant to the subject matter if it might reasonably assist him in evaluating his case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at 1546.) As Jeremy states in his motion, the records sought would establish whether Joe Da Silva is the alter ego of Defendants.

Consequently, the overbreadth objection is overruled as to RPD Nos. 1-35.

e. Pretrial Discovery of Financial Condition
f.
Defendants argue the RPD impermissibly seek inadmissible information relating to their wealth and assets in connection with Jeremy’s claim for punitive damages in violation of Civil Code section 3295. Defendants contend that such discovery is prohibited absent a court order. This argument is not well-taken.

Civil Code section 3295 prohibits pretrial discovery of a defendant’s financial condition to obtain evidence to support a claim for punitive damages. Here, Jeremy does not seek the discovery at issue in order to prove Defendants’ profitability or financial condition for the purpose of determining damages, but to show that Defendants are comingling their business assets with Joe Da Silva’s personal assets for their alter ego claim. The records are fundamental to Jeremy’s case and therefore, he should be permitted to obtain these records. (See Rawnsley v. Superior Court (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 86, 91 [stating that an objection made pursuant to Civil Code section 3295 lacks merit when the records sought are fundamental to a substantive claim in the lawsuit].)

Moreover, Defendant does not demonstrate how the records sought would relate to their financial condition. Although not concerning discovery as to financial condition, the court in Baxter v. Peterson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 673 stated that property ownership or rental records alone are insufficient to establish financial condition for the purposes of punitive damages. (Baxter v. Peterson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 673, 681.) The evidence must concern the value of the properties, the amount of income they generate, the extent to which they are encumbered, whether the properties are rented at a profit, or more, to concern financial condition. (Ibid.) Here, Defendants do not demonstrate that the records sought would implicate these issues.

As such, this objection lacks merit.

g. Conclusion
h.
For the foregoing reasons, Jeremy’s motion to compel production of documents as to RPD Nos. 1-36 is GRANTED, subject to a protective order. The parties are required to meet and confer on the language of the protective order and stipulate to one to address Defendants’ privacy concerns. Defendants shall produce responsive documents, without objections, upon the resumption of the deposition, which shall occur within 20 days of this Order.

E. Further Deposition Testimony
F.
Jeremy moves to compel further deposition testimony from Dennis Da Silva, Defendants’ custodian of records. For context, at Dennis Da Silva’s deposition, Jeremy’s counsel asked nine questions. In response to those nine questions, Defendant’s counsel objected on the same grounds he asserted as to the RPD and instructed Dennis Da Silva not to answer.

With regards to Question Nos. 1, 2, and 7, Jeremy’s counsel asked Dennis Da Silva if he had knowledge of certain properties owned by Defendants. As for Question No. 3, he asked Dennis Da Silva if he knows how many individual living units Defendants utilized as part of the compensation package for employees. In asking Question Nos. 4-6, Jeremy’s counsel inquired if certain properties were utilized by Defendants in some fashion. In Question No. 8, he asked how many pieces of property were occupied by Da Silva family members. Lastly, with Question No. 9, counsel asked how many employee housing units were on property utilized by Defendants.

Defendants objected to these questions on the same grounds they objected to the RPD. Defendants contend the questions violate their and third parties’ right to privacy, are overbroad in time and scope, present an undue burden, are irrelevant, and concern financial information and assets that are not discoverable pre-trial. The objecting party generally bears the burden of justifying any objections raised. (Kirkland v. Superior Court, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at 98.)

Yet again, Defendants do not attempt to substantiate their undue burden objection in their opposition. Thus, this objection is overruled. Defendants also only attempt to justify their overbreadth argument as to scope. The overbreadth objection based on temporal limitation is therefore overruled.

1. Relevance
2.
Defendants argue that Question Nos. 1-9 are irrelevant. They raise the same arguments they raised as to the RPD, arguing that the questions are irrelevant to Paul Da Silva’s activities on the night of the accident. This argument is not well-taken.

Discovery is allowed for any matters not privileged that are relevant to the subject matter involved in the action or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Information is relevant to the subject matter if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. (Gonzalez v. Superior Court, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at 1546.) “Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Ibid.) Courts liberally construe the relevance standard and any doubts as to whether a request seeks information within the scope of discovery are generally resolved in favor of discovery. (Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at 790.)

Defendants’ view of relevance is limited, since Paul Da Silva’s activities are not the sole and exclusive issue in this case. The questions at issue would aid Jeremy in determining if his alter ego allegations against Joe Da Silva are supported by evidence. Consequently, the questions are relevant.

The relevance objection is overruled.

3. Privacy
4.
Defendants argue that Question Nos. 1-9 violate their right to privacy because they seek information about their financial records and would violate the right to privacy of numerous unrelated third parties.

Jeremy contends in opposition that the questions do not implicate the right to privacy because they only concern whether Dennis Da Silva is aware of the properties and in any event, ownership records are a matter of public record. Jeremy also incorporates his alter ego arguments he made in relation to the RPD.

As previously stated, corporations have a general right to privacy. (SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at 755-756.) Because the corporate privacy right is not constitutionally protected, the determination of whether a discovery request infringes on that right is resolved by a balancing test. (Ibid.) “The discovery’s relevance to the subject matter of the pending dispute and whether the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is balanced against the corporate right of privacy. Doubts about relevance generally are resolved in favor of permitting discovery.” (Ibid. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)

Here, Defendants have not articulated any reason whatsoever for concluding that the general right to privacy in its corporate affairs would outweigh Jeremy’s interest in this case. They also state the questions concern financial records but that is simply not true. Defendants also totally fail to articulate how third party privacy rights are implicated by Question Nos. 1-9. Additionally, Jeremy has a strong interest in obtaining the requested information from Defendants because it is relevant to his alter ego allegations.

Defendants’ privacy objection is therefore overruled.

5. Overbreadth
6.
Defendants argue the questions are overbroad in scope because they implicate matters beyond the issues in this case. Preliminarily, the Court’s review of Defendants’ argument is hampered because they do not explicitly address the content of the questions but integrate their argument with their RPD argument.

A discovery request is overbroad if it encompasses irrelevant information but is not wholly irrelevant. (See, e.g., Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 542.) Here, Defendants argument focuses on the records sought and does not address the substance of Question Nos. 1-9 and how they are overbroad. As such, Defendants’ argument is not directly responsive.

As argued by Jeremy in opposition, Question Nos. 1-9 are not overbroad but calculated to provide information regarding his alter ego allegations. Jeremy is correct.

Question Nos. 1, 2, and 7 only asked Dennis Da Silva if he is familiar with certain properties, while Question Nos. 4-6 asked him if certain properties are utilized by Defendants. Question No. 8 asked Dennis Da Silva how many of Defendants’ properties were occupied by family members and Question No. 9 asked how many employee housing units are on the property utilized by Defendants. All of these questions relate to the commingling of business and personal assets, which would aid Jeremy in determining if his alter ego allegations have merit.

Consequently, the overbreadth objection is without merit.

7. Pretrial Discovery of Financial Condition
8.
Defendants argue the questions impermissibly seek inadmissible information relating to their wealth and assets in connection with its claim for punitive damages in violation of Civil Code section 3295. Defendants contend that such discovery is prohibited absent a court order. As previously stated, this argument is not well-taken.

Civil Code section 3295 prohibits pretrial discovery of a defendant’s financial condition to obtain evidence to support a claim for punitive damages. First, it is unclear how the questions relate to Defendants’ financial condition. (Baxter v. Peterson, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at 681.) Second, Jeremy is seeking this information to demonstrate that Defendants are comingling their business assets with Joe Da Silva’s personal assets. As such, the questions do not concern Defendants’ profitability or financial condition.

Accordingly, Defendants’ objection on this basis is overruled.

9. Conclusion
10.
For the foregoing reasons, Jeremy’s motion to compel further deposition testimony from Dennis Da Silva regarding Question Nos. 1-9 is GRANTED. Defendants shall produce Dennis Da Silva for further testimony for resumption of the deposition and he shall answer Question Nos. 1-9, without objections, and this shall occur within 20 days of this Order.

G. Jeremy’s Request for Sanctions
H.
Jeremy seeks an award of monetary sanctions solely against Da Silva Dairy Farms, LP in the amount of $5,460. Jeremy also requests an additional $1,800 in anticipated time for reviewing the opposition, preparing a reply, and attending the hearing.

In his moving papers, Jeremy cites Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.450 and 2025.480 as the bases for his request for sanctions. Section 2025.450 is inapplicable here because it concerns a motion to compel due to failure of a party deponent to appear or produce documents. Here, Dennis Da Silva did attend the deposition. Thus, the applicable statute is section 2025.480. That section provides that “[t]he court shall impose a monetary sanction . . . against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel an answer or production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (j).)

Jeremy prevailed in his motion to compel and Defendant did not act with substantial justification in opposing the motion. Imposition of sanctions would therefore be just.

Jeremy’s counsel seeks $5,460 total for sanctions for twelve hours of drafting and filing the motion, at a billing rate of $450 per hour. The Court considers twelve hours for drafting and filing the motion to be excessive. Although the volume of papers in connection with the Jeremy’s motion is large, the analysis within those papers is largely repetitive. Thus, twelve hours is not reasonable but five hours is, given the substance of the motion.

Jeremy’s further request for $1,800 in sanctions for anticipated time is also unreasonable. Sanctions for anticipated attorney’s fees are not allowable; sanctions may only be awarded for expenses actually incurred. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a); see also Tucker v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1563-1564.)

Accordingly, Jeremy’s request for monetary sanctions against Da Silva Dairy Farms, LP is GRANTED in the amount of $2250. Da Silva Dairy Farms, LP shall pay this sum to Jeremy’s counsel within 20 days of the Order.