Case Number: VC060276 Hearing Date: February 14, 2019 Dept: SEC

LEEDS v. LAW OFFICES OF REINO & IIDA

CASE NO.: VC060276

HEARING: 02/14/19

JUDGE: KRISTIN S. ESCALANTE

#2

TENTATIVE ORDER

Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees on appeal is GRANTED. Cal. Civ. Code §1717.

Moving Party to give notice.

Defendants’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Cal. Ev. Code §452.

Absent a statutory or contractual right to an award of fees in favor of a litigant, California follows the “American Rule,” under which each party to a lawsuit ordinarily must pay his or her own attorney fees. (CCP § 1021; Musaelian v. Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, 516.) In order to prevail on a motion for attorney’s fees, a party must establish an entitlement to fees and also support the specific amount of fees claimed. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.)

Defendants argue that the subject agreement between the parties contains a clause indicating that the prevailing party in a dispute arising from breach of the contract will be entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. The provision is located in ¶12 of the agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants, and states in pertinent part, “In the event of a dispute over any of the terms and conditions of this agreement, Leeds and Reino agree to resolve said dispute(s) through binding arbitration or mediation with the prevailing party being entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.” (Motion 1:11-14.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ entitlement to fees. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that attorney fees under Cal. Civ. Code §1717 are unavailable because the fee-sharing agreement at issue violates Professional Rule of Conduct 2-200, and is thus “illegal”.

This Court has already considered and rejected Plaintiff’s argument. In its order dated September 15, 2017, the Court ruled that Defendant is entitled to attorney fees under the contract even though the fee-splitting provisions are unenforceable. The Court reaffirms that ruling now. “It is now settled that a party entitled to attorneys fees under [Civil Code] section when the party prevails on grounds that the contract is inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable, or nonexistent, if the other party would have been entitled to attorneys fees had it prevailed.” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 863, 870.) Here, Plaintiff has presented no basis for concluding that he would not have been entitled to attorneys fees if he had prevailed. The Defendant is entitled to attorneys’ fees on appeal.

Defendants establish an entitlement to reasonable fees in the amount of $45,000.00, representing 100 hours at a $450.00 hourly rate. The Court’s determination is undertaken in the exercise of its discretion to determine whether or not rates are reasonable. (Dover Mobile Estates v. Fiber Form Products, Inc. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1494, 1501.) The Court has carefully reviewed the billing statement provided with the motion, and has made appropriate reductions in the time spent on certain procedural issues. In addition, the Court has considered the totality of the record and has determined that 100 hours is reasonable.