Case Number: BC716556 Hearing Date: March 04, 2019 Dept: 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT
RENE SEVILLE,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.
GLORIA RAMIREZ CAMACHO, ET AL.,
Defendant(s).
CASE NO: BC716556
[TENTATIVE] ORDER
Dept. 3
1:30 p.m.
March 4, 2019
Background Facts
Plaintiff, Rene Seville filed this action against Defendants, Gloria Ramirez Camacho and Faggioli Enterprises, Inc. dba Molly Maids of Burbank LSE for damages arising out of an automobile accident.
Motion to Quash
Defendants propounded subpoenas on Plaintiff’s various (seven) health care providers identified during discovery, as well as the fire department and Plaintiff’s employer. Plaintiff moves to quash the subpoenas at this time.
Initial Notes
As an initial note, Plaintiff failed to file a separate statement, as required by CRC 3.1345(5). The Court finds the moving papers adequately state the grounds upon which the motion is based, and all arguments are articulated in a manner that substantially satisfies the separate statement requirement. The Court will therefore rule on the motion on its merits.
Opposition to the motion was due on or before 2/19/19. CCP §1005(b). Defendants filed and served their opposition on 2/20/19, one day late. Compounding the problem, Defendants served the opposition by mail, in violation of §1005(c). The Court has read and considered the opposition despite the defect, but asks Defense Counsel to ensure timely filing and service of all opposition papers in the future in connection with this and other actions.
The Court has not, to date, received reply papers.
Meet and Confer
Defendants argue, in their opposition, that the motion should be granted due to Plaintiff’s failure to adequately meet and confer prior to filing the motion. While the Court always appreciates attempts to meet and confer, there is no statutory requirement to do so in connection with a motion to quash. The Court will therefore rule on the motion on its merits.
Medical Records
Eight of the subpoenas at issue is directed at Plaintiff’s medical providers. The subpoenas seek production of Plaintiff’s complete medical records, with the only limitation being a duration of ten years prior to the date of production. Plaintiff argues the subpoenas are overbroad; Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claimed injuries are sufficiently broad to justify the subpoenas.
Law Governing Discovery of Medical Records
For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement. Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. (Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301.) These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery (Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790), and again (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases. (Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 385.)
By filing a personal injury action, plaintiffs place in issue their past and present physical and/or mental conditions related to the injury sued upon. All medical and/or psychological records relating to the claimed injuries are thus discoverable. (Evidence Code §§ 996, 1016; Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 862–864.) Normally, information about medical conditions entirely different from the injury sued upon is beyond the scope of discovery. However, medical records pertaining to an unrelated condition are discoverable on a showing of “good cause” if the condition is relevant to the issue of proximate causation. (Evidence Code §999; Slagle v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1314–1315 [good cause shown by info that plaintiff was blind 6 months before accident].)
Analysis
Plaintiff does not, in her moving papers, define what injuries she sustained as a result of the accident. The only evidence in support of the motion is Plaintiff’s attorney’s declaration, and the declaration is silent concerning her claimed injuries. Plaintiff therefore provided no evidence concerning what her claimed injuries are in the lawsuit.
Defendants, in opposition, provide evidence that Plaintiff is claiming injuries to her back, lower extremities, hands, feet, toes, right shoulder, left brow ridge, and bilateral lower back, as well as headaches, insomnia, depression, isolation, and emotional upset as a result of the automobile accident.
Importantly, Plaintiff has disclosed prior similar injuries resulting from automobile accidents in 2014 and 2015, as well as a 2007 degloving injury to her left hand.
The Court finds Plaintiff’s claimed injuries are so broad that Defendants could not meaningfully restrict their request for medical records by body part. Additionally, her claimed headaches and psychological complaints are such that Defendants are entitled to discover other potential causes of the ongoing problem, especially where Plaintiff has expressly admitted some of the conditions were pre-existing prior to Defendants’ care and treatment.
The Court also finds the duration of the subpoenas (ten years prior to the date of production) to be acceptable; as noted above, at least one prior injury was sustained in 2007, and others in 2014 and 2015. The accident that forms the basis of the complaint in this case occurred in 2016.
Fire Department
Defendants also propounded a subpoena on the fire department. Exhibit E to the moving papers. The subpoena seeks productions of all documents relating to the care and treatment of Plaintiff for the past ten years. This subpoena appears to be substantially similar to the medical subpoenas, and appears to be directed to the possibility that the fire department treated Plaintiff in connection with her prior accidents/injuries. Plaintiff failed to meaningfully distinguish this subpoena from the other subpoenas, and the motion to quash this subpoena is also denied.
Employment Records
Law Governing Discovery of Employment Records
Confidential personnel files at a person’s place of employment are within a zone of privacy. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 528-530. Unlike privilege, privacy protection afforded is qualified, not absolute. In each case, the court must carefully balance the right of privacy against the need for discovery. The showing required to overcome the protection depends on the nature of the privacy right asserted; in some cases, a simple balancing test is sufficient, while in others, a compelling interest must be shown. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 34-35. In almost every case, disclosure may be ordered if a “compelling public interest” would be served thereby. John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1199. Moreover, even if the balance weighs in favor of disclosure, the scope of disclosure must be narrowly tailored. Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 640, 652-653.
Analysis
Plaintiff argues the employment records subpoena is overbroad, as it seeks production of Plaintiff’s entire personnel file. Defendants failed to address this issue in their opposition, and therefore necessarily failed to meet their burden to show the need for the employment records outweighs the right to privacy. The motion to quash the subpoena directed at Plaintiff’s employer is granted.
Sanctions
Both parties seek sanctions in connection with the motion and opposition. CCP §1987.2(a) permits the Court, in its discretion, to award sanctions in connection with a motion to quash if the Court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification.
The motion is denied as to medical records and granted as to employment records, such that neither party fully won or lost the motion. Additionally, the Court finds both parties took their positions in good faith. The Court therefore declines to impose sanctions.
d. Conclusion
The motion to quash is denied as to the subpoenas directed at Plaintiff’s medical providers, including the fire department. The motion to quash is granted as to the subpoena directed at Plaintiff’s employer. No sanctions are imposed.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.